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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UN humanitarian agencies fear that war in Iraq would have very serious consequences for an already beleaguered civilian population. The result could be a humanitarian emergency of exceptional scale and magnitude.

In the event of conflict, priority concerns will include the protection of civilians as well as addressing humanitarian needs. Responsibility for this will fall on all parties to the conflict and UN agencies with relevant mandates.

The UN has based its planning on a scenario of conflict continuing for an uncertain but limited duration, with possible large-scale geographic coverage. It is assumed that conflict would have far-reaching impact on the tradi people, including the possible isolation of communities in urban as well as rural areas, massive internal displacement and external refugee flows. Urban areas would be particularly affected, with possible destruction of key lifelines, such as energy, water and sanitation systems: it is further assumed that the aiready severe humanitarian conditions in-tracewould be exacerbated, and that the humanitarian support provided through the Oil-for-Food programme (OFF) would be disrupted. In surrounding countries the assumption is that potentially large numbers of people could flee their homes to locations within Iraq and possibly to other countries in search of safe refuge.

Specifically, based on this scenario, it is estimated that up to 9.6 million people could potentially come for d insecure, more than 50% of the population would not have access to clean water, and critical shortages would be experienced in essential drugs. "It sharp increases in diseases and infections. All this while access to services, e.g., health would be severely curtailed and critical increases would be experienced in essential drugs and medical supplies. Furthermore, over 1.3 million asylum seekers could attempt to cross international borders to seek refuge and protection in neighbouring countries. New mass displacement would occur in the hardest hit and most insecure areas, and entail great risk of measles outbreaks.

Against this background UN operational agencies have developed initial response plans catering to the potential needs of the most vulnerable among the potentially affected civilian populations. Planning figures and operational details are provided in this document.

It is important to note that in Iraq and in neighbouring countries the delivery of humanitarian assistance will primarily be carried out through national service delivery systems, with special assistance from Red Cross/Crescent Societies. UN assistance will serve to support, not replace or duplicate, these fundamental systems taking into account host populations/communities. UN agencies are also working on the assumption that in the event of hostilities, international staff members could be temporarily evacuated, resulting in additional responsibilities being placed on local staff, as far as possible, in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Staff safety and security factors remain a fundamental concern for the UN. The risks of operating during hostilities are compounded by the threat posed by the possible use of chemical and / or biological agents, whether intentional or not. The threat of non-conventional weapons will pose safety and security concerns alien not only to the UN, but also to the broader humanitarian community. The importance of appropriate guidance in this area is well established. There will be need for an unprecedented level of dialogue between operational agencies and UNSECOORD and, more in general, between civilian and military actors, for technical as well as operational purposes.

The estimated cost of a six month emergency operation to meet the needs of the affected civilian populations in Iraq and bordering countries (newly war affected, IDPs, refugees, food insecure, children and vulnerable groups) is estimated at about USD XXX million. These estimates include only WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, IOM and OCHA (see Annex 4). Key concerns exist in

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terms of access to resources to fund initial preparedness measures. This includes access to CERF as well as to the 2.2% account established under the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986. With a view to a possible transitional and post-conflict phase, there is a need to anticipate those follow-up arrangements that would facilitate the use of other resources and capacities that currently exist under the SCR 986 Oil-for-Food arrangements.

2. INTRODUCTION

This plan provides an initial summary framework of how the main UN operational agencies will collaborate in providing humanitarian assistance in the event of escalated conflict in Iraq. Agencies have attempted to ensure harmony of planning figures, clarify roles and functions, and define coordination and management structures. This inter-agency plan does not replace but integrates more detailed agency and UN country team planning.

The purpose for UN preparedness planning for provision of humanitarian assistance for Iraq is rooted in UN agencies' respective mandates, international law and the humanitarian imperative. This exercise follows the deliberations of ECOSOC resolution Resolution E/2002/L.34 calling upon United Nations Country Teams to promote contingency planning for possible risks related to-complex emergencies or natural disasters in support to and in collaboration with Governments.

Emphasis in this planning effort is given to the provision of humanitarian support within Iraq, and to supporting national efforts to meet humanitarian needs in neighbouring countries, particularly Iran. Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait should conflict cause displacement and refugee flight to these countries.

This plan is purposefully limited to planning by the main UN operational agencies represented in the IASC who most commonly are involved in first response activities. It focuses specifically on humanitarian assistance potentially required in the initial phase of an escalated crisis and will be adjusted as the situation progresses to include other UN and IASC actors and partenrs.

The planning is based on recognition that national governments and national systems are the principal actors responsible for humanitarian assistance; UN assistance will aim to complement and support national efforts.

3. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

The current humanitarian crisis in Iraq is the result of two devastating international wars (the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and the Gulf War of 1991) followed by nine years of UN-imposed sanctions. The adoption by the UN Security Council in April 1995 of an Oil-for-Food formula as "a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people" (UNSC Resolution 986) has only partly mitigated the very grave humanitarian situation in the country. Sixty percent of the population in Northern Iraq live in poverty, a rate which is expected to be significantly higher for populations living in the southern and central Iraq, for which statistics are not available. The main threat to the life and health of the Iraqi population are communicable diseases, nutritional deficiencies, maternal risk, non-communicable and chronic conditions. The severe deterioration of Iraq's infrastructure and essential public services (health, water, electricity and sanitation also aggravated by the sanctions regime, has been another major cause of suffering for an increasing vulnerable and rapidly growing Iraqi civilian population. Against this background, the livelihood and coping capacity of the Iraqi population have been severely strained. There are therefore widespread concerns about the potential effects of renewed hostilities on the most vulnerable segments of the Iraqi population.

An escalation of conflict in the Country will bring forward a substantial increase in the risk of traumas and injuries, malnutrition, mental distress, and increased individual and collective vulnerability, due to restricted access to clean water, sanitation, shelter, health and services in general. The risk for outbreaks will increase. Besides cholera and typhoid, measles is a specific concern, assuming population displacement and insufficient immunization coverages: historical records suggest an accumulation of susceptible children.

It is also a shared view of the UN humanitarian community that the humanitarian needs for a population the size of Iraq can be met only through the efforts of Iraqi services and that even substantial assistance from the UN would remain a supplement to local capacities and efforts. It is therefore believed that the collapse or interruption or disruption of basic services systems in Iraq could create a humanitarian emergency of exceptional scale and magnitude.

Primary concerns about the current humanitarian situation in Iraq are summarised here below:

Food insecurity

The effects of the past 20 years — var, collapse of the economy and intrastructure—have lent-may population almost entirely dependent for daily survival on government rations and the Oil-for-Food regime administered by the UN. The entire Iraqi population both in the North and the Centre/South rely almost exclusively on this monthly, imported food rations under the Oil-for-Food Programme, as monthly salaries of \$3-\$6 are totally insufficient to purchase food from local markets. The Iraqi government is presently responsible for distributing food rations to the majority of its citizens in the Center and South of the country, while WFP implements the distribution programme in the North. Under the circumstances, any disruption of this system would pose an immediate threat to the Iraqi populations.

Malnutrition and mortality

Child mortality rates have risen alarmingly over the past decade. Currently, under-five child mortality rates are 131 per 1,000 live births in the South and Centre of Iraq. The situation is not so grave in Northern Iraq (72 deaths per 1,000 live births) due to the larger amount of international assistance available in the area. Diarrhoea alone, accounts for 70 % of child deaths in Iraq. Child malnutrition remains the other major concern, with almost one-third of all children in the South and Centre of Iraq suffering from chronic malnutrition. Low exclusive breast feeding rates, high prevalence of anaemia among women, and high incidence of low birth weight contribute to Iraqi high child mortality rate, which has more than doubled from the previous decade. According to UNICEF, the prevalence of low birth weight babies has increased from 4.5 % in 1990 to 24.7 % in 2002. According to a recent MICS (2000) survey the prevalence of exclusive breast feeding is 17.1%

IDPs and refugees

There are currently 1.1 million IDPs in Iraq. In general the situation of IDPs is considered neglected and not adequately addressed. A recent study on the issue¹ stresses the lack of solid information on IDPs; the number of vulnerable, their needs and the preconditions for return. The main reason for this state of affairs is a policy of expulsion implemented by the government over the past thirty years. Limited efforts have been made by UN agencies in Iraq to ensure assistance and protection for the IDPs. There is also concern for the existing refugee population inside Iraq, which amounts to approximately 100,000 people, comprising 62,000 Palestinians, 14,000 Turkish Kurds and 24,000 Iranians and small numbers of urban refugees from Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Syria².

Education

One in four school-aged children (6-15 years of age) does not attend school. Boys are working to supplement family incomes, while girls are dropping out to care for siblings. Schools are being

² UNHCR, November 2002.

¹ The Brookings Institution - SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, by John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, October 2002.

neglected and experience severe shortages of basic supplies, classroom furniture, textbooks and teaching aids. The lack of adequate investment in teacher training and in teaching and learning materials has seriously affected the overall quality of education. The situation continues to deteriorate.

Electricity supply

Reliable electricity supply is a basic humanitarian necessity and is fundamental to the maintenance of the well being of a population. This is particularly true in a country like Iraq due to its climatic extremes and long standing dependency on electricity for almost every walk of life throughout the country. While providing food, medicines, materials required to treat water and effluent, and the like, does help, the benefits to be derived from these activities will largely be negated, if foodstuffs and medicines perish, if water and effluent cannot be treated, if community services cannot be delivered because the power supply is not available.

Health

The Oil-for-Food programme has mitigated the deterioration of the health system in the North but could not halt it in the rest of the country where facilities are unable to provide adequate medical services. Iraqi hospitals have not received limited quantities of the necessary repairs or maintenance since the imposition of sanctions. The buildings are in an advanced state of disrepair. Equally primary health centres cannot function properly owing to the shortage of equipment and material, lacking the most basic tools. Standards of treatment are also falling as doctors skills cannot be maintained. Recently as a result of the OFF programme health care services are gradually improving in specific locations. Recently the MOH has installed biomedical equipment used magnostic and treatment of diseases. Additionally, the MOH and UN reports illustrate a decline in the number of reported cases of cholera, leishmaniasis, diptheria, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis in the south and centre regions of Iraq from 1997 to 2001. Iraq has also been polio free since January 2000.

Water

A related major issue of concern for the health of the population is the quality of the drinking water. The Gulf War severely damaged Iraq's infrastructure, interrupting the power supply and consequently the operation of pumping and treatment facilities. Since then, money and space parts have not been available to repair sewage works and purification plants, that are often working at reduced capacity. Poor water supplies, both in terms of quality and quantity, and inadequate sanitation services have contributed to frequent and major health problems. Environmental pollution further compounds the problem with tons of raw sewerage discharged directly into fresh water each day. Access to safe water in rural areas has dropped to 41 percent. Electricity infrastructure, also severely damaged, is vital for these installations as well as for hospitals.

Landmines and UXOs

Landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) are found throughout Iraq as remnants of the Gulf War, the Iraq-Iran War, and two decades of internal conflict. The existence of these weapons poses a dire threat to the civilian population, with wide ranging medical and socio-economic consequences and repercussions. The mine issue is also having long-term negative repercussions on economic development making reconstruction of road networks, power lines and waterways more protracted, dangerous and costly. Mines also impede the mobility of teachers, technicians, doctors and healthcare workers, undermining the rehabilitation process.

		POTENTIAL OPERAT	(ONAL SCENARIOS
	Scenarios ·	LIKELY CONSEQUENCES	CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
Α	Hostilities avoided	Not requiring exceptional measure	es
В	Limited hostilities	 Limited disruptions and displacement Limited disruptions of lifetines Limited displacement 	 protection of civilians preserving access to safe water and sanitation food and nutrition supplementation continuation of essential services, particularly health care
c	Hostilities/unrest	 Large scale disruptions and humanitarian impact Internal displacement Asylum seekers stranded at the border 	those named in B (above) plus the need for protection and assistance to war alieu
D	Large-scale and prolonged hostilities/unrest	 Large scale disruptions and humanitarian impact Internal displacement Asylum seekers stranded at the border Refugee outflows to neighbouring countries/ 	 those named in B and C (above) plus the need for protection and assistance to asylum seekers stranded at the border and refugee populations in neighbouring countries burden on the systems and capacities in neighbouring countries
E	i Hostilities involving other countries	Not considered in this plan	

4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS

Planning for humanitarian response to a potential crisis in Iraq is extremely difficult. A wide array of potential external and internal factors could come into play leading to different situations and scenarios. Any planning at this stage is therefore based on an attempt to simplify an inherently complex, hypothetical and highly unpredictable future. UN planning has however been informed internal by an analysis of previous emergencies in the region and thorough a continued process of internal consultation and review at the UNCT, regional and HQ level.

The following operational scenarios were adopted as a common logical framework for UN humanitarian preparedness planning. The planning exercise has considered three scenarios 'b', 'c' and 'd', and then focused the contingency planning effort on the worst case scenario 'd'. In line with the scenarios outlined below, particularly critical concerns in an initial response phase are also recognised:

4.1 PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

The humanitarian consequences of a conflict would vary greatly depending inter alia on the nature, duration, dynamics, geographical location and scale of the hostilities. Projecting the potential humanitarian impact of a conflict situation is therefore extremely difficult. In order to enable humanitarian planning to take place, the following main assumptions have been used, with recognition that these assumptions may require revision.

