Hungarian Election 2026

Hungary’s 2026 election represents a pivotal moment for the country with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Four Cambridge researchers with close academic and personal ties to the country discuss how we got here, what the result means, and what the future might hold.

Professor Nora Berend, Professor of European History, History Faculty / St Catharine's College

Hungarians seized the chance to rid the country of the Orbán regime and to choose Europe instead of Russia. Beyond Hungary, the resounding defeat of the poster-boy of anti-European illiberal democracy and nationalist populism has rattled the followers of the Orbán model.

Despite the near-monopoly of state media with its propaganda and fear-mongering presenting Fidesz-KDNP as the only safe choice, despite intimidation in some rural areas and what effectively amounted to buying Hungarian votes in neighbouring countries, despite the electoral system that has been repeatedly tweaked by the regime, Orbán lost, and lost big. Magyar, a former regime insider, knew how to circumvent Orbán’s propaganda.

The changes Orbán had introduced came back to bite him: with 38% of the votes, his party only received just over one-fourth of the parliamentary mandates while the opposition’s 53.63% of votes translated to over 2/3 of parliamentary seats. Further, while the opposition gained personal mandates for many of its top candidates including Péter Magyar – whose name meaning ‘Hungarian’ took on a symbolic meaning in this election – Orbán himself and others only gained seats through the party list.

With almost 80% voter participation, this was a clear mandate for change. As the journalist Péter Németh aptly put it, ‘Fidesz drowned in the Tisza’ – the name of the victorious party (an acronym for Respect-Freedom), and a river in Hungary.

Many people were sceptical of the possibility of an opposition party’s victory, and this included all the government polling institutes which – unlike independent organizations – predicted a Fidesz victory. To some extent it seems Orbán lost because he believed he was invincible. As people celebrating on the streets of Budapest put it, ‘I can’t believe it, we’ll wake up in a free country’. ‘We got our homeland back’.

That the Tisza Party won over 2/3 of the parliamentary seats (although in seven electoral districts the results are not final yet, that is unlikely to alter this outcome) is more important than the victory itself. The government will have the legal means to enact regime change. The two-thirds majority allows the party to change any laws, including the constitution, and to remove Fidesz loyalists.

Fidesz had installed its own people in public office as judges of the constitutional court, the head of the media authority, the prosecutor general, and in many other institutions. The restitution of liberal democracy, therefore, necessitates thorough ‘de-Fideszization’. Magyar has already demanded that the Fidesz-loyalist President and heads of various institutions resign. We should not forget that no left-wing party received parliamentary mandates. Orbán’s defeat, however, is cause for joy for all democrats.

Born and initially educated in Hungary, Professor Nora Berend works on medieval social and religious history, including minorities and state building. She currently works on the formation of identity in medieval and modern times. 

In 2024, she published Stephen I, the First Christian King of Hungary: From Medieval Myth to Modern Legend. The book traces the formation of medieval legends and their modern uses throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Her book At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and Pagans in Medieval Hungary c. 1000 - c. 1300 (2001) won the Gladstone Prize. She edited Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy: Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus' c. 900-1200 (2009) and co-authored Central Europe in the High Middle Ages (2014).

Dr Marietta van der Tol, Landecker Lecturer, Faculty of Divinity; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College

Hungarians are openly speaking of ‘regime change’: the complete transformation of their society. The historic election results show that regime change has finally begun. But regime change is not a moment, it is a process, and it will take time to deliver it.

Fidesz has had a firm grip on this society, and this will not only change with elections. It is a significant task to address large-scale corruption, to wean off Hungary’s energy-dependence on Russia, and to re-balance institutions after comprehensive capture by Fidesz. We are talking about major changes that are needed in the economy, in the law and the way the state is run. Meanwhile, Hungarians of course want their lives to get better, especially the schools and the hospitals, where the failure of the state has been felt so acutely.

