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background
consequences
strategies

Proceedings of the Conference
hosted by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq
13–14 November 1999, Cambridge

CASI
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Introduction

On 13–14 November 1999, over 150 delegates from five countries arrived in Cambridge to attend a conference entitled 'Sanctions on Iraq: Background, Consequences, Strategies'. In the packed auditorium, they listened as eighteen speakers from four countries – including prominent historians, diplomats, public health specialists, anthropologists, journalists, activists and Iraqi citizens – chronicled Iraq's manifold suffering under the sanctions regime imposed after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In session after session, the audience contributed their challenges, questions, private reflections and professional experiences. The result was an impassioned debate. While the whole dynamic of this dialogue cannot be reproduced in print, the *Proceedings* offer the speeches that launched it. We invite readers to engage critically with this story of disaster.

The 'narrative' of our government, as our final speaker Dr Eric Herring points out, deserves our most alert and critical attention. It was exactly this concern that motivated the host, Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI), to begin organising this conference in the summer of 1999. Students founded this University of Cambridge society in 1997 to campaign for lifting non-military sanctions in Iraq in response to the humanitarian crisis. Since then, the official story of containment and relief has been seriously questioned. Few may now believe that sanctions effectively 'contain' Saddam Hussein's weapons development programme with minimal human suffering. But who can provide a more reliable account of the impact of sanctions on the state of Iraq, from public health to weapons of mass destruction to family and social ties? And how can we validate that account, except by comparison with other viewpoints?

We hope that these *Proceedings* can plug that gap. The

speeches offer a variety of viewpoints, sometimes conflicting and often mutually elaborating. They are anything but homogeneous; nor do they express the views of CASI. They do however reflect the contradictions inherent in the official line. Although Ivor Lucas paints a damning portrait of Saddam Hussein, for example, he denies the effectiveness of sanctions in degrading Hussein's power. George Joffé questions the conventional wisdom on the relation between British and American policy in the Gulf and access to oil; Chris Doyle deconstructs the ambivalent relationship between Iraq, the Middle East, and the West; Hugh Macdonald disentangles the accusations and the facts of Iraq's weapons programmes.

Some of the speakers draw our attention to the silent costs of sanctions: Nadje Al-Ali sows some seeds of optimisim in the creativity and endurance of women, but surveys the moral and social impact of hardship on their families. Nikki van der Gaag recalls Iraq's wasted artistic and archaeological treasures; Harriet Griffin reflects on the life of Iraqi refugees. Emad Salman and Felicity Arbuthnot provide compelling personal testimony to the dolorous conditions of life in Iraq.

Most of the speakers undermine British and American governmental doctrine on the validity of sanctions, but perhaps none more powerfully than Richard Garfield. Garfield negotiates ambiguous public health data to substantiate the human cost of sanctions: Iraq is the only instance of a sustained increase in mortality outside or war, famine or genocide in a population of more than 2 million in the past two hundred years. Doug Rokke, while not directly addressing the consequences of sanctions, unveiled an environmental and medical catastrophe with a 4 billion year half-life – one for which Iraq, its hospitals and infrastructure evicerated by sanctions, is now completely unprepared. The shocking consequences of the use of Depleted Uranium munitions are matched only by the chilling and continued indifference of the US and Brit-

ish governments to their effect on civilian populations.

The courageous work of activists and humanitarians is also profiled here. Representatives of Save the Children (UK) Rita Bhatia and Andrea Ledward outline the operational constraints, challenges and potential victories of humanitarian groups working on the ground in Iraq and in the halls of power. From another perspective, Milan Rai offers a brief history of activism on Iraq's behalf, opening his session to audience participation with characteristic generosity.

While we were glad to hear presentations from representatives of the governments of UK and France, (Jon Davies for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Anis Nacrour for the French Embassy) they were given off-the-record; and they have elected to prepare statements instead. Anthonius de Vries offered guidance to advocates of 'smart sanctions' on behalf of the European Union, similarly off-the-record. These remarks are not included, though those of their charismatic respondent, Eric Herring, are (with slight emendation).

The *Proceedings* are not intended to impose one particular conclusion on these varied presentations. However, a few certainties can be said to have emerged over those two November days: that the failure to incorporate an evaluation component into sanctions provisions has been exceptional and disastrous, preventing humanitarian agencies from obtaining vital data to shape their programmes; that mechanisms to trigger the end of sanctions are complex and political; that the logic of linking compliance in weapons inspections with suspension of sanctions is incomplete; and that the sanctions regime is largely dictated by the will of Washington.

The texts presented here were edited with their authors' help from transcribed recordings. They are arranged in the order in which they were given at the conference. Some speakers added notes as a consequence of the many and complicated developments since the conference; others elaborated

on details within the body of their speech.

We would like to express our gratitude to the speakers for their informed and eloquent contributions to the ongoing discussion of the challenge of Iraq. The generosity and spirit of the audience, combined with the expertise and courage of the speakers, made for a genuinely inspiring event. We thank those who made financial donations and all those involved in organisation and publicity.

Since 1997 CASI has maintained the largest electronic discussion list on sanctions in the UK and an informative website on sanctions. It has organised numerous speaker meetings and events including the UK tour of UN Assistant Secretary-General Denis Halliday. In addition it has produced a large number of documents and briefings and co-ordinates with other anti-sanctions groups. The conference, however, was the largest single event that CASI has ever managed. Without the superhuman effort of conference co-ordinator Seb Wills it probably would not have been the impressive event it turned out to be.

We hope that the *Proceedings*, like the conference that inspired them, extend the community of people actively campaigning for the end of sanctions in Iraq. But however they are read or used by activists, humanitarians, students, policy makers, the interested, the curious, or the concerned, we are privileged to have joined in the chorus of Iraq's twenty-two million suffering people. Like them, we wish to give witness to this unspeakable tragedy.

—Andrea Brady and Eliza Hilton.

CASI thanks for their transcription and editorial contributions: Andrea Brady, Eleanor Coghill, Alison Draper, Eliza Hilton, Hugh Jones, Steve Pollard, Glen Rangwala, Colin Rowat and Chris Williams.

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SESSION 1 : HISTORY

'20 Years of Saddam Hussein, 1979–1999.'

HON. IVOR LUCAS CMG

Educated at Trinity College, Oxford, **Ivor Lucas** served in the Royal Artillery from 1945–8 in the Middle East. From 1951–198'4 he pursued a career in HM Diplomatic Service, serving in the Gulf States, Pakistan, Libya, South Yemen, Northern Nigeria and Denmark. He was head of the Middle East Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1975–1979 and was Ambassador to Oman (1979–1981) and to Syria (1982–1984). From 1985–1987, he was Assistant Secretary-General at the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce. From 1991–1994 he was Fellow in International Politics of the Middle East at the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University. He is currently Chairman of the editorial board of *Asian Affairs*, a Vice-President of the Anglo-Omani Society, a member of the Central Council, Royal Overseas League, and a trustee of the Commonwealth Linking Trust. Publications include *A Road to Damascus: Mainly Diplomatic Memoirs from the Middle East* (Radcliffe Press, 1997) and *Britain and the United Arab Emirates: Old Patterns and New Horizons* (Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS, Occasional Paper no. 17, 1999.)

Ivor Lucas opened the conference by giving a historical overview of Saddam Hussein, the Ba'th Party and their relations in the Middle East and with the West that led up to the 1991 crisis. He began with a brief biography of Saddam Hussein, from his birth in the small town of Takrit to his role in the Ba'thist revolution and his accession to the Presidency of Iraq in 1979, a year that also saw the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Camp David Accords. The latter opened the Arab leadership to Hussein's aspiration, just as he began to realize a Ba'thist aim – the increased the wealth and status of Iraq – through programmes of economic development and social improvement. Mr Lucas stressed the potential of Iraq as a leading Arab state, frustrated by mixed ethnicity and religion that divide the country. He described the

Iran–Iraq war, precipitated by Hussein's invasion in 1980, as 'the longest, bloodiest and perhaps the most absurd Middle Eastern war that we have seen in this century'. The West's response was delayed and equivocal – perhaps one reason that Hussein miscalculated in anticipating no confrontation over his invasion of Kuwait. However, the threat it created to stability in the region and in the world was too great for the West to countenance. Mr Lucas supported the actions of the West in the Gulf War, noting that if Hussein had been able to extend his influence southwards he could have absorbed Saudi Arabia and controlled 40% of the world's oil reserves. Since the Gulf War, however, Hussein's exploitation of anti-Western feelings in the Arab and Muslim worlds, his manipulation of Western policies such as no-fly zones and weapons inspections, his continued oppression of his people and his recalcitrance suggest to Mr Lucas that, while the sanctions were originally justified and effective, they have now become 'bankrupt and counterproductive'.

"Thank you very much and good morning. It is a great pleasure to be invited to participate in this event, particularly for me to do so in Cambridge, because a few years ago I spent a very happy time working with the Centre for International Studies here. I think as the first speaker from outside it falls to me to thank those who have arranged this event, and have obviously arranged it so well – Seb Wills, Abi Cox and Colin Rowat. Can I thank them on our behalf for such careful arrangements for our comfort and convenience during the conference.

Whatever our views about the situation in Iraq today, I take it that none of us has any sympathy, and still less support, for Saddam Hussein himself. I see it as my task in opening these proceedings, to explain as best I can how and why Saddam Hussein has got himself into the position of being responsible for one of the greatest human tragedies and one of the most intractable diplomatic impasses we have seen in

recent years. When you look at the world, from Kosovo to East Timor, that is saying quite a lot.

I should start by saying something about Saddam Hussein himself. What sort of a man is he? Well, he was born in 1937 in a little village near a town called Takrit on the river Tigris, about a hundred miles north of Baghdad. Takrit was, incidentally, also the birthplace of the warrior Salah al-Din and Saddam Hussein was very fond of reminding people of this fact – without, however, adding that Salah al-Din happened to be a Kurd. He came from humble origins and his father died before he was born. His mother married again very rapidly and Saddam's stepfather mistreated him absolutely appallingly. But Saddam managed to escape, if that's the right word, to Baghdad in 1955 to go to secondary school and in 1957, as quite a young man – only twenty – he joined the Ba'th party which was then a rising force in the Arab world. It was devoted, at least officially, to the principles of Unity (of the Arab nation), Freedom (from foreign domination), and Socialism (of a Marxist-Leninist variety).

Saddam's extremely unhappy childhood had by then already made its mark on him. Although he was highly intelligent, he was paranoid about his own security, totally indifferent to the suffering of other people and had an obsessive addiction to violence. Stories of his appalling cruelty are legion. They range from the well-known and catastrophic chemical warfare attack on his own Kurdish people in Halabja, to the more apocryphal. One such was when Saddam was visiting a school one day. He picked up a little six-year-old boy, sat him on his lap and said in an avuncular fashion, 'Do you know who I am?' 'Yes,' said the little boy, 'You're the man who whenever you appear on the television makes my father spit at the set.' The story goes on, I'm sorry to say, that the family was completely wiped out and their house demolished.

In 1959 Saddam took part in the unsuccessful assassination attempt on the then dictator Qasim. He was forced to flee to Egypt where he spent a couple of years. Then he returned in 1963 when Qasim was finally overthrown by, among others, the Ba'thists. But they only managed to hang on to power for a few months before everything went badly wrong for them and Saddam himself was put in jail. In 1966 he came out of prison and was elected deputy secretary general of the Ba'th party. When they obtained definitive power in 1968, which they have held ever since, it was through the military wing rather than the political wing that this was achieved. But Saddam set about reorganising the political wing, and in November 1969 he became Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council which was the real centre of authority in the country. By force of personality, not to mention various other kinds of force, he gradually worked his way to the top until he finally ousted the titular President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr in July 1979.

Now that year 1979 was a very critical and fateful year in the Middle East for three main reasons. First of all, on February 1st, Ayatollah Khomeni returned from exile to Tehran and put the seal on the Iran revolution. Seven months later, Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed the Camp David Accords which were to have the effect of removing Egypt from the front line of the Arab Front against Israeli expansionism. In between those two events was the third one, to which I have just referred, when on July 17th Saddam Hussein finally declared himself President of Iraq, in name as well as in fact. It wasn't long before he started to try to achieve his ambition to inherit the leadership of the Arab nation which President Sadat of Egypt had abandoned when he made peace with Israel. That ambition had been part of the aims of the Ba'th Party for some time. In October 1974, for example, they produced a document in which they de-

clared their determination to make Iraq a model state and a leader in the world. Indeed the Ba'th had some success in the late 1970s in the first of these objectives, when programmes of economic and social improvement were carried out. The traditionally oppressed Shi'a began to be a little better treated and there was even a measure of autonomy accorded to the Kurds. Also there was, in that period of 1974–1979, quite an improvement in relations with the West which had been at rock-bottom ever since the Hashemite, pro-western monarchy had been destroyed in a bloody revolution in 1958.