It is assumed that hostilities could:

- Be of limited duration;
- Affect large parts of the country;
- · Pose direct threats to the civilian population;
- Most directly impact urban areas, including Baghdad;
- Result in damage and disruption to critical infrastructure, including water and sewage treatment systems;
- Disrupt electricity distribution systems which would impact essential life support systems, including hospitals, cold chain, etc;
- Severely disrupt public services, including health care delivery food distribution, social services:
- Disrupt current humanitarian programme efforts, and lead to the interruption of the existing OFF arrangements.

Humanitarian impact

in the light of the above, and considering the limited coring capacities of the Iraqi civilian population and state of the public service infrastructure, hostimes would:

- Immediately create large scale humanitarian assistance needs for emergency support for food, water/sanitation, nutrition and health care
- Create need for special protection actions for civilians;
- . Result in different levels of humanitarian needs in different regions of the country;
- Impact on urban areas and both isolate civilian populations in different locations as well as generate new internal population displacements;
- Prompt population movements including refugee outflows to bordering countries and/or asylum seekers being stranded at border areas.

Impact on Oil-For-Food arrangements

Hostilities would hinder the possibility to continue a regular implementation of the existing OFF
programmes through the existing operational arrangements (Government-led distributions in
the Centre-South, UN-led in the North).

Exceptional risk factors: Potential use of CBW or other MDWs

 Any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would create exceptional humanitarian needs, for which humanitarian agencies would have little ability to respond to.

4.2 OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

A number of assumptions have also been made with regards to operational scenarios during hostilities under scenario 'd'. UN planning is based on the following operational assumptions:

- Any use of CBW or other MDWs would trigger UN evacuation and inhibit any UN operational activity on the ground;
- During hostilities, access and the capacity of the UN to deliver humanitarian assistance from within Iraq and from bordering countries could be severely constrained;
- At the onset of hostilities, a majority of international UN staff members would likely be evacuated, leaving behind if possible only critical staff; international staff would return as quickly as is feasible;
- In the absence of international staff national staff of UN agencies, to the extent that they have been prepared/authorized and safety and security conditions permit, will manage the UN's humanitarian efforts as is possible;
- Refugees inside Iraq may require relocation to safety inside the country or admission to neighbouring countries in order to ensure their protection;
- Pockets of critical needs may develop requiring special interventions (ie, transborder and crossborder operations, airlifts, airdrops);

- The complexity of these interventions may require specific advocacy and coordination efforts;
- It is assumed that a re-entry of UN international humanitarian in most of the territory would become possible within a short period from cessation of hostilities;
- Response to any refugee crises in bordering countries would be on-going subject to the admission policies adopted by neighbouring countries.

SCENARIOS		LIKELY OPERATIONAL CONTEXT DURING HOSTILITIES		
A	Hostilities avoided	No extraordinary response require		
В	Limited hostilities	Critical international staff in country		
		Limited humanitarian activities conducted in-country		
Ç_	Hostilities/varest	Non-essential International starf evacuated		
	ľ	Widespread access and security constraints		
		Constrained internal response, limited humanitarian activities conducted in-country—ainly by national staff		
		Concentration of population in emergency conditions		
		Limited access from bordering countries		
D	Large scale and	International staff evacuated		
	prolonged hostilities/unrest	Widespread access and security constraints		
4	Trosumpearum est	Constrained Internal response, limited humanitarian activities conducted incountry mainly by national staff		
	İ	Concentration of population in emergency conditions		
		Limited access from bordering countries (cross border operations)		
	<u> </u>	On-going response to refugee crises in bordering countries		
E	Large scale hostilities involving other countries	Not considered in this plan		

Potential Levels of Need - Initial Planning Figures

To facilitate joint preparedness planning, UN agencies have estimated the number of beneficiaries who will require humanitarian assistance under scenario 'd' as a basis. These estimates of potential beneficiaries were developed through an analysis of the existing socio-economic, nutritional and vulnerability indicators combined with the use of other proxy indicators.

The common understanding is that these figures are based on extrapolations and projections of the available data, and therefore are initial and tentative. As the situation evolves, the base for planning and for operational response will have to be progressively adjusted to reflect the actual situation on the ground.

As already stressed, it is also understood that numbers of potentially affected and/or at-risk poutations will vary considerably depending on the nature, duration, and geographical impact of military intervention. Considering scenario 'd', and the event of prolonged and highly disruptive hostilities (more than 2-3 months) with a large neographical coverage the following initial projections can be made:

INITIAL PROJECTIONS POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

- Up to 9.6 million people regionally food insecure and highly vulnerable (tract and potential refugees in bordering countries);
 - Less than 50% of the population with access to potable water;
- Substantial loss off access to and functionality of medical facilities
- Critical shortages of essential drugs and medical supplies, within one month;
- Up to 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers potentially fleeing to bordering countries.
- Sharp increase in mortality and morbidity by diarrhoeal diseases and acute respiratory infections; higher risk of outbreaks.

Against this background, UN agencies have started to define initial planning figures for humanitarian response on a country-by-country and regional basis, as per the humanitarian preparedness planning figures table, below. Again, it has to be stressed that numbers will vary considerably depending on the nature, duration, and geographical impact of military intervention. These figures are only indicative for planning purposes and will be revised as more information becomes available. A modular approach is being taken by some UN agencies to ensure that response can be quickly expanded. On the other hand, it must be stressed that any prolongment, intensification or extension of the conflict beyond what has been assumed under the planning scenario would lead to an even deeper and more acute humanitarian crisis. Planning figures must therefore be considered as temporary and only indicative. The same applies to the operational costs projected for response by the individual UN agencies, which reflect the initial planning figures for humanitarian response outlined in the following table.

्रतान । त्री कार का सम्बन्ध के स्वरूप का सम्बन्ध का अस्तर का उन्हें का उन्हें का समित के सिक्स के सिक्स के किस

HUMANITARIAN PREPAREDNESS PLANNING FIGURES (December 2002)

Country	Estimated number of potentially affected populations in need of assistance	UN initial planning figures for humanitarian response
Iraq	Food Aid* Up to 8.3 million people food insecure WATSAN Up to 15.9 million (people dependent on piped water supply). Up to 12 million (people dependent on sewerage services). Healin Up to 5.2 million people subjection higher risk for injuries and disease and affected by limited access to primary health care services (4.2 million under-5 children) Nutrition 1.3 million severely and moderately wasted under -5 children (10% severe, 20% moderate). Edi que 1400 Immediate large scale psychological needs; restoration of the education services Child protection Humanitarian needs of children in institutions IDPs Up to 900,000 newly displaced IDPs	Food aid* From 4.6 to 8.3 million Water and Sanitation Emergency water interventions for up to 6.9 million beneficiaries, Support for sewerage treatment impacting up to 6 million people Iteatm —primary health care, (including enhanced capacity for injury management) and disease surveillance for up to 4.7 million beneficiaries Nutrition Support for up to 910.000 severely and moderately wasted under-5 children and 700,000 severely and moderately wasted under-5 children and 700,000 severely and including women Education Immediate educational support for up to 550,000 children; longer term aim to provide learn materials for up to 5.7 million children Child protection Up to 4000 child beneficiaries in institutions IDPs Support for health care delivery water/sanitation (including water tankering), education, and psychosocial support for up to 500,000 tDPs.
Iran**	Up to 900,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border	Up to150,000
Turkey**	Up to 250,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border	• Up to 80,000
Jordan**	Up to 50,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border	• Up to 20,000
Syria**	Up to 60,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border	- Up to 20,000
Saudi Arabla**	 Up to 20,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border 	• Up to 10,000
Kuwalt**	Up to 50,000 refugees/asylum seekers stranded at the border	• Up to 20,000

^(*) WFP projects that globally up to 9.6 million people (including IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers, war affected civilians and vulnerable groups) would immediately become food insecure and in urgent need of food aid assistance in Iraq and bordering countries in the event of a break in the oil-for-food arrangements.

^(**) Actual refugee figures would fluctuate considerably depending on the admission policy adopted by the host country.

Expected beneficiary profile

The available projections indicate that prolonged hostilities in traq would be directly or indirectly affecting a large section of the traqi civil society. Sustained hostilities, albeit of limited duration, would immediately Impact on the status and conditions of millions traqi citizens. The needs in essential sectors (i.e., food aid, water, health care) would become a pressing concern for nearly half of the traqi population. Moreover, these needs would cut across traditional social categories and beneficiary profiles and affect large parts of the traqi society. On the other hand, hostilities would generate new displacement as well as possibly new waves of refugees.

The expected beneficiary profile would therefore comprise the following old and new potential beneficiaries:

- Existing vulnerable groups
- Existing IDPs
- Newly affected civilians (including residents and host communities)
- New vulnerable groups
- New IDPs
- · Refugees arriving in neighbouring countries and asylum seekers stranded at the border
- Third country nationals

Renewed hostilities would clearly pose vast and overarching protection challenges and concerns for the civilian population potentially affected, including vulnerable groups, war-affected populations, IDPs, refugees and asytum seekers. UN agencies have agreed to a regional approach to the issue which reflects agency mandates and capacities, as well as a common understanding of the protection and humanitarian challenges and imperatives (see below).

5. STRATEGIES AND OBJECTIVES

5.1 UN Strategy. In recognition of the operational limitations and of the enormous challenges that may characterise the operational environment, the UN humanitarian strategy is based on a regional perspective. The strategy attempts to optimise the use of all the available resources and capacities both in-country and regionally with a view to ensure that humanitarian assistance and protection would be extended in the most efficient manner to the populations most in need.

The timing for UN preparedness planning and response to a potential crisis has been divided into three phases:

- Pre-emergency preparedness (on-going);
- Initial 30-days rapid response (including UNCT-Baghdad response, as well as potential regional response through crossborder and/or transborder operations); and,
 Humanitarian response operations for up to a total of six months (including the initial 30 days response), a period during which planning for the ensuing rehabilitation and recovery should be initiated and conducted.

During the preparedness phase, the UN humanitarian strategy has focused on the following four pillars:

- High level advocacy about the exceptional humanitarian crisis that sustained hostilities could provoke in Iraq and bordering countries;
- Joint preparedness planning for an initial one month response, and a coordinated six months emergency operation, involving different levels (UNCT, Regional and HQ) and complementing local and national capacities;

- Definition of coordinated policies and approaches for enhaning UN system-wide capacity to provide assistance and protection, if so required, to potentially affected civilians, IDPs and Refugees;
- Establishing appropriate staff safety and security measures including awareness raising for UN staff.
- 5.2 Principles Guiding UN Humanitarian Action. Should there be an outbreak of hostilities, any UN humanitarian interventions in Iraq and bordering countries would be guided by the international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the international refugee law, the 1998 Guiding principles on Internal Displacement, as well as by any other relevant conventions, treaties and documents. Any UN humanitarian assistance activity would be informed by the universally recognised principles and will be inspired by objectives of transparency and accountability (see Guiding principles, Annex 1).
- 5.3 Goals and Objectives. In the event of hostilities, the UN humanitarian actors have established the following key strategic goals for humanitarian action in Iraq and bordering countries. Surfintervention would:
- Advocate, as is possible, to prevent the further escalation of the confict and its regionalisation.
- Aim at mitigating the mortality and suffering that civilian populations might incur as a result of renewed hostilities in trag;
- Ensure high level advocacy to promote overaching protection concerns for civilian populations, vulnerable groups, women and children, displaced populations, asylum seekers and refugees;
- Advocate with national Governments in the region to allow the admission of any asylum seeker to safety in neighbouring countries;
- Ensure priority needs of affected vulnerable groups, especially women and children;
- Advocate for the protection of humanitarian centres and staff including medical facilities/staff;
- Ensure that relief and life-saving interventions are conducted with a view to supporting local capacities and the commencement of early rehabilitation efforts;
- Ensure preparedness for the transitional rehabilitation /recovery phase that would be initiated after the post-immediate crisis;
- Ensure that capacity building support is provided to national authorities and institutions in terms of preparedness and response capacities.

In order to meet the above goals, the following broad objectives were established:

- Ensure that all the necessary humanitarian preparedness and response measures are in place at the national, regional and headquarters levels;
- Ensure clear approaches to the delivery of protection and assistance for persons directly affected by the conflict, in particular war affected civilians, vulnerable groups, IDPs, asylum seekers stranded at the border and refugees;
- Ensure equal access to assistance (protection, food, health, care, nutrition, water and sanitation) for the needy including women and children with special needs.
- Ensure that all safety and security concerns, including sexual and gender based violence and sexual exploitation, are addressed as critical concerns.
- Support national preparedness planning and national response capacities.

6. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

6.1 Preparedness measures. To facilitate and expedite preparedness for what may evolve to be an extremely complex emergency, a broad spectrum of measures have been and are being undertaken by UN humanitarian actors. A wide variety of preparedness activities are under way to enhance regional capacities as well as interaction and coordination between the humanitarian community. As part of enhancing preparedness, exchanges of information with Government

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counterparts in all countries in the region, as well as with IFRC/ ICRC partners are being intensified to facilitate the identification of areas of common concern and of potential collaboration on the ground.

These efforts are taking place at different levels (UNCT, regional and HQ). Individual UNCTs have engaged in contingency planning in the field and this process, which is on-going, has been supported and facilitated by HQs and Regional Bureaux, including through the organization of regional coordination meetings and the fielding of technical missions to individual countries.

In parallel with the development of UNCT contingency plans, working in close collaboration, individual UN Agencies (e.g., UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO) have developed specific regional response plans inclusive of preparedness and response measures for a six months operation.

The UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP plans are summarized in Section two of this document. A revised version of the document will incorporate inputs from other agencies and partners, as well as more details regarding planning by UNCTs in the region.

Much is still required however to strengthen the current state of readiness. The current response capacity is below the ideal levels established through the planning process. It must underlined that to date, the main single constraining factor in enhancing UN agencies' preparedness has been the lack of funding sources allowing to draw resources prior to the on-set of the potential emergency. Lack of preparedness funding has limited the implementation of key measures, including the prepositioning of essential stocks. This is a key less to learned for the UNI humanitarian partners.

The following table illustrates a potential range of response over the first 30 days as compared to the planned levels of response in the event of a scaled up large scale emergency operation.

Sector or thematic area/Lead	Initial relief response - 30 days	Planned 6 months emergency response (monthly average)
Food assistance (WFP)	Initial response for up to 900,000 people (war affected, vulnerable, IDPs, Asylum seekers, Refugees)	From 4.9 to 9.6 million people (war affected, vulnerable, IDPs, Asylum seekers, Refugees) ³
Health (WHO)	Initial response for estimated 440,000 in Iraq	Ensuring/advocating access to basic health services in and around fraq for all subnerable populations
(UNICEF)	Initial ase for up to 680,000 (of which 550,000) in Iraq	Up to 4.7 million
Nutrition (UNICEF/WFP)	Initial response for up 680,000 (of which 550,000) in Iraq	910,000 severly and moderately malnourished children
Water and sanitation (UNICEF)	Initial response plans based on possible disruption of electricity supply to water / sanitation systems for up 680,000 (of which 550,000) in Iraq.	Potential beneficiaries in a protracted emergency could more than double first response planning levels.
Refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR)	NFIs planned for 600,000 (Asylum seekers, Refugees)	NFIs for up to 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers, and 100,000 refugees in Iraq

6.2 PHASES OF RESPONSE

As mentioned above, UN planning for preparedness and response to a potential crisis has been divided into three phases:

- Pre-emergency preparedness (on-going);
- Initial 30-days rapid response (including UNCT-Baghdad response, as well as potential regional response through crossborder and/or transborder operations); and,
- Humanitarian response operations for up to a total of slx months (including the initial 30 days response).

PHASE I - PREPAREDNESS

An exceptional level of inter-agency collaboration in preparedness planning, facilitated by the IASC Reference Group on Contingency Planning and Preparedness and OCHA, has characterized efforts by UN agencies regarding this potential emergency.

 Most UN country teams in the region have on-going inter-agency preparedness and contingency planning processes and are developing UN country team plans, which bring

³ Plans have been developed under a medium case scenario to extend emergency assistance to a total caseload of 9,6 million, including 1,3 million refugees.

together the planning of respective agencies. This on-going process continues to generate new collaborative initiatives, and activities, including joint assessments of potential humanitarian needs, development and review of planning figures, discussions with national authorities, joint field assessments and fact-finding missions, definition of emergency roles and functions, shared trainings, agreement on and development of key common services.

- Building on and complenting the activities conducted by UNCTs, individual agencies have developed regional preparedness initiatives and plans and developed initial cost estimates for potential response operations. Agencies will continue to review and update contingency plans in reappraisals of the possible operational scenarios, humanitarian implications, and the measures required to respond effectively. Several internal preparedness and capacity building activities are being implemented, including assessments, programme developments, training initiatives, development of service delivery partnership arrangements, and prepositioning of supplies (quantified elsewhere in this document). Standby arrangements with partners are also being reviewed, or are being negotiated with next and governments in the region to ensure access to local contingency.
- These preparedness activities have been encouraged by the IASC. The IASC Received Group on Contingency Planning and Preparedness and OCHA have supported and stimulated effective inter-agency preparedness and contingency planning efforts. In this context, three inter-agency, sub-regional consultations have been organized. Inter-agency missions to support UNCT and regional preparedness planning have been undertaken to Turkey, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and most recently Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Such missions have also enabled close interaction with host governments to gain an insight on their own preparedness plans and to lay the foundations for greater interaction in such areas as advocacy for admission policies and identification of locations for potential newly-arrived refugee populations within a host country.
- UN agencies have commenced limited pre-deployment of staff to boost in country readiness. When possible, agencies are drawing on internal emergency resources to enable an immediate response should a crisis unfold. UN agencies have identified locations where, in the event of cross-border population displacement, pre-positioned assistance will be readily available for those in need that would include the immediate provision of Non-Food Items (NFI); shelter and water and sanitation facilities; and food.
- In order to support a rapid and coordinated response, preparedness work has also commenced on the establishment of a virtual Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) to assist with the coordination of humanitarian activities; a UN Joint Logistics Center (JLC) designed to provide regional coordination for the provision of humanitarian assistance (this also includes the developing of potential transport corridors and commodity tracking systems); and an Emergency ICT platform to facilitate common communications (see below).

PHASE II - INITIAL 30 DAYS RESPONSE

Planning for a response during hostilities within Iraq is the most challenging aspect of the current process. During hostilities security threats would be at their height and many unknown factors could potentially impact on the situation as well as on the capacity of the UN to deliver assistance. Most of the UN international staff would probably have been evacuated.

Based on the planning conducted to date, the UN initial 30 days response would be based on a combination of internal (eg, Iraq-based) and external capacities and activities, as follows:

(a) Internal response/UNCT Baghdad. Work is on-going at the UNCT in Baghdad to develop operational options and alternatives for managing an internal response operation. Planning is based on the assumptions that there could be possibilities for national staff to conduct limited

activities even in the absence of UN international staff. In line with this, as a general rule UN national staff has been invited to play a lead role in designing operational response plans for the initial 30 days period. UN agencies are collaborating in establishing operating procedures that reflect key security standards and concerns. Collaboration is on-going with local counterparts. Initial planning figures have been defined and are being updated.

However, it is recognised that there may be possibilities that the level of risk could simply be too high to allow staff to operate safely during a certain period of time. It is also understood that the situation could vary significantly in different parts of the country.

- (b) Crossborder/transborder operations. Complementary to the above is the possibility of undertaking initial crossborder/transborder operations from neighbouring countries to provide humanitarian assistance respectively to those asylum seekers that could be stranded at the border, as well as to affected population inside Iraq, if so required and when the situation permits. UNCTs in bordering countries are therefore factoring into their plans the potential for activating crossborder/transborder operations. The coordination of these activities would be supported by regional mechanisms (see Overall-Management—and Coordination, below). The regional UNITED would facilitate coordination work, and support UN regional logistics plans and operations.
- (c) Response operations to refugee crises in neighbouring countries.

 In parallel with the above, response plans have been developed by the UNCTs in neighbouring countries under the leadership of UNHCR to respond to potential outflows of refugee populations from Iraq, as well as to situations whereby asylum seekers might find themselves stranded at the borders due to strict admission policies by the countries bordering Iraq.

Phase III - Humanitarian response operations - up to 6 months

Initial response operations would be scaled up as soon as conditions permit and depending on actual requirements. UN multisectoral assessment would be conducted to determine the emerging levels of need which would inform response operations. Security and safety assessments would be equally crucial factors in planning any expanded relief operations, including crossborder and transborder operations, as well as in planning a possible re-entry of UN evacuated staff in Irag.

It is expected that by the time operations gear up, UN regional structures will have been established as the key coordination mechanisms providing overall oversight and guidance on operational response. Coordination with partners, including national authorities, existing local partners and new actors (e.g., INGOs) will have to be scaled up with a view to a possible post-hostilities scenario. The convergence of new actors may place additional demands on coordination requirements. However, planning for this phase is considered to be premature at this stage.

6.3 Initial gaps and constraints

Main operational challenges and potential constraints:

It is a common assessment that the humanitarian needs for a population the size of Iraq can be met only through the efforts of Iraqi services and that even substantial assistance from the UN would remain a supplement to local efforts. The collapse or partial destruction of basic services systems in Iraq could create a humanitarian emergency of exceptional scale and magnitude.

In addition, multiple factors can constrain or hinder the effective implementation of a humanitarian response operation within Iraq during hostilities as well as in the initial post-conflict phase. These may include:

Resources and capacities:

 lack of sufficient funding, resources and capacity both during the preparedness and the emergency response phase;

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- delays or problems in the reconfiguration of the OFF programme and resources to support newly emerging humanitarian priorities;
- disruption of warehouses and loss of commodities;
- · disruption of state capacity;
- limited or disrupted implementing partners' capacity;
- limited or uncoordinated INGOs response;

Operational and security aspects

- · duration of hostilities beyond what assumed in the current plan;
- prolonged situations of intermittent or limited access;
- · disruption of logistics and transport routes;
- staff safety and security aspects, incuding threats and impediments to the work of national staff (see below);
- potential contamination problems, including in relation to the potential use of WMDs or CBWs, during hostilities and in a re-entry phase (see below).

Organizational, coordination aspects:

- prolonged absence of international staff coupled with lack of/or difficult communications/contacts with in-country national staff during hostilities;
- potential assistance provided by military actors outside the framework of a coordinated humanitarian effort;
- Potential constraining forters in bordering of the
- admission policy and security measures hindering sees to refugees and populations stranded at the border;
- security factors impeding the use of land or air corridors to Iraq
- main ports and routes logistically congested or blocked.

Additional factors and challenges in a post-conflict situation:

- The nature of the transitional arrangements and the role of the potential role of the UN therein;
- Scale of investments and time required for reconstruction and time required following a highly disruptive and prolonged conflict;
- Potentially prolonged duration of the humanitarian crisis.

6.4 STAFF SAFETY AND SECURITY

The potential scenarios considered in this humanitarian preparedness plan involve the provision of humanitarian protection and assistance as a result of, during and after a situation of armed conflict. This means that UN staff members, charged with protecting and assisting those displaced and affected by conflict may need to carry out their duties in inherently dangerous environments. Moreover, the instances when the danger to staff is greatest are likely to coincide with those where the civilian population's needs are the most urgent.

The challenge and priority for the UN agencies responding to a potential emergency in Iraq and the neighbouring countries is to carry out the UN's humanitarian mandate while ensuring the safety of staff. In the scenarios addressed by this plan, the risks are compounded by the threat posed by the possible use of chemical and / or biological agents, whether intentional or not. The use of non-conventional weapons pose safety and security concerns alien to not only the UN, but also the broader humanitarian community.

Underlying policies and principles

The protection of both national and international staff is recognised as a fundamental responsibility of national authorities. The UN has recognised as well its own responsibility to ensure that safety and security of UN staff and humanitarian workers remains a priority concern. To this end every UN agency and UN country team works within the framework of the UN Security Management

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System and is guided by the Designated Official for Security and Security Management Team (SMT). At the country level the active participation of agencies in the UN Security Management System includes compliance with established guidelines, sharing of information and contribution of recommendations to improve overall security.

The UN agencies responding to a potential emergency situation in Iraq have been closely cooperating with UNSECOORD and will follow its lead on security policy. As part of its overall
preparedness process, the UN agencies are giving priority to ensuring that all of the affected
countries for this operation are able to meet Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS) and
Minimum Telecommunications Standards (MIST) requirements. It is expected that the agencies
may deploy additional Field Safety Advisors and Officers to the countries affected by the crisis, if
necessary, to complement the capacity of UNSECOORD. It has to be noted however that MOSS
compliance may not be achieved in Iraq and is problematic in other surrounding countries such as
Iran. Problems are also being experienced in ensuring the necessary communication licences
Irom host Government authorities in some of the countries in the region.

NBC envirorment

UNSECOUND has recently issued some policy guidance with regards to security and protection of the organizations of the UN system, staff members and dependants, and property of the UN, in a NBC warfare or contaminated environment. This is an important initial step forward in enhancing system-wide safety and security. However, enormous challenges remain in terms of appropriately addressing safety and security concerns should a warfare situation develop. The major challenges relate to the security of those UN staff members who not be evacuated. Of particular concern is also the need to develop appropriate means for responding to the needs of affected populations, IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers, and other vulnerable populations who may have passed through contaminated environments ore been direct victims of attacks using non-conventional weapons. Planning for this contingency is very preliminary. What can be identified at this stage is the need for effective mechanism of dialogue between UN operational agencies and UNSECOORD and between civilian and military experts and decision makers.