Fidesz has made it very difficult to bring about such change. For one thing, they made the legal system more rigid. Early in its sixteen-year rule, Fidesz rewrote the constitution and passed laws that cemented its power. While they had a two-third majority, things that should have been legislated by ordinary majorities were put into cardinal laws that require a two-third majority to change.

In the meantime, they managed to change the electoral law such that it would be difficult for the opposition to ever get a two-third majority. They also put loyalists in almost every institution across the country. These people also have a lot to lose. The question is if they will think it is in their interest to work with the new Tisza government or if they choose an antagonistic approach, frustrating change at every juncture.

This is why it mattered so much to Tisza to get at least 133 seats in Parliament. For this to have succeeded, they needed to swing many constituencies outside of the cities. It is in these places that Fidesz’ grip has been most firm. People knew that breaking with Fidesz could have severe consequences for their daily lives, especially in the countryside, where poor people depend on the party’s favour for basic goods.

But clearly people had enough hope to vote Tisza in overwhelming numbers: currently they are projected 138 seats, and this number might still increase slightly after the votes are counted that were cast abroad. Where many people felt the alternative had been that Hungary became a second Belarus, they realise that this election result means change is actually possible. Yesterday, the appetite for change was delivered from across the country. Today, for Tisza and for Hungary, the work begins.

Marietta van der Tol specialises in the comparative study of politics, law and religion. Her current research project is: “Imagining Sacred Lands: the ‘Russian World’, ‘Hungarian World’, and ‘Holy Serbia’”. She recently authored Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of the Other in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires (CUP, 2025) and was editor of The Many Faces of Christianism: The 'Russian World' in Europe (2025). She teaches modules in Democratic Backsliding at the Faculty of Divinity and the Dept. of Politics and International Studies.

Elvira Viktória Tamus, PhD researcher, Faculty of History and Sidney Sussex College

The victory of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party at the parliamentary election marks the end of sixteen years of Viktor Orbán’s rule in Hungary, which has been characterised by a gradual rapprochement with Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders, frequent criticism from the EU, and tensions with war-torn Ukraine.

According to reported results, nearly 80% of eligible voters cast their ballots on 12 April. This represents the largest mandate in the history of post-socialist Hungary. Tisza is reported to have won 138 parliamentary seats, which would also constitute a record and a two-thirds majority in the legislature.

One of the most notable aspects of this result is that major protests against Orbán’s government began with student demonstrations demanding higher-quality education, as well as public reactions to child abuse scandals linked to figures associated with the Fidesz Party, which contributed to the resignation of President Katalin Novák in February 2024.

Péter Magyar held one of his first large public events in the city of Debrecen in May 2024 and the final rally of his campaign on 11 April there. Debrecen, the second-largest city in Hungary, has been a stronghold of Fidesz since 1998. According to the results, all three Fidesz candidates lost there, making the outcome particularly symbolic.

Fidesz has traditionally been strong in rural areas and among older, less urbanised populations. However, Tisza performed strongly not only in Budapest and county seats, but also in many smaller towns and villages. This suggests that Magyar’s extensive campaign – including visits to 700 settlements – reached voters who had previously been less engaged with opposition politics.

The campaign was marked by high-profile cases in which whistleblowers from the military, police, intelligence services, cybercrime units, and judicial enforcement bodies, reportedly influenced politically engaged voters.

Notably, the next parliament will include three right-wing parties, with no left-wing representation – which would be unusual in recent decades. Some analysts have expressed concern about the implications of a two-thirds majority, a threshold previously used extensively by Fidesz. Tisza requires such a majority to amend the constitution and pursue policies such as the recovery of national assets that were mismanaged or improperly transferred under previous governments.

The election results suggest that many Hungarians – particularly younger and more highly educated voters – are dissatisfied with corruption, economic stagnation, high prices, and low wages, as well as with anti-Ukraine and anti-Western rhetoric and serious problems in public services such as child protection, healthcare, and education.