Now the irony was, to my mind, that if Saddam had gone about his Arab ambitions in a sensible way he could well have achieved them. Iraq is one of those countries that has so much going for it. It was a major oil producer, with reserves second only in the region to those of Saudi Arabia. Unlike many of the other oil-rich states it wasn't mainly or totally dependent on that volatile product to underpin its economy. It had abundant agricultural resources, plenty of water, and its population, which at that time was in the region of 18 million, was neither too large nor too small. So as I say, if Saddam played his cards right, the prize of Arab leadership could well have been his.

However, for all the advantages Iraq has, it has always been an extremely difficult country to rule. This is mainly because of the complex religious and ethnic situation. 95% of the population are Muslims. Just over 50% of those Muslims are Shi'a who live in the southern part of the country. But the ruling clique in Baghdad has always been Sunni Muslim. On top of that about 20% of the population of Iraq are Kurds, Sunni Muslim by religion, but not Arab by race. They inhabit the north of Iraq, as well as a number of neighbouring countries.

As if these endemic problems were not enough, or perhaps because he wanted to divert attention from them, Saddam

chose in September 1980 to attack the Arabs' immemorial Persian foe – Iran. He appears to have thought that by doing that he would gain a cheap and easy victory over a regime that he believed was weakened by revolution, and would therefore emerge as the great champion of the Arabs. Instead of which, as we know, he plunged his country into the longest, bloodiest and perhaps the most absurd Middle Eastern war that we've seen in this century. It all ended in 1988, in what can best be described as a draw in Iraq's favour.

That result came about largely because of the help which Iraq received towards the end from the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and even other Arab countries. At the beginning of that war all those people who later helped Iraq were sitting on the side-lines. They were quite happy to see these two regional giants at each other's throats as they thought that would stop them from intervening elsewhere. But by the end of the war they had all reached the conclusion that, as between revolutionary Iran and radical Iraq, the regime in Iran was the greater of two evils. Unfortunately they were about to create an even worse Frankenstein in Baghdad.

That fact undoubtedly helped Saddam to embark, within a couple of years of his unsuccessful venture in Iran, on his second colossal mistake: invading his tiny neighbour, Kuwait. Here again a massive miscalculation, as he seems to have thought that at the end of the day the international community, not to mention his Arab brothers, would not be willing to lift a finger against him.

We all know what happened, and there are still people who contend that the American-led coalition in 1991 should not have started Operation Desert Storm to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait, or should not have ended it when they did, short of moving all the way to Baghdad. Indeed, some people say both at once! I am no defender of US policies in the Middle East since World War II ended. But I believe, and I believed

then, that the Americans were right to go to war when they did, and equally right to stop the operation when they did. In the first place, if Saddam had been allowed to get away with one iota of his aggression towards Kuwait, it would have been only the first step to his domination of the Gulf region, and perhaps the Middle East more broadly. One should note that if he had got his hands on Kuwaiti oil and Saudi oil, in addition to what Iraq had, he would have controlled no less than 40% of the world's oil reserves.

The reasons for Desert Storm being called off when it was were equally compelling. The United Nations mandate for the campaign was confined to expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait. To continue the march to Baghdad would certainly not have guaranteed that Saddam was overthrown, and even if he had been, it then would have probably involved us (the Americans and the British) sitting in Baghdad trying to govern the ungovernable. Continuation of hostilities would have alienated the international community and certainly it would have alienated the Arab component of the coalition. They loathed Saddam but feared even more the possible dismemberment which they thought might follow his removal at that time. They thought this might have led to a scramble by his neighbours for the bits and pieces by Iran, Turkey and indeed the Arab countries themselves.

But, because of the unfinished business from the 1991 war, there is no doubt that Saddam snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. He was helped in doing so by a very typical factor, or set of factors, affecting the Arab and Muslim worlds. He played the Arab and Islamic cards to very good effect. It was actually absurd for Saddam to pose as the champion of the Arab cause in Palestine. Iraq, although it had been among the loudest Arab states in shouting the odds on that issue, was never in the forefront of the struggle against Israel to any practical degree. It was equally ridiculous for Saddam to pose

as the defender of Islam in danger. Iraq was essentially a secular state and Saddam himself is certainly no paragon of Islamic virtue. But both these cries found very ready echoes in many Arab and Muslim hearts.

The reason they did so is that there are, in that region and beyond it, profound feelings of humiliation over the fate of the Palestinians. The US and the UK are seen generally as having shamelessly betrayed their Arab friends. Emotions of that kind reinforced, and were themselves reinforced by, a clear trend in the Muslim world at that time, to turn away from the West in their lifestyles and mind-sets. When I say that I am not just talking about extremists. I am talking about the vast majority of devout Muslims who are certainly, as I say, devout, but not fanatics. Unfortunately Western opinion and Western media so often fail to distinguish between the two. So, for many Arabs and Muslims, Saddam was seen, rightly or wrongly, and for these psychological reasons if you like to call them that, as the man who had successfully defied the worst that the Western bullies could throw at him. And the charge of double standards – by which I mean the rapid and massive Western reaction to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, contrasted with its prolonged and cynical acquiescence to Israeli aggression in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and the Golan Heights – was too odious to ignore.

Having said all that, I have to admit that the result of Desert Storm was messy. I do believe that the outcome of not stopping it when we did would probably have been even messier. Unfortunately, the realism and pragmatism which, I think, characterised British and American policies at that time seems to have deserted them at the time of Desert Fox in December last year. There's no doubt that what some observers regard as the 'unfinished business' of the war in 1991 did leave Saddam in a position to continue his oppression of the Iraqi people, and to a lesser extent to resume his threatening pos-

ture towards his neighbours. So the disarmament measures and the economic sanctions organised by the UN may originally have been justified, and up to a point they may have initially been effective. But after eight years, I think they have become bankrupt and counterproductive. Within Iraq they show every sign of strengthening rather than weakening Saddam's position.

Therefore I welcome indications that Britain is taking the lead in New York in proposing a more realistic method of dealing with Saddam. If these proposals, about which we do not know too much detail at present, are as wise as I hope, I suspect that they could and should have been put forward years ago. If they are as flawed as I fear, I think that they are over-optimistic about the prospects of Saddam's compliance with them even if the Security Council members can agree on a trade-off. I am looking forward very keenly to hearing what Mr Jon Davies of my old department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has to tell us about these proposals tomorrow afternoon."

SESSION 1: HISTORY

'How did we get here? A history of British and American relations with Iraq.'

GEORGE JOFFE

George Joffé was Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London until March 2000 and is now an independent consultant on Middle East and North African affairs, with attachments at the School of Oriental and African Studies and the London School of Economics. As a journalist in print, radio and television he has covered Middle Eastern and North African topics for the past twenty years. As a consultant he dealt with the political, economic and social affairs of the Middle East and North Africa, with special reference to Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Israel, Palestine and Iraq, and was also engaged in research into and research management of work on international boundary disputes and economic arbitration. He has written widely on topics connected with the contemporary history, economics, society and current affairs of the Middle East and North Africa and is currently engaged in writing a study of the contemporary crisis in Algeria, a book on the Qadhafi regime in Libya and an analysis of the Barcelona Process in the Mediterranean. Since the conference in November George Joffé has visited Iraq and lectured at the al-Mustansirrya University and the Bayt al-Hikma.

Mr Joffé pursued the history of the current crisis in Iraq. Wishing to avoid a 'synchronous' view of this complex situation, he began by charting the history of British involvement in Iraq since the nineteenth century. Initially, Britain was only laterally concerned with the Gulf region as part of the Ottoman Empire, whose existence it would guarantee as a thoroughfare to India. Britain also sought to exploit the commercial access given by waterways from the Gulf into the hinterland and the newly-discovered oil resources in Iran. After the collapse of the Ottoman–British guarantee deal during the First World War (the Ottoman Empire having sided with Germany), the British Indian Army occupied most of the area that is now Iraq to protect these economic inter-

ests. Eventually Britain created Iraq in 1922, imposing a Hashemite prince – essentially a foreigner – as monarch of the new state to enforce British demands. The contradictions inherent in this project contributed significantly to the Nationalist Revolution in 1958. Mr Joffé pointed out that Britain was responsible, too, for administering the border between Iran and Iraq, for the long-standing tensions between these two and, more topically, for the division of Iraq and Kuwait. Britain's departure from the region in 1968–1971 left a regional power vacuum partly responsible for the re-emergence of competition with Iran.

Mr Joffé then compared this intimate involvement by Britain in Iraqi affairs with the relative disinterest of the United States at the time. After brief US diplomatic collaboration with the Iraqi monarchy in the 1950s consequent to the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, the new revolutionary state had little communication with the US. However, during the Iran–Iraq War, the US decided to back Iraq against Ayatollah Khomeni's Islamic regime, reopening diplomatic relations in 1984. Thereafter, prominent members of the Iraqi regime came mistakenly to believe that America had accepted them as a partner in Middle Eastern, particularly Gulf, security as a means of countering Iran.

Mr Joffé agreed with Mr Lucas that this was a major reason why Iraqi authorities miscalculated in their attack on Kuwait. He stressed the geopolitical aspect of American concerns, questioning the importance of oil in the Gulf War. In the period after the war sanctions were initially attractive; however they are now no longer viable, especially since the departure of UNSCOM. He ended by saying that while there is a vital need for a policy that tries to rebuild a relationship with the Iraqi population, inflexibility – especially in Washington – prevents any such innovation.

"Thank you very much indeed. The title I have is one that was given to me, rather than one which I chose myself, but it does nonetheless cover the points that I would like to make to you this morning to back up what Ivor Lucas has said.

One of the problems with modern politics is that we tend to see events in a very synchronous sense and we tend to assume also that they are fundamentally governed by individuals. In fact, behind current events there is a lot of history; there are systems, there are states, there are attitudes, and there are ideologies. What I'd like to do is to comment on the way in which Britain in particular, and also the United States, became so involved in the affairs of a country in the Middle East on the Persian Gulf.

We have to begin with the British role, because Britain's role in Iraq – indeed in the creation of Iraq – is the key to much of what has happened since. British interest in the region which was to become Iraq goes back to the British presence in India, the construction of the Raj, and in particular to nineteenth-century concerns about secure access to India. One fundamental element of British policy throughout the nineteenth century was to guarantee the Ottoman Empire as a means of ensuring British access to India. That meant that Britain took an increasing interest in the events in the Persian Gulf and in the southern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, one could argue that largely because of the Raj, Britain's presence in the Middle East came about. When one looks at the way in which Britain began to assert itself in the Gulf states, in every case that assertion of interest came as a result of British concerns about access to India and came, indeed, from the British authorities in India and not from London. That pattern runs right the way throughout the nineteenth century. It explains why in 1800 a British Consul appears in Basra, then the major port of the Ottoman Empire towards the Gulf, and two years later a British Consul appears also in Baghdad, the centre of the Ottoman administration for a large part of the region.

At the same time, Britain also had great interests in a neighbouring, much older state – Iran. A British political presence

there began shortly before it appeared in the Ottoman Iraqi provinces. This presence became even more entrenched than it was to become elsewhere in the region and in Iraq. But British interest wasn't simply a question of strategic control. It was an attempt to secure commercial access. British politicians and diplomats realised very early on that the Shatt al-Arab and the Euphrates and Tigris rivers offered ideal opportunities for the penetration of British commerce into the heart of the Ottoman Empire. Those factors also explain why Britain became much more involved in that part of the world at the beginning of this century. During World War I, when British policy towards the Ottomans finally broke down because they allied with Germany, it was the authorities in India who insisted that there should be a British invasion of Iraq. And it was the Indian Army who carried out that invasion, was involved in the disastrous siege at Khut, but later was responsible for the capture of Baghdad and the British presence throughout all of Iraq except in the extreme north.

This gave the basis for the construction of a British mandate there in 1922. For the British there was a need to provide the basis of stability. It was quite evident that the breakdown of the Ottoman administration inside what then became Iraq had to be replaced in some effective way. It was clear, too, that the military administration put in at the end of World War I would not be adequate in the long term. Indeed, Britain also required stability in the region because of its interest in neighbouring Iran where oil had been discovered in 1908. The beginnings of the company which today is British Petroleum had begun to explore and exploit the reserves there. So Britain was then dragged into Iraq, partly as a consequence of what had happened during World War I, but now (and more importantly) because of oil's growing importance to the British economy. You will no doubt remember Winston Churchill's decision that the British Navy

should run on oil and not on coal. This decision provoked Britain's interest in Iran in the early days. Behind that, one can also see one of the issues which was to come to dominate the war between Iraq and Iran: if access to the hinterland of Iraq and Iran was to be by river, and if oil was to be exported into the Gulf via the Shatt al-Arab, then control of the Shatt al-Arab was to be crucial to access. Thus, it was a British decision about the way in which the Shatt al-Arab waterway should be controlled which determined the long-standing hostility between Iraq and Iran over their border (which runs down the waterway). So Britain therefore became entangled in the issue of borders too.