7. OVERALL MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

A potential crisis in Iraq and its possible effects on neighbouring countries warrant the strengthening of regional coordination arrangements as part of an effort to enhance regional preparedness. The potential complexity and severity of an eventual crisis calls for a flexible coordination mechanism, to be developed and adjusted as events unfold. UN agencies agreed to a phased approach, building on existing structures and capacity, and operating at different levels.

7.1 Coordination and management

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Country level coordination/UNCTs

Inside Iraq, the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) and the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOCHI), which is an integral part of OIP, will continue to be responsible for the coordination of activities within Iraq. The UN country team is playing a key role in enhancing the overall level of preparedness. In the event of hostilities and of an evacuation of OIP and UNOCHI staff, it is anticipated that some of the evacuated staff would be deployed to neighboring countries and continue to play a coordination role for humanitarian actions within Iraq and assist in coordinating cross-border operations.

In all neighboring countries, the UN country teams remain the principal in-country, inter-agency UN coordination mechanisms, facilitated by the Resident Coordinators (RCs). When appropriate, the Country Teams will expand their emergency coordination groups to include other IASC members or observers (including IOM, IFRC and ICRC, and NGOs).

General and sectoral coordination with local authorities and potential counterparts or implementing partners is ongoing in neighboring countries for contingency planning purposes and will have to be enhanced further at the onset of a possible crisis. All the necessary preliminary arrangements will have to be established in order to facilitate the stepping up of coordination functions at the national and local level

All UN country teams in the region have collaboratively defined inter-agency sectoral coordination/response arrangements, clarifying which agency has the facilitating role and others supporting roles in the provision of sectoral assistance—health, water/sanitation, and so forth. In most countries working groups have been formalized around sectoral planning.

Regional coordination

As part of the interim coordination arrangements, OCHA and the Regional Directors of the main operational agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF) with the support of the IASC RG have played a primary role in fostering interagency coordination on regional preparedness through intensified contacts, meetings and/or teleconferences. This arrangement is expected to continue with the addition of other UN and IASC regional partners.

This general may be a precursor to the appointment of a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) in case regional coordination between RCs/Country Teams, Regional Directors and UNOCHI/OIP needs to be strengthened further. OCHA is prepared to field some staff to support the functions of the RHC, the Resident Co-ordinators and the Country Teams. Other regional coordination services would then come under the lead of the RHC. This would include the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) and possibly a Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) who would be attached to the office of the RHC.

In order to ensure both coherence and efficiency in the delivery of the emergency refugee programme and to facilitate co-ordination with concerned governments and other UN agencies, the High Commissioner will appoint a UNHCR Special Regional Co-ordinator who will work closely with other regional coordination mechanisms that may be established.

UN Secretariat NY

All UN activities with regard to Iraq are being coordinated by a Steering Group that is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General. A Humanitarian Action Sub-Group has been formed that is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and includes UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, OIP and UNRWA and OCHA. OCHA NY will facilitate the dissemination of any pertinent information and guidance to UN actors in the region and in the field.

HQ support (Geneva)

In order to support the coordination of the overall contingency planning process during this phase, a regular IASC meeting now takes place under the lead of the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator (AERC). This builds on coordination arrangements established by the IASC-RG and OCHA during an earlier phase of the contingency planning process. The IASC-RG and OCHA staff already engaged in the interagency preparedness process in the region will continue to provide technical support through continued contacts with both RCs/UNCTs and UN Agencies' Regional Directors, and facilitate interaction with other related bodies and mechanisms established with the UN in New York. In addition, a weekly conference call is chaired by the AERC with the Regional Directors and RC staff from the countries in the region.

7.2 Operational arrangements on new office location

Office locations

To the extent possible, the UN will manage humanitarian support from the existing main office locations in which offices are established, both inside Iraq and in surrounding countries. However, flexibility will be maintained to shift operations and coordination centers should this be required. Should international staff be evacuated from Iraq, the suggested alternative operations centers

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currently envisaged are either Amman or Cairo. Cyprus has recently been identified as another

New field bases

Additional field offices may have to be established wherever substantial local UN assistance is required. New field offices, for instance those that would be required at border areas to support humanitarian assistance and cross border operations, will be collaborative inter-agency efforts.

Coordination arrangements on IDPs, Asylum Seekers and Refugees 7.3

IDPs

In the event of a worsening IDP crisis affecting Iraq, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in Iraq will advocate on their behalf and ensure that emergency response will be organised on the basis of collaborative arrangements among UN humanitarian agencies and partners.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers stranded at the Border

Of the countries bordering Iraq, only Syria has officially announced an open admission policy, with all of the remaining countries opting for closed borders or, in the case of Iran, access for refugees that is limited to border arcifs.

In the event of a crisis UNHCR's protection mandate will encompass both refugees as well as asylum seekers that might be stranded at border areas. As part of a joint and coordinated regional strategy, all UNCTs in the region will support UNHCR's lead role in the protection of refugees including advocating for the right of refugees to seek asylum and joint advocacy for open borders vis-à-vis host governments. However, in the event there is a failure to successfully negotiate freedom of movement between countries with the governments involved, as part of a joint and coordinated regional strategy. UN humanitarian agencies and UNHCR will commence cross-border support operations in favour of populations that may be stranded at the border. Appropriate plans will be developed in a discrete and coordinated fashion at the UNCT level for potential crossborder operations so as to ensure effective action should that type of operation be required.

Common Regional UN Inter-agency Services

Given the potential for the effects of any conflict in Iraq to be felt in those countries immediately neighbouring Iraq, the UN anticipates integrating common services to improve overall coordination at the programmatic level. These interagency services are:

- Regional UN Joint Logistics Centre:
- Regional Humanitarian Information Centre; and
- Regional emergency communications network.

The services will be provided in a manner which augments and complements but does not replace existing capacity and arrangements that have been agreed by UN country teams.

UN Regional Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)

A broader framework will be developed for the existing WFP-managed UNJLC allowing the body to provide coordination for regional logistics. UNJLC will support existing agency logistics mechanisms acting principally as a coordination mechanism and not directly managing transport assets. It is anticipated that a UNJLC operation would run for an initial six-month period, with a possible three to six month extension depending on the level of humanitarian logistics support required. The UNJLC will consist of three line management units: Air (UNHAS), Information Management and Administration. Any UNJLC operation will be reinforced by the UNJLC Unit in Rome.

The UNJLC for Iraq will undertake the following general tasks:

Inter-agency logistics coordination and planning at regional and in-country level; 23 Identification of logistics bottlenecks affecting the humanitarian effort;

- Arranging technical assessment missions related to port, rall and road infrastructure to identify and address logistics bottlenecks in a coordinated fashion;
- Prioritisation and tasking Agency air movements for the UNHAS operation;

Monitoring Agency food and non-food supply movements;

- Operational-level CMCoord functions in co-ordination with OCHA's MCDU;
- Maintenance of a web site dedicated to the Iraq UNJLC operation; and
- Assisting in prioritising reliefs items for transport on any common UN air service which develops
- Any other inter-agency logistics-related coordination activities.

Within the region, there will be a least six UNJLC satellites, security permitting: Jordan (Amman), Syria (Damascus), Turkey (Mersin) and Iraq (Erbil, Kirkuk and Basra). These satellites will be responsible for inter-agency logistics coordination activities within their areas of responsibility.

UN Regional runnanitarian Information Centre (R-HIC)

The complexity of any large-scale humanitarian operation in long will warrant the establishment by OCHA of a Regional Humanitarian Information Center (R-HIC) to streamline the provision of compatible data, sector and location standards as well as assessments across sectors and boundaries. A R-HIC would help ensure effective and cost efficient response as well as providing management to the flow of inter-agency information and acting as a resource or the wider humanitarian community.

The R-HIC for the Middle East and Iraq is planned for an initial six-month period, to be expanded or terminated in accordance with need. A virtual R-HIC will be operational already during the preparedness phase and will be transferred to the field as and when required. At this stage the virtual R-HIC will transition to a more full-fledged web based capacity to be used as the eventual Iraq HIC dissemination site. The primary focal point of the R-HIC would be the operational hub (Cairo or Amman) and it would oversee the activities of satellite HICs to be established in those countries neighbouring Iraq.

UN Regional Emergency Telecommunications Network

Given the wide array of potential actors involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance across the Middle East in the event of a crisis in Iraq, a uniform, robust and flexible emergency telecommunications network will be required. The IASC-WG requested WFP to lead this joint interagency effort. Preliminary assessment and coordination activities are already underway as a key preparedness measure, under WFP's lead. Accessibility to the network will be open to regional UN agencies and their partners.

Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS)

In the event of a crisis, there will be a requirement for a humanitarian air service to transport personnel and urgently needed air cargo. Discussions are on-going among UN partners with regards to possible operational arrangements building on Afghanistan experience. Within the framework of the contingency plan, WFP is currently carrying out an assessment of capacity requirements, facilities, routes and costing.

7.5 Other coordination requirements

Humanitarian - military interface

From a security as well as a protection perspective, in the event of hostilities UN humanitarian partners may be required to establish mechanisms of coordination and communication with military actors with a view to conducting advocacy and protection activities, raising the level of safety and security of UN staff, and ensuring coordination of humanitarian activities.

Recent experience from Afghanistan may help informing coordination structures and processes. Preliminary consultations are on-going among UN humanitarian partners and OCHA with regards

to the advocacy and strategic functions that would potentially be required. The on-going consultations will be intensified, if needed. The issue is being discussed in NY and further guidance is required. OCHA will be facilitating this process.

During and after potential hostilities, the UN humanitarian partners will be operating on the basis of the established IASC principles of Military-Humanitarian relations stipulating the independence and neutrality of the UN humanitarian actors vis-à-vis military forces, and establishing parameters for potential coordination (See Annex 2).

Joint UN Advocacy

UN humanitarian partners agreed to developing further a joint advocacy strategy that would be established in the event of a crisis. The joint strategy, to be developed under OCHA's leadership, will cover the following priorities:

- · protection of civilians and refugees;
- security for civilian infrastructure (residential areas, hospitals and health centres, water plants, civilian transport and warehouses and other assets of humanitarian agencies);

international:

 securing operational arrangements for humanitarian activities (eg., licensing of radio equipment) and

anitarian workers, national and

humanitarian assistance for persons at risk due to winter conditions;

humanitarian accordant cross-border or trans-border opcition

The joint UN strategy would have different audiences, including a UN internal audience (UN Secretarial/UN SC/DPA/DPKO/DPI/OIP); host governments; military actors; international public opinion; and the donor community.

Public Information and Media strategy

The UN humanitarian partners also agreed to developing a joint PI and media strategy which would address issues such as protection of civilians and refugees, access for humanitarians and cross border or trans-border operations, civilian residences, safeguarding infrastucture hospitals, water supply systems, safety and security of relief workers. The joint strategy would allow harmonising messages within the region to help ensure free and fast flow of information.

Mechanism for coordinating information flows from Headquarters and Secretary General's spokesman to the field would also be established. UNHCR has agreed to chair an ad hoc interagency task force to prepare the ground for such initiatives, if so required. OCHA is working in conjunction with DPI on communications issues in the framework of the Inter-Agency Taskforce on Communications, created under the DSG Steering Group.

8. AGENCY OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES BY SECTOR

8.1 The World Food Programme (WFP)

Preparedness measures and planned emergency response in view of a potential humanitarian crisis affecting Iraq and bordering countries

In the context of increased international tension and serious prospects of military intervention in traq. WEP has been actively planning to be ready to assist populations in need of emergency assistance in ligageand-surrounding-countries in the event of a sudden deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

WFP's preparedness efforts and planned emergency response have been coordinated with those of other UN agencies and partners through bilateral contacts and/or under the auspices of the IA Reference Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning. They include plans to set up a UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), common UN ICT services and common!

(UNHAS). WFP initiated a number of targe-scale preparedness actions related to management, procurement of commodities, logistics, ICT and staff training, deemed essential to ensure the Programme's readiness and capacity to respond immediately and efficiently to an emergency crisis.

WFP is particularly concerned by the situation of extreme vulnerability already prevailing in Iraq, where an estimated 60 per cent of the population relies entirely on the SCR 986 (Oil-for-Food) food ration for its daily subsistence. In this context of extreme dependency, it is essential that all possible measures be taken at the highest level necessary to ensure that the SCR 986 food procurement, shipping and distribution processes continue to be operational and adequately funded.

WFP drafted a regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) to be activated upon the outbreak of a potential crisis. In accordance with initial common IA estimates, WFP's regional EMOP is designed to assist an *initial caseload* (low-case scenario) of 4.9 million including 0.3 million refugees for an initial duration of six months: Another operational plan has been developed under a medium-case scenario to extend emergency assistance to a total caseload of 9.6 million, including 1.3 million refugees.

A summary table of estimated costs for preparedness and planned emergency response is provided in Annex 5.

1. PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS

Over the past months and increasingly in the past few weeks, WFP has taken or initiated a significant number of preparedness measures, including:

- Conducting a logistics capacity assessment in Turkey, and opening an office in Ankara staffed with an emergency Coordinator and a Logistics Officer;
- Conducting further logistics capacity assessments in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq;
- Conducting missions to Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Kuwait to appraise operational needs and available facilities (ports, storage, ICT, partnerships, etc.) and to plan for augmented/new capacity;

- u Initiating the deployment/connectivity of corporate food commodity and financial tracking systems (COMPASS, WINGS) in Country Offices in the region, and the recruitment/ training of adequate support staff;
- a Redeploying staff on TDY to appraise/set up logistics corridors and build minimum readiness capacity:
- Carrying out ICT needs assessments in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq;
- and closely monitoring food pipelines in the region, including stand-by borrowing agreements, to increase WFP's immediate response capacity;
- a Conducting targeted training sessions in emergency response and emergency needs assessment for staff in countries of the sub-region, including Iraq.

The cost of these measures, especially beyond the initiation stage, cannot be fully covered by WFP's available resources. Additional funding is urgently needed to maintain the current effort and to reach an adequate level of preparedness, particularly in the areas of logistics and ICT where readiness in terms of equipment, facilities and procedures/set-up is key to immediate emergency response. Funding is also needed to complement stand-by borrowing agreements for cereals with the purchase and pre-positioning of additional commodities, such as vegetable oil and pulses.

Preparedness costs pertaining to a period covering one to three months which cannot be funded from WFP's available resources are currently estimated as follows:

Logistics:	USD	735,000	
ICT:	USD	2,440,000 (incl	. 1.8 m. for equipment stockpile)
IA ICT:	USD	160,000	
HN II C:	USD	185 000	

105.บบบ Commodity pre-positioning: USD 3,650,000

Total: USD 7.150.000

2. PLANNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE

2.1. CONTEXT

It is extremely difficult to predict the extent of emergency food aid needs resulting from a military intervention in Iraq. This is not only due to the uncertainties about the potential scenarios for a military intervention and about the level of human suffering they would cause. It is also due to the fact that the entire Iraqi population is currently entitled to and largely dependent on a full food ration through the Oil-For-Food programme. In the context of this vast programme, WFP is currently instrumental in distributing 100 percent of its food requirement to the 3.6 million population of Northern Iraq, while Government authorities address the food requirements of another 21.8 million Iraqis in the Centre/South of the country. The level of needs will clearly depend on the level of disruption that could result of a military conflict, depriving the population of its almost unique source of food supply.

WFP's assessment of food insecurity levels resulting from a military conflict, based on currently available socio-economic and nutrition data as well as on conflict scenarios, shows that a population ranging between 4.9 and 9.6 million could become imendiately vulnerable and food insecure. This includes different categories of affected civilians, ie, vulnerable groups, waraffected, IDPs, asylum seekers and refugees fleeing into neighbouring countries. Against this background WFP is working on two main contingency scenarios:

- emergency assistance (EMOP) to an Initial caseload of 4.9 million (low-case scenario), and.
- emergency assistance to an increased caseload of 9.6 million (medium-case scenario).

In relation to the above, it should be noted that support costs to WFP's planned emergency operations do not include costs (essentially staff costs, estimated at an additional third of the and the factor of the property of the party that the property of

requested staff costs) currently funded through the 2.2 percent account (SCR 986). It is assumed, however, that this funding source (and WFP's related activities) will be maintained in a conflict/post-conflict situation in order to limit the need for even greater relief assistance.

It also be noted that food commodity and transport costs for WFP's planned relief operations are strictly related to the provision of emergency food assistance to caseloads of 4.9 or 9.6 million under the two scenarios. They do not take into account the possible need to cover all or part of the food and transport costs currently paid by the GOI against the blanket food ration through SCR 986, should the current line of supply/funding be interrupted.

2.2. WFP'S PLANNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE

LOW-CASE SCENARIO: 4.9 MILLION CASELOAD

- Under this street, WED stands ready to assist caseloads of 4.6 million within Iraq, 150,000 in Iran 80,000 in Turkey, 20,000 in Syria and 20,000 in Jordan for an initial duration of six months, through the provision of a 2,100 kcal food ration per person and perday comprising cereats, pulses, oil, sugar, salt and blended food (csb).
- a WFP is also planning to extend its current programme of assistance to malnourished children in the South of Iraq to the entire country under the EMOP.
- □ The total commodities required for the EMOP amount to 578,033 metric tons (95 percent destined to Iraq) at an estimated cost of USD 135.2 million, including milling costs.
- External and internal transport costs, through the planned corridors, total an estimate of USD 127.2 million.
- The EMOP will be supported by significantly upgraded capacity (staff and equipment) in the countries surrounding Iraq, in order to assist the refugee caseload and to monitor logistics corridors. Inside Iraq and upon re-entry after eventual evacuation, WFP is planning to provide emergency food aid through a network of four area offices and seven sub-offices, all coupled with warehouse/logistics facilities in addition to logistics facilities established at points of entry and/or transit. A regional coordination unit will be established.
- EMOP staff costs (USD 11.8 million) will cover the augmentation of the current staffing levels in Iraq (funded through the 2.2% account) and in surrounding countries, and the establishment of a regional coordination unit;
- Other EMOP direct support costs total USD 17.4 million, including USD 8.6 million in ICT equipment and USD 2.8 million for the purchase of vehicles.
- The total cost of the operation would amount to USD 311.9 million for a period of six months.

MEDIUM-CASE SCENARIO; 9.6 MILLION CASELOAD

- Under this scenario, WFP would provide emergency food assistance to caseloads of 8.3 million within traq and 1.3 million refugees for an initial period of six months, under similar but enhanced operational modalities.
- Commodity requirements would raise to 1.1 million metric tons (87percent destined to Iraq), at an estimated cost of USD 254.0 million, including milling costs.
- External and internal transport costs would reach an estimated USD 242.9 million.

- The required augmentation of WFP's logistics and monitoring capacity inside and outside Iraq would increase the operation's direct support costs (including staff costs and equipment) by half with respect to the low-case scenario, to an estimated USD 43.2 million.
- The total cost of the operation would raise to USD 578.0 million for a period of six months.

2.3 INTER-AGENCY ICT

In its role as leading UN agency for the ICT sector, WFP has been drawing detailed contingency plans for a potential emergency situation in Iraq, based on the model applied successfully in Afghanistan.

Services provided would include (1) assistance with the delivery and installation of equipment to set up the minimum communication infrastructure in support of staff security; (2) establishment and maintenance of a common UN room, equipped with basic computing facilities and internet connectivity; (3) coordination of the deployment of common ICT networks and monitoring of optimal division of IA response littles and pooling of resources.

The cost of these services, to be provided over a period of six months, is estimated at USD 3.7 million (low-case scenario) or USD 5.5 million (medium-case scenario).

2.4 INTER-AGENCY LOGISTICS (UNJLC)

The complexity of any large-scale humanitarian operation in Iraq will warrant the establishment of a UNJLC. In its custodian role for the UNJLC, WFP has been planning the set up of a UNJLC for trag. The UNJLC's IA logistics coordination tasks will include identification of logistics bottlenecks. technical missions related to port, rail and infrastructure assessments, prioritization and tasking agency air movement through UNHAS, monitoring agency NFI and FI movements, and CMCOORD functions as needed.

The cost of these services over a period of six months is estimated at USD 2.2 million (low-case scenario) or USD 3.3 million (medium-case scenario).

2.5 INTER-AGENCY HUMANITARIAN AIR SERVICES (UNHAS)

There will be a requirement for a humanitarian air service to transport personnel and urgently needed air cargo. WFP will manage this service on behalf of the humanitarian community to provide safe, efficient and cost effective air transport service to staff of UN agencies, eligible NGOs and representatives of donor countries in the region, carry out timely medical and security evacuation of staff as and when required, and provide airlift and airdrop capability for food and non-food to areas where overland access is not feasible. Within the framework of the contingency plan, WFP is currently carrying out an assessment of capacity requirements, facilities, routes and costing.

The cost of UNHAS services over a period of six months is estimated at USD 2.6 million (low-case scenario) or USD 3.9 million (medium-case scenario).

UNITED NATIONS CHILDRENS' FUND (UNICEF)

Preparedness and Response

In accordance with UNICEF's mandate, CRC and other international instruments, and "Core Corporate Commitments" in emergencies, UNICEF's overarching concern is the protection of civilians, particularly children and women. If an escalated emergency occurred in Iraq, UNICEF strives to ensure that should there be a sudden need for humanitarian assistance for children and women, UNICEF would be in readiness to respond to those needs in an adequate and timely manner in Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. The need for readiness is evermore important as the current situation of children and women in Iraq remains fragile and any deterioration in the situation can be expected to create increased levels of vulnerability and thus even more acute humanitarian needs.

In co-operation and co-ordination with the authorities, UN agencies and other partners, notably IFRC and ICRC, UNICEF plans to support humanitarian action in child and women's health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education, and child protection including psycho social support. UNICEF also plans to provide non-food relief items and support mine risk awareness activities. UNICEF will target its assistance to the most vulnerable, with particular attention to the internally displaced. UNICEF will also collaborate with UNHCR in providing assistance to refugee populations.

Planning Process

Over the past months, all UNICEF offices in the sub-region have engaged-in an intensive contingency planning and capacity building effort in order to increase their level of readiness. To this end, each Country Office has developed and maintains a preparedness/contingency plan. UNICEF national staff are actively engaged in preparedness planning, particularly as international staff could be evacuated temporarily and national staff, if able to work, would have responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. To ensure in-country co-ordination, all offices are actively involved in consultations with respective governments, other UN agencies and NGOs including ICRC and Red Crescent societies. Collaboratively, all Country Teams have agreed on sectoral coordination roles and responsibilities. For example, in Iraq UNICEF has agreed to assume a lead role in the sectoral co-ordination sectors of Wat/San, nutrition, education and child protection, and a supportive role in the sectors of health and the JLC.

The Regional Director is recognised as the principal focal point on matters related to preparedness and response in this situation. As such the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office coordinates sub-regional level preparedness consultations between concerned Country Offices, HQ, Copenhagen and Geneva.

Preparedness Levels and Planned Response

At present perceived levels of risk, the UNICEF offices in Iraq and surrounding countries are preparing for a minimum level of readiness for 550,000 beneficiaries within Iraq, 100,000 in Iran and Syria, 20,000 in Kuwait and Turkey, and 10,000 in Jordan. Planned interventions focus on reducing and mitigating the impact of the emergency on the health and nutrition status of children and women, ensuring access to potable water and sanitation facilities by targeted populations, ensuring learning opportunities to children as well as their care, protection and well-being, including psychosocial. Type and scale of interventions will differ from country to country since they depend on assessed needs, interventions by governments and other donors, and availability of funds. UNICEF is ensuring that its humanitarian response is co-ordinated with the response of respective governments and other donors.

Preparedness Activities

Under the overall guidance of the MENA Regional Office, offices have identified a series of preparedness activities that need to be implemented as soon as possible if they want to ensure an appropriate level of preparedness as wells as the adequacy, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of planned interventions. Identified preparedness activities include the following:

Facilitate technical assistance to develop interventions in the areas of health, nutrition, water & sanitation, education and protection, in particular tracing/reunification of unaccompanied

children, landmines and psychosocial programme interventions.

 Organise training on communication for humanitarian principles, management of emergencies, rapid assessments and monitoring in crisis and unstable contexts, media management, health and nutrition in emergencies, child protection, psychosocial programme interventions, stress management for staff, logistics, IT/telecoms, security.

Conduct inter-country visits to work out details of cross border operations and assistance to

refugees.

 Upgrade staff skills and of telecoms and related IT equipment so as to ensure a sustained level of high quality and reliability of voice and data management within and between offices of the sub-region as well as with Copenhagen, Geneva and HQ. This involves development of connectivity and back-up connectivity plans/schemes.

Implement minimum organisational security standards (MOSS)

 Pre-position in strategic locations in all countries but especially lraq critical stocks of emergency supplies such as essential drugs and vaccines, HPB biscuits, hygiene kits, blankets, ORS, health materials & equipment, teaching/learning materials, school tents, heaters, educational/ recreational materials, water storage/treatment and sanitation materials and equipment, building materials and equipment, IEC materials.

Identify supplies needed at the onset of the crisis.

Pre-position staff to allow rapid expansion of emergency operations

 Establish temporary programme bases where needed like for example in Kuwait and in border locations in Iran and Turkey.

 Develop contingency human resources plans and identify staff for rapid deployment, including redeployment of those who are likely to be evacuated.

FUNDING NEEDS

Since most offices have a very narrow resource base, UNICEF HQ has advanced, on a reimbursable basis, US\$2 million to enable offices to start implementing preparedness activities. This has allowed the traq, tran, Jordan, Syria and Turkey offices, most of which have a very modest operational base, to increase their level of readiness.

However, additional resources are urgently needed for all countries concerned but especially Iraq where, given all the potential access difficulties and uncertainties, UNICEF is planning to scale up its operation in support of emergency water and sanitation services from the 550,000 persons planned as a first response to up to 6.9 million people, providing health support up to 4.7 million, aiding up to 910,000 severely and moderately malnourished children, providing learning materials for up to 5.7 million children, and assisting up to 4,000 children in institutions.