Péter Magyar and Tisza politicians now face significant responsibility, and many Hungarians hope they will be able to meet the high expectations placed upon them. The main message of the election is that Hungary’s place is in Europe – always has been and always will be.

 

Elvira Tamus is Hungarian and researches sixteenth-century Hungarian and French diplomacy within the broader context of European geopolitics and great power relations. She appears as an expert contributor in the documentary Mohács – Világok Harca [Mohács – Clash of Worlds] which revisits the pivotal Battle of Mohács of 1526, when the Ottoman army under Sultan Suleiman I secured a decisive victory over the forces of Louis II of Hungary.

Elvira has written for the Hungarian Observer about The Ottoman Past and the Politics of Memory and How Child-Abuse Scandals are Changing Hungarian Politics, and for Engelsberg Ideas about Viktor Orbán’s geopolitical hedging and Hungary's long rebellion against the West. 

Dr Barnabás Szabó, Post-doctoral research associate, Centre for Geopolitics / Peterhouse

With great power comes great responsibility. The outcome of the Hungarian parliamentary election this past 12th April is one of the few instances in which this commonplace feels warranted. After sixteen years in office, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán conceded defeat to his challenger, Péter Magyar, a former member of Fidesz and leader of the Tisza Party.

With turnout just below 80 per cent, Hungarian voters delivered a supermajority to the Tisza Party in the country’s unicameral legislature, in effect turning an electoral system long associated with Orbán’s political success against him. Following a campaign marked by intense—at times visually, verbally, and even physically confrontational—competition, the result has been met domestically with a clear sense of collective relief.

The significance of the election was reflected in the level of international attention it attracted in the final weeks of the campaign. Coverage across major outlets—including CNN, the BBC, and several European broadcasters—introduced wider audiences to both the structural challenges and the more unusual antiques of Hungarian public life.

Reports highlighted pressures on the healthcare system, encapsulated in the sad reality of BYOTP (bring your own toilet paper), and more symbolic representations of political hubris and corruption, such as the Prime Minister’s zebras grazing on the grounds of a repurposed Habsburg mansion acquired by his family, or random elements of infrastructure—treetop promenades with no trees around, roundabouts with no road connections, bike lanes leading into walls—comically unfit for purpose. More importantly, sustained reporting helped international audiences to appreciate the broader geopolitical implications of the election.

A change in leadership is widely expected to alter Hungary’s position within the European Union and NATO, potentially reducing tensions with the country’s allies. It may also signal a shift towards a less accommodating stance toward Russia and a more consistent approach to supporting Ukraine. In the current geopolitical climate, such adjustments are likely to be welcomed across much of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Although the new administration is unlikely to face significant constitutional constraints, its capacity to deliver substantive change remains uncertain. Hungary may once again become a more reliable partner to its allies, yet its contribution to collective defence will be limited by years of mismanagement and corruption affecting the armed forces. Other key public sectors, including healthcare and education, have faced similar pressures over the past decade.

In previous elections, Fidesz relied on a combination of relatively satisfactory economic performance, targeted fiscal measures, and an aggressive and overpowering communications strategy. By 2026, however, economic stagnation and restricted access to European Union funds had reduced the effectiveness of these tools. The legacies of the past decade—economic, institutional, and social—will shape both the opportunities available to Péter Magyar and the constraints his government will need to navigate.

Barnabás Szabó is Hungarian and obtained his PhD in Comparative History at Central European University (Budapest/Vienna). His research focuses on the establishment of the early modern British and Spanish unions. Barnabás points out that themes orienting European diplomacy in the 1700s—including security, economic prosperity, stability, trade, and national interest—are gaining a new urgency today, and seeks to incorporate an applied history approach into his research. 

Barnabás has published in the Journal of Applied History, and written for Engelsberg Ideas and news outlets in Hungary on British and Spanish history, as well as current matters in the UK and Spain.