Furthermore, because of a British presence further south in Kuwait from the 1890s onwards, and because of the British decision to administer the two parts of this empire in different ways, the territorial division between Iraq and Kuwait was also a British responsibility. I'll come back to that point in a minute because it is germane to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait some sixty or seventy years later. Britain, however, had no intention of creating a permanent direct British administration of Iraq. Instead, it sought to square its promises made to the Arabs during the First World War – to support Arab nationalism – with its desire to maintain a presence inside Iraq by creating a monarchy to act as its own surrogate administrator. It did so by foisting upon Iraq a monarch drawn from the Hashemite family in Mecca, just as it did in Jordan. This created inevitable social and political tensions amongst those in Iraq who believed that the nature of the political dispensation should not be governed by colonial whim. They believed that this monarchy imposed on Iraq had nothing to do with the country itself. We see in that early decision, too, the beginning of the tensions among Nationalists in Iraq, keying into developments inside the wider Middle East. Eventually after World War II they became avid supporters of

Ba'thist Arab nationalism and this, in turn, led to the confrontation with the monarchy which was to come to a head in 1958 with the institution of a Republican revolutionary government.

Britain, therefore, is deeply implicated in the way that Iraq itself has evolved and developed. It is a point well worth keeping in mind, because in the aftermath of World War II, when Britain's global influence began to wane, its influence inside Iraq was already being minimised (although it played a key role in the construction of the Baghdad Pact designed to bring pro-Western regimes into alliance against the Soviet Union and thus guarantee the security of NATO's southern flank). When Britain decided to leave in 1968–71, the new revolutionary Iraqi state saw itself as the potential replacement of British influence in the Gulf region, despite Iranian intentions in that regard. That explains in large part the sudden recrudescence of tensions between Iraq and Iran in the post-British imperial period. Because Iran had similar ambitions, the confrontation between the two states produced the tensions which eventually led, after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, to the war between them. Thus again it was the disappearance of the British Empire in the region which generated the tensions which led to war. Britain clearly has had a very deep involvement in these regional affairs.

Strangely enough, if we come to look at the United States as the parallel case, we do not find any parallel depth of involvement. In fact, American influence in the region only begins after World War II, partly because of what is known as the Red Line Agreement that controlled Western interests in Middle Eastern oil. According to this agreement, those states which were not directly involved in the early exploitation of oil inside the former Ottoman Empire were excluded from it. Iraq fell within that definition as its oil was primarily a British concern and the United States had no role to play before

the war, focusing instead on Saudi Arabia. American interest in Iraq really develops over the question of the Baghdad Pact. This was the construction of an alliance between series of states linked together to confront and seal off the Soviet Union from access to the Gulf. The membership of the Pact was completed in the 1950s, but it was destroyed by the anti-monarchist pro-Arab Nationalist Revolution in Iraq in 1958. The United States therefore, after a very short period of engagement in the Gulf, found itself confronted by a very powerful and radical state that rejected all ideas of participating in an alliance to confront the Soviet Union. It was a state which furthermore, even as early as 1948 when still under the monarchy, had intervened to oppose the creation of the state of Israel. Thus, for both reasons, the United States found itself in a very difficult situation when trying to deal with Iraq.

It is interesting to note that for a period of seventeen years, from 1967 when Iraq broke off formal diplomatic relations with the United States up until 1984 when they were renewed, there was virtually no contact between the two states except abusive propaganda in the world media. The important factor, I think, which changes the picture, is the Islamic revolution in Iran. As Ivor Lucas pointed out, Western powers had to make a decision as to the way in which they were going to view that revolution. They decided, in general, that a dictatorial and radical Iraq was probably a more acceptable alternative to the Islamic revolution inside Iran. Certainly, once the Gulf War broke out between Iraq and Iran, for the United States such a decision was much easier to accept. Not least for cynical reasons: as Henry Kissinger is supposed to have said, 'Too bad they can't both lose!' and went on to support Iraq. But there were also practical reasons for the American decision: to control Iran in its newly revolutionary phase with an ally like Iraq which had the military advantage would be a far better option than intervening directly. Indeed, Western

policy inside the Gulf region until 1990 was never to intervene directly but to use regional powers to act on the West's behalf. Thus, from the beginning of the war against Iran, the United States began to provide intelligence support and equipment to Iraq and in 1984 (as mentioned earlier) actually opened diplomatic relations with it. Iraq, in turn, began to behave in ways much more acceptable to the United States within the Middle East region. There was even the belief in 1987 that Iraq might come to terms with the creation of the state of Israel, at least open contacts with it if not formal diplomatic relations.

It is largely after the end of the Iran–Iraq War that the danger signals begin to emerge. It is important to remember that as much as we render the country of Iraq a personification of the figure of Saddam Hussein, there is also a political system behind him. He may dominate it, he may well have designed much of it, but it is not only he who takes decisions. Iraqi diplomats, in the period after the end of the Iran–Iraq War, allowed themselves to believe that they would be accepted by the United States as a partner for security guarantees inside the Gulf region, in order to make sure that Iran was excluded. American diplomats were never approached directly over this, but I remember talking to senior members of the National Security Council in the United States who said that this had been hinted to them, although they had not acted on the hints.

In that context it becomes rather easier to understand the miscalculations that emerge in 1990. And the miscalculations were not only over the question of Kuwait – they go much further back. They go back to the actual re-arming of Iraq, to the Supergun affair, the Kryptons affair, the execution of Fazad Bazoft, the growing Iraqi aggressiveness towards Israel and the confrontation between Iraq and Egypt over potential leadership inside the Arab Middle East. There were a

whole series of pointers throughout that year that were simply ignored by major policymakers in the West. When in July 1991 US Congress for the first time banned the provision of credits to Iraq, the Bush administration overturned the Congressional decision in order to maintain good relations.

Therefore, I think one can see that there was a combination of signs misread by the West and incorrect assumptions by Iraq, which created the conditions in which the Iraqi authorities, led by Saddam Hussein, could believe that the invasion of Kuwait would be acceptable to Allied sentiment. Now, in retrospect, that was a disastrous miscalculation. It was a miscalculation not just because of the issue of oil. Oil is always cited as the reason why the Americans decided to react so strongly to the Iraqi invasion. I am not at all sure that is true. We need to bear in mind that the United States did not then, nor does it now, depend on oil from the Middle East. The question of access to oil wasn't really the issue. We also need to bear in mind another important fact: oil in the ground has absolutely no value until it is pumped up and sold. The issue was not so much how much oil Iraq could control or block, but what it could do to questions of oil price if it controlled such a large proportion of the world's reserves. Ivor Lucas pointed out that had Saddam Hussein guaranteed his position in Kuwait and extended it southwards he would have controlled 40% of the world's oil reserves. However, it wasn't that he might refuse to sell, but that he would have been able to dictate world oil prices. Although that might have adversely affected European economies, it would not have been a problem for the United States. It simply would have meant that American oil reserves – very expensive to produce – would have become again attractive prospects and would have come back into production.

So the real threat to the United States arose not from the

oil issue but was, I think, really geopolitical in nature. Certainly it had a lot to do with the character of the administration in Washington as well. President Bush quite clearly saw Saddam Hussein's actions as parallel to those which started World War II. He very quickly began to identify Iraq with the role of Germany, and saw this as a moral confrontation. All his early statements emphasised that aspect of the conflict. The idea of the Middle East dominated by a country like Iraq, with the aggressiveness it demonstrated against the security of Israel and the implications that would have for American domestic policy, also provoked anxiety. The issue was not so much access to resources as the question of geopolitical control in the Middle Eastern region. I should point out that Iraqi foreign policy traditionally was not directed toward the Gulf, but toward the Levant; it only became directed towards the Gulf after the 1971 British withdrawal.

So there was a series of reasons why the American government was concerned by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but they had little to do with issues of oil. Now one can argue about whether the United States intervention was appropriate, correct, useful or acceptable. I don't propose to enter into that discussion except to point out that a large part of the disbelief about intervention was based on a complete misjudgement about the nature of modern warfare. Few observers realised the power of contemporary conventional warfare, even in Iraq, despite the war with Iran. This, combined with American irredentism over an Iraqi withdrawal that blocked all attempts at a peaceful retreat, determined the disaster that was to befall the Iraqi army in Kuwait.

America too made its mistakes, particularly after the war had ended. The sanctions policy intended to destroy Iraq's military power and, in reality, Saddam Hussein's regime proved woefully misguided. The US had very limited experience of what sanctions might really mean. Its policy was initially was

designed to be short-term and cheap; it did not require further commitments of troops in a region that would have found them extremely difficult to tolerate. However, it has turned out to be long-term and the West has no alternatives to offer. Its series of confused objectives – simply to force Iraqi compliance with United Nations resolutions about arms, or actually to remove a regime from power – rendered this policy, in reality, ineffective. This was demonstrated most profoundly in December 1998 by the Desert Fox operations. They destroyed the fundamental pillar of the policy towards Iraq: the disarmament of Iraq enforced by UNSCOM. Quite simply, Iraq refused to co-operate any further; the policy of disarmament and sanctions relied crucially on some degree of co-operation. At the moment there is no possibility of co-operation with the Iraqi authorities, as the population of Iraq – not Saddam Hussein's regime itself – really suffers from sanctions.

Now we are left with the challenge of constructing a new policy. We must rebuild our relationship with the whole population, which has suffered not only the physical but the psychological and social damage of sanctions as well. We are talking about a country where, for the last decade, not a single academic journal has been imported, where there is no means of effective intellectual or social communication with the outside world. In this atmosphere of resentment, isolation and aggravation, extremely violent and antagonistic views towards the West have fomented.

But domestic concerns prevent Washington from developing the flexibility to design new policies to achieve its objectives. Now the situation is frozen by the upcoming presidential elections. And I very much doubt that any new presidential administration will wish to engage in the near future with the dangerous task of reformulating a failed policy which, nevertheless, touches at the heart of the American diplomatic self-image and vision of the new world order!"

SESSION 2: HEALTH

'Changes in health and well-being in Iraq during the 1990s: what do we know and how do we know it?'

PROFESSOR RICHARD GARFIELD, RN DrPH

Richard Garfield is Professor of Clinical International Nursing at Columbia University. He is a nurse and epidemiologist, and focuses on the effects of wars on civilians. He has spent the last six years comparatively studying the impact of sanctions. He worked with governments in Cuba and Iraq, and UNICEF in Haiti, to document these effects and revise Ministry of Health actions accordingly. He has also been consultant to the governments of Canada and Sweden. Professor Garfield's articles on the issue of sanctions include 'Unconventional warfare: the silent deadly weapon', *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* [1999, 14(2): 52-8]; 'Public health and human rights issues in economic embargoes', *The Sciences* (1999:19-23); 'Mortality changes in Iraq, 1990-1996, a review of the evidence', Occasional Paper, *Fourth Freedom Forum*, 1999; and RRN Network paper #31, 'The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-Being'.

Using data from household surveys conducted by Iraqi and independent agencies, Professor Garfield delineated the humanitarian conditions in Iraq. He drew on data for four conditions as exemplary of the public health crisis in Iraq: child mortality, malnutrition amongst children, water and electricity supplies, and literacy rates. Focusing audience attention on the most reliable studies conducted on child mortality (including the recent UNICEF survey), he debunked the 'magic number' of half a million deaths but pointed out a profound indicator of the scale of the crisis in Iraq: that this is the only instance of a sustained increase in mortality outside of war, famine, or genocide in a population of more than 2 million in the past two hundred years. He provided some history of Iraq's attempts to improve children's health, and the devastating impact of war and stringency meas-

ures on their improvement. Professor Garfield then offered his insights into the political use of sanctions, but made specific criticisms both of the Oil-for-Food programme's failure to incorporate an evaluation component and of interference by the US in rectifying that failure. He distinguished between short- and long-term assets, citing the damage done to the latter – especially in the provision of clean water, reliable electricity, and literacy through primary education – by the Gulf War and the sanctions regimes. However, he emphasized that the grim picture of public health presented by contemporary Iraq was not inevitable: he criticized the failures of the Iraqi government to mobilize resources and co-ordinate the dissemination of vital information on water boiling, child-feeding practices, immunization, and breast-feeding. Finally, he cited the differences between provisions and social development in the northern Kurdish autonomous zone and central and southern Iraq as indicating the politicization of the Oil-for-Food programme, as well as demonstrating how the UN and other relief agencies in Iraq could become more efficient.