The additional resources will be used to cover costs for pre-positioning critical staff and emergency supplies, establishing temporary bases, and upgrading telecoms and security equipment. Costs could however increase substantially if OFF staff and assets would not be made available for re deployment or if staff/offices were to be evacuated/ relocated to a place where UNICEF has no base of staff, offices, vehicles, IT/telecoms equipment from which to build.

UNICEF estimates that it will need US\$9 million for preparedness activities in Iraq and surrounding countries (this includes the reimbursable US\$2 million), a minimum of US\$ 30 million during the first month and US\$100 million during the next 5 months. It is to be noted that the latter figures are estimates since the type and scale of interventions will depend on the results of assessments that will be carried out in all concerned countries at the onset of the conflict.

8.3 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

Mandate in the Event of a Refugee Crisis in and around iraq

In the event of a crisis in Iraq and a subsequent outflow of people in the neighbouring countries, ecting on the basis of its mandate, UNHCR's priority concern will be to ensure that the immediate protection and material needs of those fleeing are being met. To do so, UNHCR will advocate for an open admissions policy and a temporary protection regime in neighbouring countries. Should this option prove not to be achievable, UNHCR is ready to envisage cross border operations, provided that both minimum-security conditions are met and that by doing so the protection of the concerned people is not further jeopardised. In all cases, UNHCR's response will be carried out in close co-operation with the authorities of each of the respective host countries, or other relevant authorities, and in full co-ordination with the other concerned UN agencies.

Planning figures for Populations of concern to UNHCR

Conflict in Iraq could lead to major population displacements of which the following groups would be of concern to the High Commissioner (planning figures are given in brackets):

- (a) Iraqis crossing the border into neighbouring countries to seek asylum (up to 800,000);
- (b) Asylum seekers stranded at the border inside Iraq (500,000);
- (c) Refugees currently in Iraq (100,000);

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(d) Third country nationals currently in Iraq, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion who are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail of the pattection of his/her country.

Admission to neighbouring countries

UNHCR and its UN partners will advocate for admission, under a temporary protection regime, of those fleeing generalised violence and/or persecution. For admission to be ensured, a convincing strategy will be necessary that includes diplomatic interventions as well as concrete offers of burden sharing by other States.

Temporary protection would need to be based on a clear understanding that the basic standards of treatment need to be enhanced over time. The situation of Iraqi refugees who were already in the host country before the outbreak of the crisis and enjoy a more favorable status than temporary protection should not be affected.

Existing Refugee Population inside Iraq

UNHCR is concerned about the existing refugee population inside Iraq who may be forced to flee and seek asylum in neighboring countries or move to safer areas inside Iraq.

There is a possibility that Palestinian refugees could flee from Iraq to UNRWA's area of operations, which will require close co-operation between UNHCR and UNRWA.

As far as third-country nationals are concerned, UNHCR will examine the protection concerns of those who are unwilling to return to their countries of origin and, therefore, may need international protection.

Protection, Assistance and Operational Co-ordination

In the event of a mass influx of people into countries neighboring traq, responding to the protection and assistance needs of the refugees will be a complex task. In co-operation with other UN and humanitarian agencies, UNHCR has already developed a six-month integrated emergency protection and assistance program to ensure a rapid, coherent and efficient response during the initial phase of such an emergency, UNHCR will take the lead in the planning, delivery and co-ordination of protection and the provision of material assistance for refugees. Four priorities have been identified so far:

1. The protection of the refugees through:

 Registration and documentation as early as possible which consists of fixing the population and issuing temporary documentation. A verification exercise, including more permanent identification, would take place at a later stage. The early registration of refugees will ensure that important information is recorded and that their legal, physical and material safety is facilitated.

The registration exercise will be conducted, to the extent possible, so that armed elements are

properly identified and referred to the appropriate authorities.

Screening to determine refugee status, which might be necessary under certain circumstances, for instance, if in the course of the registration process special protection or potential exclusion cases are identified.

Special attention to be given to groups with particular protection needs as early as possible, in particular women without male protection and unaccompanied and separated children, to

identify and provide appropriate interventions/solutions.

2. The provision of a winter package (tent, blankets, mattresses, heating/cooking stove, kerosene tamp, fuel and plastic sheeting);

3) The provision of basic water and sanitation services in accordance with recognized international standards.

4. The sectoral level co-ordination of the refugee program/asylum seekers at the border - co-ordination functions will involve harmonizing and streamlining policies, needs assessment, recovers and implementation as well as facilitating the flow and sharing of information.

Overall Co-ordination on Refugee Issues
In order to ensure both coherence and efficiency in the delivery of the emergency refugee program and to facilitate co-ordination with concerned governments and other UN agencies, the High Commissioner will appoint a Special Regional Co-ordinator.

Co-operation with neighbouring countries
UNHCR will practice full partnership with the neighbouring countries capitalising on their prime responsibility, generosity and capabilities. UNHCR will co-operate fully with national NGOs and other implementing partners.

As in any refugee situation, UNHCR and its partner staff will need to obtain safe and unhindered access to refugees wherever they are. Such access is essential to conduct proper protection monitoring, to undertake reporting and to effectively intervene when necessary, especially when protection problems arise. This is a staff-intensive exercise.

Cross-border operations

Cross border operations should not serve as a substitute for asylum and not be used as an argument to deny it. Experience shows that there is often a real danger that the presence of large concentrations of people and the establishment of camps in border areas still under the control of the national army (or another party to a conflict) would elicit serious protection problems.

However, some relief/protection operations on the Iraqi side of the border may become unavoidable when all efforts to secure open borders fail and when International humanitarian assistance proves clearly necessary for the material survival of stranded populations. Persons fleeing generalised violence and/or persecution who seek access to asylum are of direct concern to UNHCR. Asylum-seekers would qualify for refugee protection were they to be given access to asylum in accordance with international standards. They clearly differ from internally displaced persons who seek refuge inside Iraq, and they have in effect the same protection needs as de jure refugees.

1. Policy considerations

The following policy considerations should guide decisions on involvement in cross-border operations:

- a) The timing and scope of such involvement needs to be assessed with great caution and to be closely co-ordinated amongst the agencies involved, so as not to jeopardise international efforts, led by UNHCR, to negotiate admission into neighbouring countries;
- b) Cross-border operations should focus on the most immediate needs and be of short duration in anticipation of either admission to asylum or safe and voluntary return to places of origin;
- c) The security situation in the affected areas should be relatively stable and be expected to remain so; In particular, areas of operation should not be located in or near zones of combat;
- d) The authorities in control of such areas must be reliable interlocutors with a willingness and capacity to live up to their undertakings;
- e) Such undertakings should include respect for the right of civilians to leave their country to seek refuge abroad or to return home; for non-discriminatory and safe access to humanitarian assistance and for the impartial character of humanitarian operations.

2. Practical involvement

The exact modalities of cross-border operations will eventually depend on such factors as the number of asylum-seekers in any given location, their own coping mechanisms and any local assistance capacity. Operations should focus on ensuring that the basic physical and protection needs are met. Fixed camp structures should be avoided.

Because asylum-seeking populations would be of special concern to the High Commissioner, and given the practical linkages between operations on either side of the border. UNHCR will retain a a co-ordinating role on asylum seekers. As described above, it is understood that in the event there is a failure to successfully negotiate with the governments concerned on admission for asylum seekers, as part of a joint and coordinated UNCT and regional strategy, UN humanitarian agencies and UNHCR will commence cross-border support operations in favour of populations stranded at the border. Plans are being developed discretely at the UNCT level to prepare for this eventuality should a cross-border response be required.

In recognition of the ICRC's specific mandate and expertise with regard to the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict, close liaising with the ICRC on crosscutting concerns will be particularly important.

Protection in non-neighbouring countries

In the event of an emergency, it will be necessary to declare a moratorium on refugee return to Iraq.

Level of Preparedness

UNHCR has adopted a phased approach to preparedness for a possible crisis in and around fraq subject to availability of funds:

- Pre-positioning of NFIs in three locations in the sub-region⁴ for an initial outflow of 100,000 people into the countries bordering Iraq with the intention to increase this to 600,000 people as funds become available;
- Missions by Senior Emergency Officers to Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudia Arabia for Contingency Planning. Contingency Plans done at the interagency level. UNHCR plans completed for all countries.
- Deployments of Telecoms Officers to Syria, Jordan Kuwait, and Turkey to set up Telecommunications network under MOSS/MiST compliance.

Iskenderun in Turkey and Aqaba in Jordan.

 Mission to Turkey and Kuwait by Senior Logistics Officer to review Regional Warehousing and distribution networks.

 In addition, UNHCR's global stand-by capacity includes 72 international staff members ready for deployment within 72 hours and a Central Emergency Stockpile in Copenhagen with NFIs for 250,000 persons.

Emergency Training for staff in Iraq, and surrounding countries.

 Joint Interagency Contingency Planning missions to Turkey, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan. Saudi Arabia.

In the context of the IASC Reference Group on preparedness, close co-ordination and ongoing information sharing is maintained with OCHA and other concerned UN agencies.

Constraints on Level of Preparedness

Fund Raising Strategy and Current Financial Constraints

It is clear that the current financial constraints facing UNHCR, in particular the lack of operational reserves, prevents the Organisation from preparing for the full projected outflow (600,000). Should a crisis in Iraq become inevitable, the rapid mobilisation of resources (i.e. rapid response by donor governments) will be essential to respond to the immediate needs of the people and avoid undue suffering. A funding strategy is under discussion internally, and will eventually be co-ordinated at the inter-agency level.

8.4 THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

8.4.1 Preparedness measures and planned emergency response in view of a potential crisis affecting Iraq and bordering countries

WHO's contingency plan for Iraq is developed under the leadership of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO), based in Cairo. Given the impact that the crisis would have on surrounding countries, the plan also covers Iran, Jordan, Kuwuit, the OPT, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. The plan is based on preliminary estimates of WHO country offices and the regional inter-agency contingency planning process. It is designed to assist around 4.9 million people inside and outside Iraq, for at least six months. The beneficiary population would comprise war affected civilians, vulnerable groups, IDPs, asylum seekers and refugees in Iraq and bordering countries. Focus shall also be maintained on the populations and the health systems of the surrounding countries.

WHO will mainly assist with strategic and operational public health guidance and coordination, working through its national and international partners so to reduce the avoidable mortality and morbidity resulting from the events.

8.4.2 Preparedness

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Over the past months, WHO has taken a number of preparedness measures:

⁵ This includes support costs and a tump sum for vital sectors (water, sanitation, etc.)

- Missions to WHO offices in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to assess operational and strategic needs; in addition to a number of planning meetings with WHO Representatives
- Consolidating information on the staff posted in the region (currently 327)
- Stock-taking of WHO regular budget resources available in the region
- Ordering and propositioning emergency medical supplies to specific countries
- Training staff in emergency management and defining lines of command in case of withdrawal of international staff from Iraq
- Accelerating the implementation of Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) for all national and international staff, including security training and emergency communication
- Setting-up and strengthening in-house and external consultation mechanisms to deal with technical questions
- Establishing a crisis management unit in Cairo
- Developing a regional contingency planning for emergency preparedness and response in the event of a crisis in the region

The cost of the complete implementation of all these measures cannot be covered by WHO's regular budget. Only extra-budgetary funding can sustain and enhance current efforts and to reach an adequate level of preparedness. Total financial requirements for three months of the activities above, are currently estimated at about USD 6.3 million.

8.4.3 Plans for Emergency Response

The context. The health of the Iraqi population is uncaterious, communicable and chronic conditions. Eleven years of sanctions have worsened structural vulnerability, for individuals, communities and institutions. An armed conflict is expected to bring a substantial increase in the risk of traumas and injuries, malnutrition, and restricted access to clean water, sanitation, shelter, health and services in general. Outbreaks will be special concern, especially cholera and typhoid, and measles, assuming population displacement and insufficient immunization coverage: historical records suggest an accumulation of susceptible children.

A special feature of Iraq are the health concerns inspired by depleted uranium (DU), the memory and consequences of past chemical warfare and the presumed existence of stocks of weapon-grade chemical and bacteriological agents. In addition, the experience of the Balkans suggests that aerial bombing in modern, industrial areas can imply hazardous environmental pollution.

Objectives, outputs and activities of WHO Emergency Response.

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When identifying possible components of its plan, WHO concentrated on the objectives and outputs that it can manage satisfactorily in such a difficult context, taking into consideration its capacities and responsibilities as a UN Specialised Agency for health, WHO aims:

- 1. To safeguard the health status and health systems of the tradi population, by
 - 1.1. ensuring that the population in Iraq receives prompt and effective health care through key public health programs,
 - 1.2. ensuring that the damage to health and health-related systems is minimised,
 - 1.3. having selected, key health facilities rehabilitated and upgraded as soon as the situation allows
 - 1.4 supporting health sector coordination mechanisms for humanitarian assistance
 - 1.5 supporting initial rapid health assessments addressing health needs and concerns
- 2. To safeguard the health status of Iraqi refugees migrating to neighboring countries and health systems of the host communities, by

- 2.1. ensuring that refugees receive prompt and effective health care (in support of UNHCR's mandate).
- 2.2. ensuring that host communities and local health systems are not unduly burdened,
- 2.3. ensuring a fast recovery of the health sector once conditions in Iraq allow for the return of refugees and IDPs
- 2.4 supporting health sector coordination mechanism for humanitarian assistance
- 2.5 supporting initial rapid health essessments addressing health needs and concerns
- 3. To safeguard WHO staff and assets, by
 - 3.1. securing the life and the welfare of national staff and dependants,
 - 3.2. securing the life and the welfare of international staff,
 - 3.3. reducing material losses so to be ready to resume country work as soon as possible.