"It is a dubious honour to be called the most careful analyst of Iraqi mortality; you might indeed call me the only analyst. One of the major problems with sanctions is that there is very little careful assessment of humanitarian conditions and changes. We in the field of public health are not well established to measure short-term changes. Usually, we can identify trends very carefully over a five or ten year period; but where political emergencies occur, and humanitarian conditions change rapidly, we need to know within a matter of months what's going up, what's going down, and who has special vulnerabilities. To add to that, given the political complexities surrounding sanction regimes around the world, sanctioning powers are typically not particularly interested in – or may have a special interest in not finding out about – humanitarian conditions. Iraq has been subject to that situation.

Mistakes made in terms of health and well-being in Iraq are many, and it would be easy to spend the hour just reviewing what has been done wrong. If we made a long list, it would be fairly evenly split (I believe) between the failures of the Iraqi government and of the international community to preserve health and well-being. But one condition has been especially significant: sanctions having been established as an (anticipated) short-term measure, no monitoring capacity at all was incorporated as a requirement. It was virtually locking up the prisoner, throwing away the key, and not wondering if he was going to feel well in the cell without food or medical care.

If indeed sanctions had only lasted for several months this would not have created a crisis. But political movements and wars – and in the world today sanctions proceed, accompany, or follow wars, so are intimately related to war – create situations which are unpredictable. Just as the governor of Iraq didn't expect a long war with Iran, the Security Council didn't expect sanctions to last nine years. And no one sees an end in sight.

Without any monitoring of health and well-being conditions in Iraq, and with a rapid deterioration of the Ministry of Health's ability to measure these things (because people stopped going to hospitals when hospitals no longer had medicines), we have been left since 1994 with virtually no information on the most extreme aspect of humanitarian conditions: changes in mortality. The Iraqi government suggested that mortality conditions were growing much worse. They were trying to be accurate: they projected national levels of mortality from deaths they counted in hospitals. But when fewer people go to hospitals, and those who reach hospitals are closer to death, this indicator is not only unstable but totally invalid. We are left with no useful information. The Iraqi government works in the dark, while no one in the in-

ternational community would trust their results anyhow.

As early as 1995, the Iraqi government claimed that there had been half a million excess deaths among children under five years of age. There was an international study (which was done wrong) which also came up with that same number; and since 1995, the number of half a million deaths has functioned almost magically in the world, taking on a life of its own. Since 1991, we had lacked accurate information on mortality levels among children in Iraq – until this year's UNICEF demographic household survey, which indeed confirmed very radical changes in mortality.

I'm going into some detail about this for two reasons. First, because we don't know anything reliable about mortality levels among any population group over age five. Levels for under age one and under age five are much easier to assess because under normal conditions mortality levels are higher at those ages, and it's through families we have standard means to determine this. We have other indicators (most importantly nutrition) which give us an idea of this. Second, because people are very interested in mortality levels. I'm asked all the time about this question. In fact, in terms of humanitarian conditions mortality is just the tip of the iceberg. It's probably more important to look into other factors – I hope we have time to get into some, either during the session or in informal discussion afterwards – because even with elevated mortality levels, most people don't die. Most people are subject to changes in their life chances, their quality of life, without having a much increased chance of dying. But, being the tip of the iceberg, we know that if mortality is rising that other conditions are importantly and dangerously shifting under the surface.

There's one other thing to point out before I go into the specific data on mortality. I've worked for six years on issues of sanctions around the world, and for a dozen years in issues

of civilian mortality in wars around the world, and I've realised something rather strange. One would expect that when economies contract radically, and food becomes scarce, that mortality would start to rise right away. This has almost never been the case in the modern world (modern meaning last 200 years). Even in cases of extreme economic decline like the Great Depression in the United States, there was no increase in the rate of mortality. During World War I and World War II in Europe, except where civilians were directly in the line of fire, child mortality decreased.

Mortality is only partly related to the access to routine resources. It also has a great deal to do with how those resources are mobilized. In times of crisis, governments and families mobilize resources especially to protect young children. So, the data on Iraq is important not only in terms of the life chances of 22 million Iraqi people, but as a remarkable condemnation of the international community as well as the Iraqi government. It is the only instance of a sustained, large increase in mortality in a stable population of more than 2 million in the last two hundred years.

It's odd to have a career bringing such good news to audiences like you. But I think there's a great deal to learn, about what went wrong and what we have to do right.

There's no such thing as a perfect study. But this (figure 2.1) calls upon data from four valid, population-based and very well-executed large scale studies performed prior to the Gulf War: one carried out in 1991, as well as data generated from a study that was completed (the field was completed) in April 1999. These studies show that mortality rates among children under five years of age were declining at a moderate pace for a period of twenty-five years prior to the Gulf War. In the 1980s, through a child survival campaign, Iraq was doing targeted interventions to increase fertility and reduce

figure 2.1: Mortality Among Under Fives, Iraq 1963-1999



child mortality. From 1985 to 1990, this campaign was in fact remarkably successful – more so than anybody realised, until we did a careful analysis of data from 1996. Mortality rates, although they had been declining, were declining more rapidly just prior to the Gulf War than they had previously. It's not a surprise that in the period immediately following the Gulf War, mortality rose (roughly speaking) threefold in eight months. What analysis of the data shows is that during the four months of sanctions prior to the initiation of the Gulf War, mortality also rose among children. Not radically like this three-fold increase (a very rare event in any country, but not entirely unparalleled in war situations), but by 15% among under fives. This demonstrates the shortage of resources administered by the Iraqi government, who were withholding food stocks and medical supplies. Many people weren't receiving adequate care during these months; outside the country the international community did not recognise

that Iraq was preparing for a long siege.

A recovery began following these four months. But what we must face is that this recovery was followed by a gradual rise in mortality, returning Iraq to a level as high as any it had experienced in the last thirty-five years. Immediately after the war, there was a considerable increase in injuries and death directly related to war as well as an acute shortage of resources; no electricity was produced; food was not moving into the cities. It was a disaster period, common enough in countries during and following such a devastating war. Far more condemning to the international community is evidence that Iraq, as far as survival chances of its children, has descended again to these disaster conditions in the intervening nine years.

Very often, countries in crisis experience a shortage of medicines and food. We call these short-term assets – what we normally think of as necessities for survival. But in fact long-term assets – communications systems, roads, and most importantly educational levels among mothers and skill levels among trained bureaucrats, physicians, and teachers – are the strongest predictors of the resilience of a society to external threats. Iraq has endured a social and a demographic disaster because of the unique combination of a war which devastated its physical infrastructure (destroying short-term assets in the period immediately after the war) and comprehensive sanctions. Sanctions have been imposed frequently in this century, but since World War II this is the first time that a country has been comprehensively sanctioned. So in fact long-term assets (which almost never decline) have been significantly and increasingly deteriorated. It's the worst of both worlds: short-term and long-term losses on top of one another. In fact, such a disastrous pattern of public health depends on both of these conditions.

I would have expected, based on comparative data from other countries, that in five or six years Iraq would have re-

turned to its pre-Gulf War level of around forty deaths per thousand births of children under five. Instead, we can observe not just an increase, but a sustained increase. This is remarkable.

Public health is indeed starting to improve – but so recently that our methods cannot very precisely measure the gains. Although the provision of humanitarian goods through Iraqi oil sales controlled by the UN had been proposed in 1991, Iraq and the Security Council finally agreed on the Oil-for-Food programme in 1996. This programme reduces the Iraqi government to the status of a domestic governor under an external sovereignty: it's an occupied country where nationals continue to manage civil administration but an international force controls everything else. In 1991, Iraq rejected the proposal. Having prepared stocks for a long time (especially in the months prior to the Gulf War) they thought their ability to maintain key resources could outlast the coalition in the Security Council and the world community. They miscalculated – just as the Security Council miscalculated in establishing sanctions.

Sanctions have a unique political characteristic. Although unity has to be attained in the United Nations for their establishment, only one member of the Security Council can prevent their removal. So it is much easier to impose sanctions than to remove them. The British and US governments thus far have been fairly intransigent in maintaining sanctions on humanitarian goods, providing only the Oil-for-Food programme for access to materials. The Iraqi government finally agreed to conditions that the Security Council had established for providing those humanitarian goods in 1996. Goods started to flow in 1997, and the first food reached Iraq from the Oil-for-Food programme in March. We now have two and a half years of that programme, providing over $7 billion in humanitarian goods, out of over $14 billion of oil sold in

five rounds (we're completing the sixth round now). That makes not only the humanitarian situation in Iraq unique, but also means that Iraq has experienced by far the biggest dollar value of humanitarian assistance in an emergency programme of any country.

Usually humanitarian emergencies occur in refugee situations, amongst populations relocated from their normal place of abode. These situations require the establishment of services (often in unfavourable conditions), but at least you're starting from a clean slate. Iraq is a nation, and a large one at that: physically and in terms of its population. It's unusual, and almost unprecedented, to establish a programme of emergency relief at a national level, where people are still in their homes and the physical infrastructure must be reformed rather than established. If you add to that the mistrust and hostility between the Iraqi government which administers the programme in fifteen governorates in the centre and south of the country under the political control of the United Nations, you have a formula for poor results – and indeed the Oil-for-Food programme has provided poor results.

I should explain one reason why we're not getting such a good 'bang for the buck' (as we say in the United States). The two hundred UN staff in Iraq who run the programme are very concerned – and are no longer sure if they're doing more harm than good. They're used to running programmes which produce tangible results. They are not particularly loved by their national counterparts, and they're not seeing any radical improvements in humanitarian conditions. If not in the 1990 sanctions measures, then surely after the Gulf War with their reassertion in 1991 conditions for humanitarian monitoring should have been incorporated. Funds should have been supplied to Iraqi organisations – because only national organisations can do the door-to-door work that assessment requires. A minimum set of data should have been observed

to identify if humanitarian conditions deteriorated; and some kind of trigger mechanism should have required the sanctioning power to respond if they did deteriorate. It's unheard of for a large-scale programme of assistance or social development to be formulated without an evaluation component. But the Oil-for-Food programme was established without any such component.

Nonetheless, as of December 1998, the governments of Canada and Brazil on the Security Council pushed through a resolution to assess humanitarian conditions in Iraq. In fact, all the Security Council members were in favour of evaluating the impact of their $7 billion investment. The commission would be given to the 'Humanitarian Panel,' a team of five people with a $100,000 budget from the Security Council which would prepare a report in January and February and report back in March. To add insult to Iraq's injury, that evaluation never occurred. Although the Security Council had voted to fund it, the project was cancelled and no team was fielded. The Office of Iraq Programmes was pressured not to go to field, not to carry out their mandate; and they were scared out of doing it by the governments determined to keep sanctions in place.

I hate to admit this, as an academic from New York; but I'm now one of a just few people who, spontaneously and of our own interest, do what little evaluation the world has of the programme. I'm happy to say however that the UN team on the ground in Iraq is keen to have such an evaluation carried out; they were energetically preparing for the Humanitarian Panel, and are still enthusiastically ready to assist our assessments.

I've already told you about some of the unique features of the humanitarian situation in Iraq. To put these sanctions in context, look at the black areas of this map of the world (figure 2.2). These are the territories which in 1996 had some

form of economic, military or political sanctions by the United States. Of these, only Iraq has endured *comprehensive* economic sanctions. Sanctions are part of the new world order. In its first thirty-some years, the United Nations embarked on a total of two sanctions regimes, only one of which was intended (unsuccessfully) to be comprehensive – against Southern Rhodesia. In the 1990s, the United Nations has established eleven new sanctions regimes. And every time a political or military crisis surfaces, both in the United Nations and the United States, people will endorse sanctions as a sort of knee-jerk reaction.

There are two fundamental reasons why sanctions are now a key and normal part of hostile foreign policy. First, in the post-Cold War world, economic concentration has rapidly increased; the United States has even more economic clout than it did during the Cold War. Second, without Cold War competition between two superpowers, domestic constituencies in the United States (and I assume here in Britain as well) are reluctant to commit troops to conflicts. So sanctions can

figure 2.2: Sanctions in the New World Order

enforce a hostile foreign policy without necessarily committing troops and all the domestic policy issues that such a commitment would engage. In many ways, we are still experiencing the post-Vietnam War syndrome – and it doesn't look like we're getting over it anytime soon. So sanctions will always be with us. They are an effective means of demonstrating resolve, getting the attention of another regime, and pursuing national or international interests. I mention this because everyone is criticising sanctions, some suggesting that they ought to be outlawed altogether; but whatever our reservations, sanctions are here to stay.

The question now is, how can they be implemented so that humanitarian conditions can be maintained – or at least damage can be limited? This is what Iraq can teach us. I put it to you that Iraq highlights all the major political and humanitarian issues of the post-Cold War world that we face in many other states, and will continue to encounter in the future. So you don't necessarily have to be interested in Iraq to be concerned about what's going on there.

There have been forty-three studies done on population bases of nutritional status of children in Iraq in the past fifteen years. Most of them have been very small. Most of them have not been co-ordinated and the methods were not necessarily well-explained. Out of those forty-three, this is the total of the five studies you can depend on as stable national indicators of nutritional conditions (figure 2.3). Again, it's remarkable that so much effort (most of it small-scale and independent and without any coordination through the UN or other agencies) has been lost. I'll summarize for you what these studies indicate about Iraq.

Interestingly, we don't have any reliable baseline prior to the Gulf War. But in the immediate post-Gulf War period, let's focus on acute malnutrition (a recent event), chronic

malnutrition (something that has grown gradually over a period of time), resulting in our mixed measure of chronic and acute malnutrition. These three measures stood at levels not unlike many moderately developed countries – surely somewhat worse than prior to the Gulf War, but not much worse. They serve as a baseline for the country, and fall in an expected range.

In the years before the Oil-for-Food programme when Iraq depended essentially on rationed food stocks distributed in diminishing quantities at the household level each month in Iraq, nutritional conditions of children very significantly declined. Finally they reached crisis proportions characteristic of some of the least developed countries of the world with a three- or fourfold increase in malnutrition among children under five years of age. That's not a surprise, given their resources. But it isn't a universal pattern. In other sanctioned countries, or countries with economic crises, malnutrition not only doesn't rise but in fact *decreases* because of targeting and interventions. Such targeting didn't occur in Iraq.

At the start of the Oil-for-Food programme we expected mortality to be at more or less the same levels as in 1991. Humanitarian conditions (just like mortality levels) gradu-

figure 2.3: Five Valid Studies of Nutritional Status of Children

	August 1991 (IST)	August 1996 (MICS)	April 1997 (Immunization Clinic Exit Survey)	March 1998 (Immunization Clinic Exit Survey)	April/June 1999 (Immunization Clinic)
Percent Moderate or Severe Underweight for Age	9.2	23.4	24.7	22.8	19.6
Percent Moderate or Severe Underweight for Height	3.0	11.0	8.9	9.2	4.2
Percent Moderate or Severe Underheight for Age	18.7	31.2	27.5	26.7	19.1

ally deteriorated through 1996, before reaching their tabling level. What is more of a surprise to me, knowing some of the limitations but being aware of the level of resources being provided through the Oil-for-Food programme, is that contrary to my predictions – that by 1998 those nutritional conditions would be considerably improved – they weren't. The improvements are very minor, indeed insignificant. Essentially the nutritional conditions for children in Iraq plateaued and remain at that level a year after the influx of considerably improved rations from the Oil-for-Food programme. And it's only in 1999 that nutritional improvements are starting to be recognised.

It's a simple equation: throw food at people, and nutrition will improve; but it doesn't work that way. Certainly it is important to have access to food. But calorie viability is not enough to establish nutritional conditions. So, now that we are involved in evaluating the Oil-for-Food programme, we must determine why nutritional conditions didn't improve more rapidly, why they are still not good enough, and what can we do to improve them further.

First, the Iraqi government had opportunities with a highly educated population and good communication systems to focus families on the nutritional needs of children, but it did not do so. Similarly, there were many opportunities to improve the quality of water that individuals consumed in households. Families have ample and very inexpensive supplies of fuel, and there is practically nothing harmful in Iraqi water that you can't boil away. The water that Iraqis received wasn't clean, but water could have been boiled, and household disinfection among a number of other hygiene measures could have been encouraged. These measures had been used in other sanctioned countries so successfully that levels of child mortality actually declined. It may seem ironic, but it doesn't take much to improve survival chances among children dur-

Figure 2.4: Iraq under-five mortality rate.



ing an emergency, if you're very careful of what those few things are: clean water, adequate protein, breast-feeding, immunization. Consider it as a family member, as a mother: what would you do in time of crisis? You would look out for the child. That child would be your first concern. It doesn't take a lot of material resources to do so successfully. It takes information and co-ordination of that information. And secondarily it takes a provision of resources which even at its worst Iraq could have provided, and which in some other cultures and countries would have ensured much less deterioration and in fact some improvement.

Second, in addition to the lack of targeted intervention and co-ordinated information and health promotion from the Iraqi government, the limited production of electricity, and the deterioration of the water system, another crucially insuf-

ficient resource was the considerable gradual decrease in the quality of schooling. This led to a decrease in the number of children attending school, resulting in a decrease in the overall literacy rate among adults from 80% to 58%. When we say 80% down to 58% of the adult population literate, that's household survey data including all men and women of adult age. That for me is perhaps at least as condemning a statement about humanitarian conditions in Iraq as data on mortality. It is almost impossible significantly to deteriorate levels of literacy. The way it's been done is about the only way you can do it: fewer kids go to school, fewer kids graduate school, and many of the schools (though not all of them) are producing a very poor-quality product. It had been that 60-some percent of Iraqis between four and twenty-three were currently in school; now around 40% of them are. Most schools have two or three turns in a day, many of them lacking in books. Virtually no schools in centre and south prior to the Gulf War were being taught by teachers who weren't qualified. Now about a quarter of the teachers are not qualified. Many of the others, earning salaries essentially of $5 a month, are little motivated. There's a great deterioration at every level which results in the outcome figure of literacy. This is what we call 'long-term assets' of a society.

So: rations are now quite adequate during most months to defend the nutritional conditions of the vast majority of the population, but nutrition is still not very good. First of all, electricity production improvement has occurred only very slowly. Iraq's ability to produce electricity declined by about 50% from 1990 to 1996. It has since increased by 8% but demand has increased by 40% since the Oil-for-Food programme was initiated. Ironically, there are now more power outages than occurred in the worst years of low electricity production. Secondly, water pumping is the key to water and

sanitation in a country with as flat a topography as Iraq. Although the entire country has new high quality pumps, many of these new pumps are only being used part-time, and in some pumping stations they haven't even been installed. Those responsible watched their old water pumps go bad because of voltage spikes and power outages, and so are withholding the use of those goods until more reliable electricity comes along. Thus, almost all the pumping stations during the past eight years have experienced burst pipes. Almost 5,000 breakages in the pipes have been logged; in the 1980s the municipal water system of Iraq recorded a total of two breakages. These breakages are only slowly being repaired if at all – so that water goes out clean, but arrives in the home dirty. To make up for it in part, double levels of chlorination are being put in at the level of the pumping station. This has improved water quality to some degree, but water quality overall improves very slowly.

So nutrition, perhaps even more than mortality, aptly expresses the combination of goods and resources necessary to run a country. To improve nutrition you have to start at the end of the story: you must produce more electricity, make sure that electricity is provided reliably, pump the water, improve the breakages, and educate a literate (and now illiterate) population about good nutrition and sanitation in the home. After all that, adequate levels of calorie availability will be much more effective in reducing malnutrition. Society is, after all, a complex matter. With a combined decline in short-term resources and the long-term assets which contribute to health and well-being, it will take a very long time to re-establish long-term assets.

Fertility is a factor in public health which the public doesn't think about that much. In fertility data, we can gauge the resilience of the population as well as adjustments that need a response. In fertility as in other areas, our information has

not generally been that good. Iraq is a very high fertility country overall: married women in 1990 had, by the time they were finished having all babies, an average of eight children; because of the demographic survey we now know that it's reduced to seven. In the world of fertility, that's a rapid reduction and is a normal response to an economic crisis. More importantly in terms of the population of Iraq, is that the number of people marrying has declined by about 30%. People are having fewer children in marriage but many fewer people are getting married, again because of economic factors. In many other countries with sanctions or economic crises, much of the population moves to rural areas, returning to a lower level – a simpler, an older level – of means of production. This is not really possible in Iraq. The land being so flat, agriculture is largely a modern affair; you can't eke out a living in Iraq in small-scale agricultural production. So there is very little movement to rural areas. Most of the movement (if there is any at all) is outside of the country. My guess is that 4 million people have left.

One more very important piece of the puzzle before I ask you for some comments. I've described conditions throughout the country. But in the three governorates of the northern Kurdish autonomous zone administered by the UN rather than the Iraqi government, humanitarian conditions have changed quite considerably compared to the rest of the country. Those governorates had lower levels of social development in 1990; chronic malnutrition was much higher to start with there, affecting about a quarter of all children in 1990. In the intervening eight years it has declined considerably, to 14% now. In the centre and south this pattern has been inverted: low levels of malnutrition have increased over this period. Literacy was also much lower in the north; it too has improved over these eight years. These results are attributable to five factors.

First of all, government social development strategies in these three northern governates have been decentralized, and now invoke a local participation not matched in the centre and south. Secondly, what goods and services are available tend to be used more efficiently and incorporate an education promotion component, with recipients participating in their own development. Thirdly, there are also many more non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the north of Iraq. An area with 15% of the population of the country has nearly twenty-five NGOs working, whereas the rest of the country has eighteen NGOs registered and (I believe) twelve actually on the ground. The NGOs have made a significant difference in the school system. Although educational materials are coming in through the Oil-for-Food programme in the centre and south, the number of schools with competent roofs continues to decline. In fact the schools, the pumps, the water systems were at the point of collapse in 1996; goods imported through the Oil-for-Food programme are therefore arriving just before or just after the system falls apart, rather than to supplement a social development process.

A fourth major difference in nutritional figures in the north is that regional agriculture is mostly rain-fed, providing opportunities for local autonomy in food production and less dependence on rationed goods than centre and south have experienced. Until, that is, this year's severe drought, which has caused acute malnutrition to rise in the north. This should be the moment for Oil-for-Food goods. This drought is exactly the kind of need an emergency relief programme should relieve. In fact Iraq has been reduced to the level of an emergency relief programme throughout the country, but the Oil-for-Food programme is making its clearest impact in the north. Fifth, it is especially significant that in comparison to centre and south, where *all* goods are commodities, 10% of the value

going into the northern autonomous region is cash. So local government gets to fly in unavailable goods – looking only at commodities, theirs is a development programme virtually done through airdrops from helicopters. You need the pin to stick in the equipment to make it work. You need local labour to buy sand and to shovel it in order to make a water filtration system work – just the pumps won't do it.

And finally – and this is very important, though rarely mentioned in the United States at least – the north receives 22% more per capita in dollar value goods than centre and south from the Oil-for-Food programme. The north is relatively favoured because prior to the Oil-for-Food programme they withstood a double embargo: international sanctions and domestic sanctions from the government of centre and south. Though such favouritism is no longer appropriate, it persists as a politicization of the Oil-for-Food programme which gives the government of Saddam Hussein an 'extra kick'.

These inequities demonstrate that indeed international systems can make a substantial difference where there is trust, and where relief is not strictly separated from development. It is appropriate that there should be a relief programme in Iraq. It is also necessary that the international community support development in Iraq. However, the hostility between the Security Council and Iraq – so much hostility that the Security Council won't even be permitted to evaluate humanitarian conditions – has resulted in a very restrictive definition of development. Consequently, we're throwing medicines and food at people in the centre and south. So it's no wonder that we're not getting much bang for the buck."

SESSION 3: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

'NGO Opportunities, Options and Constraints Regarding Iraq.'

RITA BHATIA & ANDREA LEDWARD,
SAVE THE CHILDREN (UK)

Rita Bhatia has been working as a policy analyst for Save the Children (UK) for nearly two years. She is involved with a broad range of economic and political issues as they relate to children and the realisation of their rights. She has been leading a project analysing the impact of international sanctions on the rights of children in a number of countries where Save the Children is based. Previously, she worked to create an advocacy strategy for Action Aid, a UK non-governmental organisation. She has a background in international development, completing an MPhil in Development Studies in 1996 from the Institute for International Development, University of Sussex.

Andrea Ledward is the research and advocacy officer on Iraq at Save the Children (UK). She was previously a Fulbright scholar and research fellow at the Harvard Centre for Population and Development Studies. Since June 1999 she has worked for Save the Children (UK), doing advocacy on Iraq around the United Nations in New York and London. Her disciplinary training is in anthropology and psychology, and her practical experience has been in the development of child-centred research methodologies for evaluating health education, child rights and HIV/AIDS.

Save the Children has worked in northern Iraq since 1991 and as an advocate on sanctions and Iraq in New York and London. The two speakers presented the programmatic and advocacy challenges facing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in and on Iraq.