In order to achieve the above, the following activities are planned:

- VVHO national staff within Iraq will continue to assist national health partners for on-site delivery
 of services/assistance;
- International staff evacuated from Iraq will be relocated close to the centre of UN operational coordination, or to WHO offices in surrounding countries, so to maintain guidance to staff in Iraq, while supporting health partners for cross-border operations into Iraq and humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees;
- Additional resources, for general public health management and coordination, or for specific tasks - specialised technical advice, etc- will be mobilised by EMRO from Cairo, Geneva and/or collaborating centres;
- Cross-border health operations in support of UN humanitarian assistance to Iraq will be
 monitored and supervised by the WHO offices in the concerned country; in some countries,
 e.g. Iran, this may entail the need for WHO to decentralise capacities to sub-offices;
- The involvement of WHO Regional Office for Europe (EURO) will facilitate humanitarian access for health supplies or operations via Turkey;
- The WHO representative in Iraq will integrate the UN operational coordination;
- The Regional Office for WHO will provide coordination and backstopping to WHO operations from Cairo.;
- WHO-Geneva will provide technical, scientific and strategic backstopping liaising between EMRO, collaborating centres, IASC partners, donors and the media
- WHO will facilitate conducting public health management in emergencies refresher/training courses in countries that may be affected by an emergency

The estimated extra-budgetary requirements for six months of operations would be around USD 11.6 million ...

8.5 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Operational objectives:

- Support to in-country coordination through the Resident Coordinator System:
 - Support to the coordination of the consolidation and regular up-dating of contingency plans;
 - Regular situation analysis and monitoring;
 - Exchange of information, data, and analysis with the UN Country Teams;
 - Data collection and analysis.
- Capacity building support to key national response institutions (governmental and non-governmental):
 - on Review of national contingency plans and organizational arrangements;

- o Enhancement of the response capacity / support to Operational Centers;
- o Situation assessments.
- Depending on the evolution of the situation and, in case of conflict, on the length of the first emergency period and the gradual emergence of the transitional recovery phase, UNDP would be prepared, should funding be available, to rapidly beef-up its operational and delivery capacities and move quickly into recovery and reconstruction, in areas such as demining; emergency rehabilitation; support to the reintegration of displaced people; support to the re-establishment of governance structures; national and local capacity building; with a view to contribute, in the longer term, to eventual Nation building requirements.

Planning and preparations:

- A senior level UNDP Task Force has been established in New York to provide guidance on preparedness and contingency planning. UNDP Regional Bureau for the Arab States, in close coordination with UNDP-Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
 providing an operational leadership.
- UNDr Country Offices are up-dating / consolidating their preparedness and contingency plans, in consultation with other UN agencies, national authorities and other national and international partners.
- UNDP is pre-emptively strengthening the capacities of its Country Offices / Resident Coordinators Offices in Iraq and key neighbouring countries (Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). Additional staff are in the process of being redeployed to these countries, to essentially (i) support the RCs in the coordination of their respective UNCTs; (ii) review and/or further define UNDP's contingency plan as part of the broader UNCT contingency plan; (iii) support capacity building efforts to strengthen key national emergency response institutions; (iv) guide the elaboration and/or review UNDP's mitigation and recovery strategy.
- UNDP Development Group Office is in the process of providing additional support to the Resident Coordinator System in key countries. Should funding be available UNDP is also planning to provide additional support to its Country Offices in terms of coordination and national capacity building on preparedness and emergency response through the recruitment of 12 UN Volunteers.
- UNDP is taking action to ensure that minimum organizational security standards (MOSS) are met and is coordinating with other UN agencies on telecommunications.

8.6 MAIN ACTORS (Iraq)

National actors

Central Government structures and administrative units play a key role in coordinating and in the delivery of services and commodities under the existing OFF arrangement for Central and Southern Iraq. An emergency operation within Iraq will have to take into account the possibility that these structures will be at least partly disrupted and not in a position to operate properly for a certain period of time. This will enormously affect national capacities to deliver assistance. A similar situation may also eventuate at the provincial level in some parts of the country.

Military

Hostilities in Iraq would see opposing military forces and actors on the ground. In their relation with the militaries, the UN humanitarian partners would be guided by the existing IASC principles of Military-Civilian relations (below) and by overriding staff safety and security concerns.

OIP/UNOCHI

UNOCHI presently plays a crucial role in the coordination of OFF humanitarian programmes in Iraq. Its role and modus operandi would probably have to be reviewed following the outbreak of hostilities, and the potential temporary interruption or cessation of the OFF arrangements.

UN agencies UN system agencies have been coordinating on both policy and operational matters with a view to a potential crisis in Iraq. Regional plans have been drawn and are being continuously updated. WFP, WHO and UNICEF are expected to be key players within traq. UNHCR will lead the UN's effort to ensure protection and assistance for both refugees and asylum seekers stranded at the border. WFP UNICEF and other agencies will support UNHCR in this effort. Details about UNCT coordination arrangements by sector will be provided in a revised version of this document. UNDP is planning to play a key role in the ensuing rehabilitation and recovery transition phase.

ICRC and IRCS ICRC is expected to be a key actor during the active conflict situation, and to continue to deliver assistance in different sectoral arras in a post-conflict phase. The traqi Red Crescent Society is expected to play a key role in implementation of response operations particularly after the conflict-The IRCS's operational capacity during the conflict phase may be severely constrained.

International NGOs The international NGO community, with a few exceptions, is largely absent from Iraq⁶. In the event of a conflict, should the situation permit, it could be precised to have a convergence of international NGOs. This would inter alia put severely demands on the UN in terms of coordination.

In the Center South, less than ten international NGOs have permission to operate. Humanitarian assistance in this part of the country would be largely dependent on the UN and implementing partners to implement the OFF program. CARE is by far the major NGO with a consolidated presence in this part of the country, currently engaged primarily in the water and sanitation sector. It is expected that CARE's capacity might expand in a post-conflict phase.

In the North, NGO activity is richer. Several International NGOs are operating, including SCF/UK, CARE, Christian Aid, Islamic Relief (See Annex 3). Again, NGOs would be expected to play a pivotal role if access and security conditions permit.

MAIN ACTORS (Bordering countries) 8.7

National authorities and Potential partners

UNCTs in bordering countries have been in dialogue with national authorities and potential partners regarding the eventuality of a humanitarian and refugee crisis unfolding at border areas. Planning by UNCTs is quite advanced and takes into account the potential for both refugee, crossborder and trans-border operations. In most cases, it has been possible for the UN humanitarian agencies to establish initial contacts so as to share information regarding a possible cooperation in the event of a humanitarian crisis.

In most of the countries bordering Iraq humanitarian response to a refugee crisis will be ensured through the national Red Crescent Society, which work and action UN agencies therefore plan to supplement and support. The admission policy adopted by each country will of course be crucial in determining how the UN system will be able to support. As clarified below, the common stand of the UN will be in favor of open borders, and UNHCR will continue to negotiate with the neighbouring countries to advocate for the rights of those in need of international protection.

Similarly, the Iraqi national NGO capacity is modest in size and scope. National NGOs have increased in the North, but tend to focus on development oriented projects, IRC paper: Iraq; The Urgent Need For Humanitarian Coordination and alogue, November 2002, p.2.

Several International NGOs are also present in the region and would play a pivotal role as implementing partners to the UN.

4. 18.

Security factors and considerations may also play a prominent role in the way national authorities plan to respond to a potential refugee crisis at border areas. In some situations, militaries may be called to play a key role including in securing the areas of settlement of IDPs, refugees, and/or asylum seekers. It can also be expected that militaries might engage in some forms of assistance to populations in need (infrastructure, security). In these situations, special efforts will be required by the UN humanitarian actors to interface with national authorities and ensure the compliance with humanitarian standards and principles. Special attention will also have to be given to planning for cross-border operations for populations inside Iraq.

ANNEXES

- 1 PRINCIPLES'GUIDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION
- 2 IASC PRINCIPLES ON MILITIARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS
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ANNEX 1

PRINCIPLES GUIDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Humanity. Human suffering is to be addressed wherever it exists. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Impartiality. The provision of humanitarian assistance is based on needs assessments carried out by the UN, ICRC, and NGOs following internationally recognized standards, without discriminating by ethnicity, nationality, race, gender, religion, class, or political opinion.

Neutrality. Humanitarian action takes place without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in political, religious, or ideological controversies. Aid has an independent status beyond political or military considerations and should be viewed as such.

Protection. The fundamental right of all persons to live in safety and dignity, as well as the right to reside in the location of their choice, including return, must be affirmed and protected, and is an integral part of humanitarian action.

The Right to seek Asylum and return in safety and dignity

Independence. Humanitarian organizations endeavour not to act as instruments of government policy. Humanitarian agencies formulate their own policies and strategies and will not implement any policy of any government, except insofar as it coincides with their own policy.

Transparency and Accountability. Humanitarian agencies will implement activities transparently. Organisations are accountable to the people they assist and to those from whom they accept resources.

ANNEX 2

IASC PRINCIPLES ON MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS

- Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- 2. Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, an its use should be a last resort.
- 3. A humanitarian coperation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organisation responsible for the operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. To the extent possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.
- 4. Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organisation responsible for that deployment.
- 5. The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided.
- 6. Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character. .

Country	MAIN ACTOR NGO – IO – Red Cross –National Authorities As of December 2002	SECTOR
	Sharth with the UNIT	General protection needs
Iraq	Regional Government (North) works with the UN to implement programs in favor of the displaced and	General protection needs
North	other vulnerable groups (2001-2002)	
	 ICRC and IFRC provide assistance to the IDPs in 	
	northern Iraq (2000-2002)	General protection needs
	Save the Children Fund, UK	,
	• 4RS	 Children and vulnerable group
	* * RG	in Kurdistan
	CAFOD	A) Provide Income generated
		project for displaced and
	Care Int. UK	yulnerable women; B)* Emergency Drought and Publi
	Christian Aid	Awareness Pilot Project
	• ACORN	
	Help Age International	DEACH Interested Malor
		 REACH, Integrated Water, Management program
	Islamic Relief	Physical disabilities with
		children through physiotherap
		General Support to the old .
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Center South		
Iran	Iranian Red Crescent Society	•
Turkey	Turkish Red Crescent Society	•
Jordan	Jordanian Red Crescent Society	•
Syria	Syrian Red Crescent Society	•
Saudi Arabia	•	•
Kuwait	•	•

COUN	TRIES					
	CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ SURGE CAPACITY	CURRENT LEVEL OF READINESS IN THE SUS-REGION	DESIRED LEVEL OF READINESS IF ADEQUATE FUNDING MADE AVAILABLE 1	FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS PRE- EMERGENCY PRE- POSITIONING (USD)	Financial Requirements for Month One of Operation In Event of Emergency (USD)	FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SIX MONTH OPERATION IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY (USD)
UNHCR	Central Emergency Stockpile of relief supplies for 250,000 persons 72 UNHCR staff members on 72 hour standby capacity Additional NGO partner staff on standby Pre-positioning of registration materials	Pre-positioning of non-food relief items for 100,000 underway Urgent upgrading of telecoms to ensure MOSS Compliance currently underway Contingency plans developed both at sub-regional and at the country level are underway Support missions undertaken/planned in concerned countries Targeted training of country staff in Emergency Management	 Pre-positioning of non-food relief items for 600,000 persons Funding for preparedness support missions Funding for initial response Funding for upgrading of infrastructure to meet new MOSS requirements in event of emergency 	5C 000,000	68,624,432*	154,070,429*
d \$ 1, 154	!		UNHCR SUB-TOTAL	60,000,0001	68,524,4321	154,070,42911
UNICEF	Standing surge capacity for up to 500,000 beneficiaries for all UNICEF basic programmes, available on demand from warehouse in Copenhagen Immediate human resource mobilization based on redeployment of in-country staff, redeployment of UNICEF's regional and global staffing pool and partnership arrangements.	Country and sub-regional preparedness/response planning/plans in place. Pre-positioned supplies for emergency health, nutrition, water/sanitation, child protection and education response in strategic locations in: Iraq (550,000) Iran (100,000) Viran (100,000) Viran (10,000)	Enhanced staffing and human resource capacities Continued enhancement of all programme and operational capacities Continued pre-positioning of supplies in the region Continued planning	9,000.000	30,000.000	100,000.000
			UNICEF SUB-TOTAL	_ . 39	million .	100 million

⁷ On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has determined that USD80 million is needed in order to establish an appropriate level of preparedness for 600,000 potential beneficiaries against a total potential beneficiary planning figure of 600,000 persons.