Ms Bhatia spoke about the work of Save the Children (UK) in the north of Iraq and the possibilities, despite political con-

straints, for NGOs to advocate for a more humane and targeted sanctions regime. Their work is complicated, however, by political contingencies in Iraq and at the United Nations. Ms Bhatia described some of the operational realities and constraints for agencies working in northern Iraq. In a brief history of Save the Children's involvement there, she described how, starting as an emergency relief provider in 1991, that programme had moved strategically to long-term reconstruction support, including the rehabilitation of basic services such as education, water and sanitation. Visible reconstruction and health indicators suggest that the situation is improving; however, with limited measures for social and economic development under the Oil-for-Food programme, local capacity and social structures continue to be undermined. Ms Bhatia critiqued the temporary and partial design of the Oil-for-Food programme, as well as the absence of assessment or adaptation in its structure. She also alluded to the obligations of NGOs domestically: as registered charities, they may speak only on the basis of direct experience; and the specific mandates of groups like Save the Children often derive from particular treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Finally, she regretted the few channels of communication between operational agencies like Save the Children, campaigning groups, human rights organisations and UN agencies, but assured the audience of NGOs' persistent (if sometimes unpublicized) efforts to overcome political hindrances to the provision of relief to Iraqis.

Ms Ledward built on Ms Bhatia's presentation, focusing on the advocacy constraints which prevent international NGOs from speaking out about the humanitarian situation in Iraq. She discussed the politics of the administration of the sanctions regime and then suggested steps that NGOs could take in raising concerns about the humanitarian situation in Iraq and pressing for changes in the current implementation of the Oil-for-Food programme. She stressed that the humanitarian programme is run and designed by politicians on the Security Council, whose priority is disarmament rather than relief. Although Save the

Children (UK) cannot make political statements on the merits of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy, international human rights legislation like the Convention on the Rights of the Child offers it a powerful platform when advocating on issues such as sanctions. NGOs can put pressure on such inadequacies in the design and implementation of sanctions as the 'No Objection' procedure, long processes, labourious paperwork, the consequent large number of contract holds and delays on imports. Looking ahead positively, NGOs can contribute to humanitarian needs; however, they need political allies. Due to the highly parochial, military and political interests of UN Committee members and the pressures of their large portfolios, such allies are hard to find. More opportunities exist currently for NGOs, including targeting of assistance to vulnerable groups (which will require accurate baseline data); a cash component and local purchasing; bypassing the Sanctions Committee for approval of food, medicine and educational items; increasing transparency; and redefining 'human security'. Ms Ledward said however that real change for the population could only come at a geopolitical level with a fundamental alteration in US and UK policy.

Rita Bhatia

"I'd like to thank the conference organisers for bringing us here to share some of Save the Children (UK)'s perspectives on our work in the north of Iraq. I would also like to thank Richard Garfield for his very thorough background review, which allows me to skim over some of the points a little bit quicker.

Non-governmental organisations have a role to play in advocating for more targeted and humane international sanctions, in order to minimise their impact on vulnerable civilians whilst maximising their political and military effectiveness. In the case of Iraq, international non-governmental organisations are constrained by the politically charged na-

ture of the issue, the fragmented baseline data, the limited ability to do research and the current high stakes and impasse in the negotiations at the UN Security Council. So what we would like to question, is whether NGOs can square the circle, and make a difference while still maintaining their political neutrality.

NGOs can make a difference, and there are a number of options we would like to suggest for being more strategic, scaling up NGO impact, raising public awareness and influencing the UK government's policy agenda on Iraq. I'm going to cover some of the operational realities and constraints facing Save the Children in Iraq. My colleague Andrea is going to look at the potential for doing advocacy on Iraq, given some of the political constraints.

Many international NGOs began operating in Iraq during the humanitarian emergency after the Gulf War in 1991. Save the Children (UK) began providing emergency relief to the Kurds in the north of Iraq, who at that stage had largely fled to the Turkish and Iranian borders. In August of that year we opened an office in Baghdad to provide assistance both to the Kurdish refugees in the north and the Arabs who were returning to the southern marsh areas. When the government of Iraq restricted Save the Children's access to those southern marshes we were forced to work only in the Kurdish controlled areas in the north of the country.

In 1992, international NGOs were invited to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Iraq. At this point it was made clear that all international NGO operations would then be restricted to the south and centre parts of the country. Save the Children and many others chose not to sign this. Thus, currently, our presence in the north, according to the government of Iraq, is technically illegal. Just two organisations signed this memorandum: Care International (Australia) who are still based in Baghdad and Oxfam

(UK) who subsequently closed down their field office in Iraq in 1995. Save the Children's work in northern Iraq has been very much an emergency driven programme, looking at the repair and reconstruction of roads, health centres and a number of water and sanitation projects. It has now moved strategically from basic relief-driven provision to working on more long-term reconstruction support, including the rehabilitation of basic services such as education, water and sanitation. Save the Children has helped families return to their villages, including developing income generating and credit-loan schemes with vulnerable households. Recently SCF has begun to work with the problem of children in institutions, juvenile justice and human resource development with Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. After nearly ten years of working in a narrow emergency-focused type of programme this approach is clearly not tenable given the current humanitarian situation in Iraq.

There are a number of reasons why Save the Children's programme is evolving, from relief to development, in northern Iraq. I would like to outline them for you. Firstly, we know that comprehensive sanctions have now been in place in Iraq for nearly ten years and there seems little sign of them being lifted at least in the short-term. From Save the Children's perspective, sanctions are degrading the physical infrastructure in Iraq and also, therefore, impeding the rights of children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most widely signed UN human rights treaty; all but two countries have ratified it. We are arguing, essentially, that both the targeted country and the sanctioning governments have a responsibility to uphold the rights of the child. The UN Convention refers quite clearly to the right of a child to life, and Richard spoke about UNICEF's recent child and maternal mortality study which said that there are now an estimated 500,000 children who have died unnecessarily since

sanctions have been put in place. We also had the example from Richard about literacy; I'm not going to repeat the figures, but UNESCO's contribution to that second humanitarian panel report suggest that illiteracy is on the rise again in Iraq by an estimated 5% a year.

Secondly, we believe that the Oil-for-Food programme is actually inadequate. It was only ever designed to be a partial, remedial and temporary measure. After ten years its achievements are clearly limited. Also, the second humanitarian panel report in 1999, which Richard mentioned, had quite a damning conclusion about the Oil-for-Food programme. It concluded,

> The humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved through remedial humanitarian effort.

Look at the revenue under the Oil-for-Food programme. Take the amount of money that is raised for Oil-for-Food, which is done in six-monthly phases, and take the 13% to 53% allocated for the purchasing of humanitarian supplies in the north and centre-south respectively. Then divide that by the twenty million people in Iraq – the per capita figure is just $180 per person. That is intended to pay for health, education and other 'humanitarian needs'.

Thirdly, we believe that the Oil-for-Food programme, in its design, is driven by short-term objectives and doesn't really build in any vision of what Iraq would need post-sanctions, that is in terms of post-sanctions reconstruction. As Richard mentioned, and I would also like to emphasise, to date there has been no comprehensive assessment of the adequacy, effectiveness and equity of either the Oil-for-Food programme or the impact of sanctions on the civilian population in Iraq. There are some complex reasons for this; I don't think that the answer is as simple as saying that members of the Security Council don't want it. The government

of Iraq does not want this for its own reasons as well. And one of the conclusions coming out of the second humanitarian panel report was for a multidisciplinary team to work outside the framework of SCR 986 in co-operation with Iraqis to complete an assessment. That hasn't happened. Just to give you some additional background: all UN sanctions when they are set up and put in place have Sanctions Committees. The chair of all the UN Sanctions Committees recently brought out a note in January 1999, where he made some recommendations about how UN sanctions could be implemented more effectively. One of his clear recommendations was that when sanctions are put in place they should always monitor the impacts on vulnerable groups, one of which was children. Another proposal was that the chair of each Sanctions Committee should visit the country regularly in order to facilitate this. Again, this hasn't happened. These recommendations have not been applied in the case of Iraq.

Also, there are very few channels of communication between operational organisations like ourselves, campaigning groups, human rights organisations and the UN agencies themselves who are quietly lobbying behind the scenes at quite a high political level. We feel it is necessary to bridge this communication gap.

Another issue for Save the Children is that we are currently working in the three autonomous Kurdish areas in the north of the country, where, in some ways, one can say that the humanitarian situation is improving. This, therefore, limits the opportunities we have based on our programme experience to advocate around sanctions. But one has to put the situation in the north in context. It has a more difficult history and is starting from a much worse humanitarian situation with years of conflict and displacement. Therefore, if you take that as your baseline, then one can say that in some ways things are improving. But improving mortality rates masks a

wider fact that in the north of Iraq broad-based social and economic development is not supported under the Oil-for-Food programme. What we are seeing, and this is confirmed by our recent research, is that the Oil-for-Food programme may actually be undermining agricultural production in the north. Hence what we have been calling for all along with many other agencies is for there to be local purchase of wheat in the north.

Now what are some of the constraining factors and operational realities that lie before Save the Children and other humanitarian actors? Firstly, if we are looking at the south of the country the government of Iraq controls the distribution plan and there is very little opportunity for humanitarian agencies to have any leverage over this plan. A recent example was UNICEF's Child and Maternal Mortality study, which recommended among other things that the government remove breast-milk substitutes from rations and make breast-feeding a national policy. UNICEF can only make recommendations, it has no way of enforcing this.

Secondly, in terms of humanitarian work within Iraq, there is actually little funding available outside of the Oil-for-Food programme. It is little known that some of the UN agencies like UNICEF, UNDP and the World Food Programme also have country programmes within Iraq and it is actually very difficult for them to raise funds from donor governments.

Thirdly, there are issues around how the UN Sanctions Committee in Iraq works, and particularly the 661 Committee. Let me give you some background on that. Sanctions Committees are made up of representatives of the Security Council members, so all fifteen are represented. The main role of the 661 Sanctions Committee on Iraq is to approve any of the contracts that have been signed. There has been lots of concern about how many goods have been put on hold and how any one member can put a good on hold without

necessarily having to disclose why. It is currently estimated that a large amount of contracts are on hold, largely in the water, sanitation, oil and telecommunications sectors. Such items are actually fundamental for doing humanitarian work. Medicines are often useless, unless you have supplies of water, electricity and agricultural goods.

Some of the other issues which I can only briefly mention due to the time, are the continued isolation of our programme in the north of Iraq, the constant uncertainty about what the future of the north will be and the constraints of working in a potential conflict situation. I think I had better hand over to Andrea now who is going to be talking about certain types of advocacy in Iraq and what we hope to be doing in the future. Thank you."

Andrea Ledward

"I really want to try to address a question which many of you might have: 'Why aren't NGOs doing more on Iraq? Why don't you hear about the big agencies like Action Aid, Save the Children and Oxfam coming out with statements about Iraq when we all know how bad the situation is?' I would like to give you a sense of the political context. Nobody is free of guilt and blame; many political actors are complicit in maintaining the sanctions the way they are.

One example to highlight the complexity of the issues and the joint responsibilities of the government of Iraq and the international community is the humanitarian assessment that Rita and Richard have talked about. They've said that the government of Iraq would not be happy having that type of assessment done. They consider it an invasion of their sovereignty to monitor their capacity to look after their own population. China and Russia also do not want an assessment, feeling that on principle it is an invasion of Iraq's state sover-

eignty. Arguably the UK and the US too do not want to see pressure for removing or modifying the Oil-for-Food programme. The pressures of everybody's own agenda makes it very difficult for an NGO like us to go in there and discuss things.

To give you a sense of what is happening at the United Nations I will explain that currently in New York there is a very large resolution being negotiated, an 'omnibus resolution' which has developed from a French, Russian and the UK–Dutch texts which I'm sure that Jon Davies is going to talk about tomorrow. At the moment it is delayed by the issue of a 'trigger mechanism': how much compliance and/or co-operation the government of Iraq has to show on weapons inspections before the suspension of sanctions can be considered. Now, this means that discussions are mainly taking place between the permanent five members and not in the Security Council as a whole, and also NGOs are completely excluded from the debate. Save the Children, for example, has no position on disarmament issues. The whole of the draft resolution is stuck on this detail which actually has nothing to do with the humanitarian situation – delivering food, medicines and various other things in the Oil-for-Food programme.

So what do we do? Do we say that that is not fair and that attention should shift away from complete disarmament, which is unrealistic politically? Instead, Save the Children has been thinking more about how to improve the actual procedure of the 661 Committee, to which Rita referred, and the fact that the sanctions committee is non-transparent: minutes are not published and nobody really knows what happens within it. Also there is a 'No Objection' procedure which means that anyone can block any contracts. So Save the Children has been following the discussions in New York and talking about ways in which some of the humanitarian responsibilities, particularly ours on delivering food and educational

items, can be taken away from that Committee and put within the Secretariat.

The humanitarian Oil-for-Food programme, as everyone has said, is very political and parochial and was not designed by humanitarian relief personnel. It is run by politicians and that's the sense in which it is defined. This makes it difficult to engage in the mechanism of the Oil-for-Food programme. There is a government distribution plan which covers the whole of the centre and south of Iraq. We can't tell the government of Iraq what they should be giving their population, so we have no movement there. We also can't tell the Security Council what to tell the government of Iraq; there is very little leverage there too.

Also, there is very little political focus on thinking forward to the longer term. 'What would happen if there were changes in the sanctions regime or if the Oil-for-Food programme were to end?' That is a question which no one wants to consider. So everyone focuses on the day to day, and gets lost in the technical details. Otherwise it involves a radical redesign and political solutions, for example, with respect to the political status of the north.

Within the political context, if NGOs are going to have influence they have to have allies. The problem on Iraq is there are no obvious allies. You may say that the Office of the Iraq Programme would be one as it was created out of the Secretariat to administer the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it is a deeply political organisation whose interests are to maintain the programme despite its inefficiencies or inefficacy. It is also operating under a very technical mandate. If asked to do a humanitarian needs assessment they would probably say that it was not their remit, which is restricted by SCR 986, not by the country's needs. They would consider UNICEF a more appropriate body to assess it.

On the Security Council itself there is an NGO working

group, a group that regularly meets with the ambassadors. But in New York the UN representatives are responsible for a range of issues from Chechnya to Kosovo and East Timor. Iraq is only one of many complex issues on their agenda.

It must be noted that NGOs have different targets and different approaches to campaign groups. Many NGOs are working very hard behind the scenes, trying to work out where the key decisions are being made. Although they are not making public statements, that does not mean that they are not following the events and trying to see a change. Also, NGOs have charity commitment obligations which, as Rita mentioned, means they must remain politically neutral. They cannot make statements about whether sanctions are good or bad. What we can say is that at the moment the Oil-for-Food programme is not appropriately designed to meet the full needs of the population. We are working from within the current system rather trying to advocate a top-down political change.

There are options at the moment, and there are definitely openings and chinks in the discussions and things that can be put forward. There is the possibility of real progress. That could come from this large draft resolution which the UK are proposing or it could come at the start of Phase VII when the new Oil-for-Food six month period starts. New humanitarian provisions could be included. There is definitely more room too, within the existing political constraints, to build in more meetings and more dialogue. Changes already identified could be mandated without the government of Iraq consent or Security Council consensus.

Save the Children thinks that in order to secure some of the improvements, we must target very specific issues. In line with the British government, we think that local purchasing is very necessary. We think that a cash component is also necessary, as Rita has already mentioned. We think bi-

lateral donor funding beyond SCR 986 is very important and again, we have been pushing for this. We think that essential humanitarian goods such as food, medicine and educational items should not have to go through the Sanctions Committee. They should be transferred over to the Secretariat just for notification. We also think that there is a need to target more vulnerable groups. To do that you need research to find out who the vulnerable groups are. We want to see a more modern definition of human security extending beyond military threats. This would shift the focus away from ensuring the security of a population just by protecting the borders of its country and clearing its weapons. We want to see security of the population defined as freedom from dependence on others and reduced vulnerability to external shocks. This means increasing people's self-sufficiency and ability to provide for themselves and their families.

Save the Children works from a child rights mandate. As Rita said, this is a strong legal basis from which to advocate. Many good opportunities are opening up. Governments are more willing to discuss with representatives of civil society. But we need co-ordination, we need to share information and we need to step back on all sides to view the constraints and understand why people act and speak as they do. There needs to be more sharing and more balancing.

The purpose of this talk has been to say that the political constraints are very large and the issues very sensitive. Many NGOs are doing everything that they can within their mandates. We must also accept that we will not see a change in sanctions as a regime until there is a major shift in geopolitics, a political change in policy at a very high level. At that point Iraq as an issue may be bargained off against others."

Afterword

The opinions represented here are only those of Save of Children (UK) and do not necessarily reflect the views of other international NGOs.

On December 17 1999, the impasse referred to here was in some sense overcome with the passing of resolution UNSCR 1284, on which four SC members abstained from voting and eleven voted in favour.

In February 2000, the latest estimates suggest that $1.5 billion worth of contracts are on hold, including over 50% of oil spare parts requested. The Financial Times (7/2/00) stated that 377 oil contracts were on hold in January, while Iraq had received $300 million out of a possible $1.5 billion worth of equipment.

SESSION 4: SOCIETY AND CULTURE

'The Iraqi Exodus.'

HARRIET GRIFFIN

Harriet Griffin is a researcher at the Centre for Environmental Change at Oxford University, having previously been an exhibition manager at the Natural History Museum. She currently works on domestic energy use in Europe; however, she has also been pursuing research interests in the socio-economic impacts of sanctions on Iraq in particular and of British foreign policy in general. She has also researched issues of the forced migration, structure and adaptation of migrant communities. She has a BA in Zoology from the University of Oxford.

Harriet Griffin, the first speaker on the social and cultural consequences of the sanctions on Iraq, collated personally collected evidence with generally available information on past and current trends in Iraqi migration. An estimated 5 million Iraqis now living outside Iraq. Ms Griffin charted the historic and economic triggers of their movement. Starting with the abolition of the monarchy in 1958, she described patterns of migration resulting from a rise of political intolerance targeted at Kurdish and Shi'a minorities. Before the Gulf War, economic expansion increased the capital available for voluntary migration; many Iraqis left to pursue education and work. Since 1990, however, asylum applications in Western countries have increased exponentially, despite severe exit restrictions. Financial insecurity, poor career prospects and a pessimism about the future cause many Iraqis to migrate; middle-class families now often rely on money sent by relatives working abroad. Although it is difficult to determine precisely what effect sanctions have had on post-1990 migration, the implications of migration for Iraq's future are clear: the loss of skilled labour will impede the country's potential for reconstruction, and the fragmentation of families will damage Iraq's traditional values.

"Good afternoon. I'm going to talk about the mass migration of Iraqi people over the last few decades. I became interested in this subject after reading in an article that 4 million people had left the country. I wanted to find out more, so I started to read papers, interview people, and consider whether sanctions were playing any role in these movements of the population. All the data I will show you I have collected from reading and talking to people.

I've become aware of controversy about the effect of sanctions on migration even within my very small circle of Iraqi acquaintances. When I've asked for their opinion on what percentage of the people who have left since 1990 have left because of the dire economic situation, some people have said 20%, while some have said 100%; it is also true that those people who make larger estimates tend to be those who've left the country more recently.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq was the largest refugee community in 1998. In 1998 there were 54,000 asylum applications made by Iraqi nationals; in 1997 that figure was 48,000 – an increase of six thousand. There are also many internal displacements, as well as thousands of people living in what are known as 'refugee-like situations', such as in refugee camps where accommodation is unstable or unsatisfactory.

I estimate that there are about 5 million Iraqis living outside Iraq. The last official estimate was made by the UNHCR in 1996. On the basis of 1995 data, they said that 4 million were in exile, 3 million of whom had left before the Gulf War. Earlier this year an Arabic newspaper estimated that 2 million had left Iraq since 1991. We have to accept that since 1995 there's been a lot of migration; which is the basis of my figure of about 5 million.

I'm now going to look at patterns of forced migration before the sanctions. Forced migration been going on since 1948

and the establishment of the state of Israel. It hasn't been gradual, but has proceeded in a series of waves responding to political upheavals. However, forced migration before 1990 is characterised as reactive to the politics of the regime and not by economic constraints. In 1958, an alliance of the Ba'th and the Communist party overthrew the monarchy; in 1963 the Communist Party was excluded and many intellectuals left the country at that time. Political emigration really started to increase after 1968 when the Ba'th Party came to power, targeting Kurdish Assyrian people for persecution. Restrictions on freedom of speech or opinion may have encouraged many people to emigrate then. The nationalistic policies of the Ba'th Party caused the expulsion of between two and three hundred Shi'a in 1973. Late in the 1970s bad relations with Iran also supplemented this movement.

So political migration intensified during the 1970s, but at this time it was mainly 'voluntary' – students went abroad, the country was opening up, the economy grew massively, people could afford to go overseas to university or to work in the Gulf region or in other countries. However, these people were not economic migrants. Iraq has never historically been a source of economic migrants, but has actually attracted economic migrants. For example, in the 1970s millions of migrant workers arrived from Egypt to work in the oil industry.

Moving on to look at migration after 1990, there is actually a lot of data on this, but unfortunately most of it has not been analysed and is locked up in national statistical offices. The most comprehensive survey I've come across is the UNHCR background paper on Iraqi asylum seekers and refugees in 1996. This gives some information on asylum applications made by Iraqi nationals in western European countries. Western Europe is actually the most important destination for Iraqi asylum seekers, and in 1997 three quarters of the 48,000 applications by Iraqi nationals were received in

western Europe. Between 1995 and 1997 Iraq was the third largest source of asylum seekers coming to Europe. That number doubled during those three years. However, many of these people didn't come directly from Iraq, but may have spent some time in other countries; also asylum applications might not be a very precise indicator of the number of people arriving in the country. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are the most important asylum countries for Iraqi people. For most of these countries the number of asylum applications has increased almost exponentially since the late 1980s. It seems that migration to western Europe has intensified especially in the latter half of this decade.

Between 1995 and 1997 Iraqi nationals had the highest rate of asylum recognition – about 50%, compared to the EU average of 11%. But there have been severe clamp-downs in EU asylum policy recently, especially in Germany, causing Germany's rate of acceptance to plummet in 1998. In 1997 the European Council on Refugees and Exiles in a response to these reforms said that many Iraqi refugees would only be protected in Europe by the near impossibility of forcing them to go back to Iraq. Sarah Graham Brown wrote that the rising numbers of Iraqi asylum seekers since 1991 were due to

> the combined effects of the economic embargo, continuing human rights abuses, fighting in the north and the failing hope of imminent improvement in the situation.

We mustn't lose sight of the fact that political persecution leading to forced migration is still taking place on a large scale in Iraq. Two examples of many are the forced relocation of Kurdish and Turkaman families in northern cities in favour of Arab families, and the drainage of the southern marshes with the continued offensive against the Shi'a.

One small unofficial survey of just under two hundred people was carried out by a member of an organisation called the Iraqi Corner for Democracy. He asked his acquaintances

their reason for leaving Iraq, and found that although before 1968 most migration was voluntary (people were going to universities abroad), during the 1970s political migration began in earnest and has continued until the present day. Between 1990 and 1998 40% of his small sample had left for political reasons. Although it seems that the support base of the Iraqi president may have narrowed over the last few years (an observation suggested by increased civil disorder), the party's manipulative power over civilian population has not diminished. One Oxford doctoral thesis examines the Iraqi government's use of the rationing system to engender a state of dependency in the population. Sarah Graham Brown said that

> the regime has enforced the effects of scarcity by singling out particular groups for privilege or persecution.

Many, then, are leaving Iraq for economic reasons as well as political. We know about the deterioration of the economy and how it has affected almost everyone's chances of getting a job. Deprofessionalisation, by which I mean professionals and graduates working as street vendors and taxi drivers, has been widely undertaken as a survival strategy. There's been a dawning realisation, especially on the part of the young and educated, that things are just not going to get better. For young men there may be virtually no career prospects unless they want to work for the government. They have very little chance of getting married themselves and raising a family because they have no financial security. They may also feel the need to go abroad, to help support their immediate and extended families; many middle-class families now depend on that type of financial support. For young Iraqi women, marriage prospects may be more important as the means by which they can establish themselves outside the parental home. Many young female graduates now choose arranged marriages

with Iraqis living abroad as their best chance of financial security, professional fulfilment, independence, and relieving the stress on their family. It's been said that the desperation of Iraqi families can be seen in this practice of sending their daughters, of whom the society has traditionally been extremely protective, into exile and marriage with a man they may have only met once. One survey put social migration (basically young women leaving for arranged marriages with Iraqi citizens) at 15% of post-1990 total migration.

However, most people do not have the chance to leave Iraq. When in 1991 the Jordanian border was opened after the second Gulf War, the Iraqi government anticipated a serious loss of skilled manpower. They put in place barriers to emigration. The main internal barrier is the exit tax, which at the moment is 400,000 dinars or about $500. For Iraqi people this is an unimaginable amount of money – the average monthly salary of a teacher or dentist in the public sector would be between $2–$5. There are also restrictions on who can leave the country: academics, IT professionals, engineers, doctors, dentists and teachers have to leave a deposit of 1 million dinars as a guarantee of their return. There are also institutional barriers, such as the exit permit. External barriers must also be overcome, the most significant of which is the passport. Most embassies won't grant visas to Iraqi passport holders other than women leaving to get married or a family reunion in the United States. This has caused the growth of a massive trade in fake passports for Iraqis, which usually cost between $2,000 and $10,000. Illegal trafficking of migrants, which increased significantly in 1997, is also a huge industry mostly involving Iraqi Kurds. Even when people manage to overcome these massive challenges, they must adapt to an alien culture and cope with the stress of endless demands for money from their extended families.

The family network is crucial in enabling people to leave

Iraq; it provides the money to overcome the exit tax barrier, pays for the passport, and then provides additional support on arrival. For people remaining in Iraq, relatives living abroad are crucial in funding medical treatment.