On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has estimated that a total of \$65,524,432 would be needed in the first month of an emergency in order to meet the protection and material assistance requirements of a potential beneficiary population of 600,000 persons.

On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has estimated that a total of \$154,070,429 would be required to meet the protection and material assistance requirements of a potential beneficiary population of \$00,000 persons for a period of 6 months. This amount includes the pre-emergency (\$11,514,532) and month one of the emergency (\$88,624,432) requirements.

To On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has determined that \$11,514,632 is needed in order to establish an appropriate level of preparedness for 100,000 potential beneficiaries against a total potential beneficiary planning figure of 600,000 persons.

On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has estimated that a total of \$88,824,432 would be needed in the first month of an emergency in order to meet the protection and material assistance requirements of a potential beneficiary population of \$00,000 persons.

On the basis of detailed contingency planning, UNHCR has estimated that a total of \$154,070,429 would be required to meet the protection and material assistance requirements of a potential beneficiary population of 600,000 persons for a period of 6 months. This amount includes the pre-emergency (\$11,514,532) and month one of the emergency (\$68,624,432) requirements.

	G CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ SURGE CAPACITY	CURRENT LEVEL OF READINESS IN THE SUB-REGION	DESIRED LEVEL OF READINESS IF ADEQUATE FUNDING MADE AVAILABLE	FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS PREP	Requirements for Month One of Operation in Event of Emergency (USD)	FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SIX MONTH OPERATION IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY (USD)
WFP	Standing response/surge capacity includes:	The following measures have been initiated:	The completion of all readiness measures	Logs: 735,000	EMOP: 65,241,000	EMOP: 325,149,000
	Food and non-food items available from WFP	Pre-positioning of food	International desiration for a	ICT: 2,440,000	IA ICT: 3,000,000	IA ICT: 3,860,000
	contingency stocks	commodifies for caseload of up to 900,000 people	previous column), will enable WFP to be	IA ICT: 160,000	UNJLC: 360,000	UNJLC: 2,365,000
	(UNHRO Brindisl, FITTEST Dubar)	sufficient for one month CT upgrades in all	prepared to provide food assistance to a planned	JLC: 165,000	UNHAS 430,000	UNHAS: 2,600,000,
	 Stand-by agreements with implementing partners 	neighbouring countries, _including commodity	caseload of 4.9 to 9.6 million through a regional	Commodity 3,650,000		
	and with neighbouring country governments to	tracking system In-depth logistics	Emergency Operation (EMOP) for an initial	prepositioni di ng:		
	borrow from national strategic stocks (cereals)	assessments in Iraq and all neighbouring countries	duration of six months, • Preparedness measures	**		
	Immediate staff mobilization through	(corridors and assistance to refugees)	and planned emergency response are also costed	TOTAL: 7,150,000	TOTAL: 69,031,000 (for low	TOTAL: 333,974,000 (Low
	reassignment, TDY, Emergency Response	Augmentation of logistics and programme capacity	for Inter-Agency services (ICT and UNJLC).	9, 4	impact scenario —	Impact)
	Roster (ERR)	in all neighbouring countries, including	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	1	requirements to be adjusted	(medium 590,721,333 impact
		Turkey Targeted training sessions			for medium impact)	scenario)
		in emergency				
	Pr .	response/needs assessment		, ;	.'	<i>*</i>
ОСНА	Non-ERR staff pre- selected for specific	Virtual HIC in place with	Coordination and	\$104,877 for one month seconding to staffing table	\$104,877 covering pre- deployment staff in	\$415,942 covering pre- deployment staff in Jordan,
	positions in region	development ongoing Deployment of HIC staff	information staff to be based in all regional UN		Jordan, Turkey, Syria,	Turkey, Syria, Iran and 2 HIC staff who would be
	Immediate staff deployment through ERR	to the region, Pre-deployment of	offices in addition support for Regional	\$30,000 for HIC equipment and operation costs	would be expected to	expected to continue their
::	Deployment of specialised staff through	coordinational staff to countries neighbouring	Humanitarian Coordinator Focal point(s) for Civil /	ļ'. ,.	continue their functions.	functions.
, i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	partnership arrangements (NRC, DRC, SRSA, etc)	Iraq to assist RCs and UNCTs with coordination	Military coordination Pre-deployment of staff to		\$248,175 for one month operation in event of	\$949,482 for 6 month operation in the event of
	 Immediate deployment of equipment through 		regional HICs and RHC office to assist with		emergency.	an emergency
	partnership апалдетеліз (SRSA)		coordination efforts and information flow	New York	\$557,781 for HIC equipment/operational	\$1,241,990 for HIC 3. equipment/operational.
	Con seer of	•	B		costs. HIC staffing is included in the staffing	HIC staffing is included in the \$1,365,500 cited
			,		table.	above.
				OCHA TOTAL: \$134,877	OCHA TOTAL: \$910.833	OCHA TOTAL: \$2,606,500
25				7.07.0	40.10,000	

This budget includes: the recovery of preparedness pre-emergency pre-positioning costs; and the estimated cost for the first month of operations.

This budget includes: the recovery of preparedness pre-emergency pre-positioning costs; and the estimated cost for the first month of operations.

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UNDP	Immediate deployment of 7 staff to support RCs in Iraq and all neighbouring countries; Specialized staff preselected for specific positions in Iraq and neighbouring countries; UNDP BCPR technical resources in disaster management; recovery; mine action; etc.; Additional resources from UNDGO to support in-country UN coordination.	Deployment of 7 staff under way to support RCs coordination functions and UNDP Country Offices contingency planning: Contingency planning missions sent to iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: Contingency plans reviewed or under review; UNDP currently reviewing with national authorities/institutions level of preparedness / response capacities and additional requirements.	Deployment of 12 UN Volunteers to further strengthen RCs coordination capacities and support national capacity building in disa: ter/emergency coon lination and response; Procurement of critical equipment to support national response capacities; Procurement of secure communication equipment; Continued enhancement of all programme and operational capacities; Coordination of Country Teams and Host Countries liaison.	820,00013	Covered under pre-positioning	10,000,000
			UNDP SUB-TOTAL	R:	20,000	10,000,000

¹⁹ UNDP has determined that US\$820,000 would be necessary to (i) further strengthen in-country UN Coordination (for the coordination of the consolidation and regular up-dating of contingency plans; situation analysis and monitoring; exchange of information, data, and analysis with the UN Country Teams; data collection and analysis); (ii) provide capacity building sipport to key national response institutions (review of national contingency plans and organizational arrangements; support to rehearsal exercises; enhancement of the response capacity / support to Operational Centers situation assessments; information management; procurement of critical electronic and communication equipment).

This figure is indicative only and actual requirements will very much depend on the evolution of the situation and, in case of conflict, on the length of the first emergency period and the gradual emergence of the transitional recovery phase. UNDP would be prepared to move quickly in terms of recovery and reconstruction, in areas such as de-mining; emergency rehabilitation; support to the reintegration of displaced people; support to the re-establishment of governance structures; national and local capacity building; with a view to contribute, in the longer term, to ever fuel Nation building requirements. UNDP will also seek funding to rapidly beef up its implementation and delivery capacities in affected countries? regions.

	CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE/ SURGE CAPACITY	CURRENT LEVEL OF READINESS IN THE SUB-REGION	DESIRED LEVEL OF READINESS IF ADEQUATE FUNDING MADE AVAILABLE	REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS PRE- EMERGENCY PRE- POSITIONING	for Month One of Operation in Event of Emergency (USD)	FOR SIX MONTH OPERATION IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY (USD)
WHO	1. Staffing: EHA/EMRO-Cairo staff EHA/HQ-Geneva staff Surge team from WHO technical Departments like Communicable diseases etc 327 WHO staff in all	WHO office staff in the region, especially the staff operating in Iraq under Oil for food programme (311 staff) Assessment taken place in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and partially to Kuwait	a) Staffing: 1. Countries surrounding frequenced at least three additional international and 10 national in each country. Area to be covered are; health WHO lead agency), nutrition at d water and sanitation (where WHO participates)	2,950,000	6,327,833 of the preparedness costs plus an additional 20% of supplies (819,000) and 30% of the logistics, administration and communication (702,300)	
	countries of the region (mainly in Iraq) 2. Financial resources available (still in processing). Regular budget in each country of the region, including Iraq.	•	2. Regional Co-orc nation Office In Cairo: C isla room with additional 7 pro essional staff (logistic officer , medical officers, media officers, communication officers and additional administrators are needed	300,000		
	Regular budget for the biannum are: Syria: 1,427,000 Jordan :850,000 Iran: 2,123,000 Iraq: 1,661,400		3, HQ in Geneva no ads resource mobilisations and information management. 7 advocacy officer for the coordination cell. Communication and logistic support. b) Supplies:	100,000 2,047,500		
	(the RB can only be modified upon the request/consent of the Member State) 3. Supplies: Four NEHK placed in Amman. Additional		50% of the supplies needed for the entire operation (4,095,000) for five months should be purchased and placed in the region c) Logistics 30% of the total logistics and	780,333		
	supplies purchased in the framework of WHO Regular budget programme	, 	administrative support needed in all countries including Iraq is (2,341,000) e) Assessment and crash training on preparedness and response for various issues.	150,000		
			Preparation of health education matters for public use.	6,327,833	7,849,133	11,568,260

IOM Component – Planned Activities and Budget— (Version 12 Dec 2002a)

IOM role: IOM is part of the UNCT preparedness planning in the countries bordering Iraq, as well as in the regional interagency framework document. IOM's role is in transport / logistics, specifically in arranging the safe and orderly movement of refugees and stranded asylum seekers from border areas to designated camps. IOM is also given the lead role in providing assistance to fleeing third country nationals to return home.

Period covered and activities: 1 month initial response plus 6 months operational response, as well as pre-emergency preparedness.


Areas covered: 6 countries bordering lraq for refugee / asylum seeker caseload, plus Egypt, since IOM is also responsible for TCNs. In the emergency phase, IOM does not have activities inside lraq pending evolution of events.


Regional coordination office: As there is no interagency decision yet where the regional coordinating office will be located, both Cairo and Amman are potential sites, as well as Lamaca. IOM's planning assumes it will be in Lamaca for now

Planning figures: The 4 Dec 2002 interagency planning figure for humanitarian response includes 300,000 refugees and stranded asylum seekers broken down as follows: 20,000 to Jordan; 20,000 to Syria; 80,000 to Turkey; 150,000 to Iran (IOM not tasked to do transport of this caseload); 10,000 to Saudi Arabia and 20,000 to Kuwait. IOM is thus currently tasked with local movements of 150,000 refugees from the border to designated camps. In addition, UNHCR is preparing for an additional 200,000 stranded asylum seekers who may, depending on border policy of neighbouring countries, be included in the caseload. This possible additional caseload is reflected in the last line of the budget below. In total, therefore, IOM is planning for 350,000 refugees and stranded asylum seekers plus some 60,000 third country nationals leaving Iraq and or the region or a total of 410,000 persons. The 60,000 TCNs may be broken down as follows: 50,000 Egyptians from Iraq, 3,000 Sudanese from Iraq and 7,000 other nationalities from Iraq and from the region.

Activities / Items	Egypt	Jordan	Syria	Turkey	a Iran	-S Arabla	Kuwait w	Total (USD)
PREPAREDNESS				-		i ize gode	: 	250
Staff and travel	11,260	34,400	34,400	34,400	1 34,400	34,400	34,400	217,660
Office, supplies, equipment and kits	2,500	22,490	22,490	22,490	22,490	20,970	20,970	134,400
Admin / operations support	1,651	6,827	6,827	6,827	3 6,827	6,644	6,644	42,247
Sub-total	15,411	63,717	63,717	63,717	63,717	62,014	62,014	394,307
RESPONSE (1+6 MONTHS)		·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	· · · · ·	
Transport – border areas to camps	N/A	- 120,000	231,000	960,000	外 25,000	50,000	100,000	1,486,000
Transport – camps to air/sea ports; arrival point to home	600,000	960,000	30,000	31,900	15,000	15,000	60,000	1,711.900
Transport – air/sea ports to home country	2,600,000	·775,000	950,000	475,000	475,000	475,000	1,900,000	7,650,000
Movement-related health services	372,400	528,200	163,400	604,200	7,600		178,600	1,900,000
Staff, travel and security	918,540	588,952	147,238	147.238	147,238	73,619	220,857	2,243,682
Office, supplies, equipment, kits and information	332,360	531,143	159,999	284,697	152,293	95,092	218,165	1,773,750
. Admin / operations support	150,108	134,411	36,868	51,932	35,944	20,245	52,683	482,092

Total	4,988,819 3,701,423 1,782,222	2,618,584 921,792 836,	570 2,792,319 17,641,	,731
Transport of 200,000 stranded asylum seekers should these cross international borders (UNHCR estimate)	d		2,600	,000
Grand Total		4	20,241,	,731
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