It's not possible to say how much of post-1990 migration has been due to the sanctions; but there has clearly been a change in the balance of pressures behind migration. We must consider the consequences. One implication of migration is the loss of skilled man power on Iraq's internal potential for reconstruction, once the economy has been released from the current stranglehold. Another is the fragmentation of traditional family structures and changes in the attitudes and values of this traditionally-orientated society. As one of my friends told me, almost every middle-class household she knows in Baghdad has an empty place in it."

SESSION 4: SOCIETY AND CULTURE

'Sanctions and Women in Iraq.'

DR. NADJE AL-ALI

Dr. Nadje Al-Ali is a lecturer at the Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. She is a social anthropologist who is currently doing research on Bosnian refugees. Previously, she has worked on gender issues in the Middle East. Her PhD dissertation (SOAS in London) on the women's movement and political culture in Egypt is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. She is a member of Women in Black, a loose international and national network of women campaigning for peace and against injustice. Women in Black have been campaigning to lift the sanctions in Iraq and the group is specifically concerned with the ways in which women are affected by sanctions. Dr Al-Ali is half-Iraqi, half-German; her father's family is still in Iraq.

Dr Al-Ali spoke from her personal experience as an academic and a campaigner as well as from conversations with her acquaintances and relatives. She focused on the effects of sanctions on women in Iraq and started by warning against a homogenised representation of Iraqi women, who, in fact, experience these effects in many ways. Women of different social classes, for example, suffer from food shortages and lack of medicine differently. Yet a constant sense of insecurity, uncertainty and anxiety is part of every woman's life in present-day Iraq. Providing a historical background to the present situation, Dr Al-Ali first described the situation during the 1970s and 80s, when women were encouraged into public sector employment. The regime – keen for their labour and loyalty – provided good pay and services such as transport and child-care. Women took a great leap forward through education and labour force participation. Their access to the 'public sphere' was accompanied by a liberalisation of values evident in dress codes, marriage patterns and ethical mores. This historical background provided a contrast with contemporary Iraq,

in which public sector pay has collapsed, education is under severe strain and more restrictive and conservative values have become popular. Dr Al-Ali told of many women who had been forced out of work by the pressures of looking after, educating and cooking for their families under the stringencies and low wages of sanctioned Iraq. She explored the pressures on individual relationships and marriages, focusing on a demographic shortage of men (due to the casualtis of two wars and economic migration) and the consequences for marriageable women. She then spoke of how many have turned to religion for comfort. While Dr Al-Ali stressed that she did not malign such piety, her anecdotes associated increased religiosity in society with increased conservative intrusions on women – the most obvious being the mounting demand to wear the Hijab. According to Dr Al-Ali, Iraqi society has witnessed a stark increase in prostitution, so called 'honour crimes', illegal abortions and the abandonment of babies. These terrible indicators expose how much sanctions have eroded women's social positions.

In her talk, Dr Al-Ali quoted numerous women with whom she had spoken. These quotes gave vivid expression to the demoralisation, desperation and isolation of life under sanctions. However, Dr Al-Ali reminded us not to view Iraqi women merely as victims. She ended her talk on a positive note with a tribute to the ingenuity and creativity of Iraqi women under sanctions.

"When I told a friend of mine that I was going to give a talk about women and sanctions in Iraq, she asked me, 'Are you going to talk as an anthropologist, as a political activist, or as an Iraqi?' I had to pause for a moment. When I talk to you today I don't wear these different hats; I wear one hat with different materials interwoven. I am an anthropologist, and I've worked on gender relations in the Middle East; I'm a member of Women in Black and I'm specifically concerned as a member of that group with war and injustice. I'm also half-Iraqi, and I have aunts, uncles and cousins in Baghdad, with whom I'm in regular contact and whom I visit quite

regularly.

Unlike Harriet, I won't be able to quote any statistics. What I'm trying to do is just sketch out some broad trends and transformations related to particular social and cultural aspects. How did society change in the sense of adjustments that specifically affected women? The information that I'm going to present is based partly on informal interviews with women in Iraq during my visits, and partly on observations of changes I noticed over the past ten years. Recently, I have also carried out some more formal interviews with Iraqi refugee women recently arrived in London. This talk will also include information I obtain through friends who have recently visited Iraq.

I'd like to start by saying that Iraqi women, like men, do not constitute a homogenous group. We tend to forget this when we speak about refugees or people in war-torn societies who live under conditions like in Iraq. They tend to become homogenised or essentialised. When I speak about Iraqi women, I am speaking about women of different backgrounds, different social classes, women who live in urban areas, women who live in the countryside. Different women are affected differently by sanctions. Having said that, there are certain things that affect almost all women. When we hear about child mortality rates or maternal mortality, it is the very poor who are mostly affected; but even for educated middle-class women, who were relatively well-off before the sanctions, feeding the children has become the major worry and focus. Hannah, a middle-class woman who has recently left Iraq and now lives in London, told me:

> I would feed my children and my husband, before eating anything myself. Often I would stay hungry. I would also feed my children before visiting anyone. Before the sanctions, people were very generous. You would always serve tea and biscuits, if not a meal when people came to see you. Now, people stop visiting each other, so that they do not embarrass each other.

The massive impoverishment and insecurity caused by sanctions have subjected women of various social backgrounds to considerable material strain. Household management in the context of electricity cuts – we heard about that before – and water shortages is time-consuming, exhausting, and frustrating. Just an example: bread is now too expensive to buy on the market, and many Iraqi women have no other choice but to bake their own on a daily basis using the flour ration distributed by the government. Besides, food storage is largely impossible partly because of the frequent electricity cuts.

Aside from the more obvious effects related to basic survival strategies and difficulties, sanctions have also left their mark on the social and cultural fabric of Iraqi society. Without doubt, Iraqi women lost some of the achievements gained in the previous decade. They can no longer assert themselves through previous channels of promotion: education and waged work. Here some background is needed. The 1970s and early 80s were years of general economic prosperity, witnessing the emergence and expansion of a broad middle class. State policies worked to eradicate illiteracy, educate women, and incorporate them into the labour force. The initial period of the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil industry in 1972 was characterised by economic hardships and difficulties. However, the oil embargo by OPEC countries in 1973, known as the Oil Crisis, was followed by a period of boom and expansion. Oil prices shot up considerably, and oil-producing countries started to become aware of their bargaining power related to Western countries' dependence on oil. In the context of this rapid economic expansion the Iraqi government consciously sought out women to incorporate into the labour force.

Without doubt, policies of encouraging women to enter waged work cannot be explained in terms of egalitarian or feminist principles even though several women I talked to did comment positively on the early Ba'thist policies of wom-

en's social inclusion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse carefully the specific motivations and ideology of the Ba'thist regime in terms of women's roles. However, it seems important to mention that labour was sparse; and while the Gulf countries started to look for labour outside their own national boundaries, the Iraqi government tried to tap into their own human resources, that is, tried to get women involved. Subsequently, working outside the home did not only become acceptable for women, but became prestigious and the norm. Another factor which has to be taken into account is the regime's attempt to reach out to women as part of a general project of indoctrination. Obviously it was much easier to reach out and recruit women when they were part of the so-called public sector and visible in their work places. Notably a great number of party members were recruited through waged work.

Whatever the government's motivations, Iraqi women became among the most educated and professional in the whole region. The question of how far access to education and the labour market has resulted in an improved status of women and a change of values is much more complex. As in many other places, conservative and patriarchal values did not automatically change because women started working. Here I emphasise the great differences between rural and urban women as well as women from different social class backgrounds.

Returning to present-day Iraq: as we heard earlier, education and working conditions have deteriorated rapidly. Higher education has virtually collapsed, and degrees are worthless in the face of widespread corruption and an uninterrupted exodus of university professors. Monthly salaries in the public sector, which has paradoxically become increasingly staffed with women, have dropped drastically, and do not correspond to high inflation rates and the cost of living.

An educated middle-class woman in her late forties, let's call her Wedat, worked as a teacher in a high-school until 1995. She said,

> We did not feel it so much during the first years of the sanctions, but it really hit us in 1994. Social conditions had deteriorated. The currency had been devalued but salaries were fixed. Many women started to quit. Some of my friends could not even afford transportation to the school anymore. Before the sanctions, the school made sure that we were picked up by bus but all this was cut. For me, the most important reason to quit work was my children. I did not want them to come home and be alone in the house. It has become too unsafe. And I know from my own work that teaching has become so bad, because teachers are quitting and there is no money for anything. So I felt that I had to teach them at home.

Working women like Wedat have suffered from the collapse of their support systems. One previous support system had been funded by the state, and consisted of numerous nurseries and kindergartens, free public transportation to and from schools, as well as transportation to the working places of women. The other support system was based on extended family ties and neighbourly relations, who helped and got involved in child care. These days, women are reluctant to leave their children with neighbours or other relatives because of the general sense of insecurity.

Crime rates are on the increase. Many women reported that ten years ago they used to keep all their doors open and felt totally secure. Now, there are numerous accounts of burglaries – often very violent ones. Also, several mothers told me that their children have become much more needy and clinging after the Gulf War and the continued threat of bombings. In light of the absence of counselling and therapy, mothers carry the burden of dealing with their traumatized children. There is also a general sense of distrust except within the closed nuclear family. This starkly contrasts with traditional cultural values which put a great emphasis on the ex-

tended family's relationships. Because of the bad conditions in schools due to the lack of resources and teachers, many parents also feel that they have to contribute to their children's education. And 'parents' here reads as 'mothers', of course.

So these are a few reasons why many women decide to quit, in addition to the fact that they cannot afford transportation any more now that the salaries are too low. But one refugee woman who has come to the UK nine months ago stated that she knew of some women who wanted to resign from their jobs in the public sector because of their fixed salaries and because they could not even cover the cost of transportation, but who felt compelled to continue working because their monthly food rations are tied to their jobs.

The demographic cost of two wars, and the forced economic migration of men triggered by the imposition and continuation of the sanctions, account for the high number of female-headed households. It is not only war widows who find themselves without husbands, but also women whose husbands left for abroad to escape the bad conditions and find ways to support their families. Other men just abandon their wife or children, being unable to cope with the inability to live up to the social expectation of being the provider and breadwinner. Another side-effect of the current demographic imbalance between men and women is the difficulty for young women to get married. We've heard about this before. Polygamy, which had become largely restricted to rural areas or uneducated people, has been on the increase in recent years. And I want to add to something that Harriet was saying about women marrying expatriates to get out. Often the pattern is that young women marry older men, sometimes twenty years older. There are therefore many problems linked to this kind of marriage. Several women told me that they know of daughters of neighbours or friends who are extremely unhappy be-

ing married to someone they've never met before who is much older and living outside of Iraq.

Another common phenomenon is what one Iraqi woman called 'marrying below one's class'. Iraq has traditionally been a very class-oriented society where one's family name and background might open up or close many doors. Now, one can detect greater social mobility and less rigid class barriers. This is partly due to the uneven demographic situation between men and women, but also relates to a radical inversion of class structures. The impoverishment of the previously well-off middle classes goes side by side with an emergence of a *nouveau riche* class of war and sanctions profiteers. As in any tragedy, certain people make money out of sanctions, especially those related to black market trading.

At the same time as marriage has become a relatively difficult undertaking, particularly young women are pressured by a new cultural environment which is marked simultaneously by a decline in moral values pertaining to honesty, generosity and sociability, and an increased public religiosity and conservatism. Many women I interviewed concurred with my relatives in Baghdad when they spoke sadly about the total inversion of cultural codes and moral values. I will never forget when one my aunts told me: 'You know, bridges and houses can easily be rebuilt. It will take time, but it is possible. But what they have really destroyed here is our morale, our values.' She, like many other Iraqi women I talked to, sadly stated that honesty was not paying off any more. 'People have become corrupt and greedy. Trust has become a very rare word, and envy exists even among closest kin.'

In the midst of the inversion of moral values and cultural codes, economic hardships, and political repression, more and more women and men have turned to religion to find some sort of comfort. Even Manar Younis, the president of the Federation of Iraqi Women and an affiliate of the Ba'th Party

and the regime, is now veiled and ostentatiously pious. The apparent increase in religiosity became very obvious to me during my last trip to Baghdad. None of my aunts or cousins had ever worn the Hijab, and religion was never a big issue within the family. But now all of my aunts pray regularly, wear the Hijab, and frequently mention religion and God in their discourses. I personally do not put any value judgement on increased religiosity in and of itself. It is not a good or a bad thing for me. But, in the Iraqi context, similar to the Islamisation processes in other countries in the region, the turn towards religion is coupled with an increased conservatism and social restrictions which target women specifically. So, there has not only been a growing trend towards religiosity by women, but women have also been subjected to increasing social pressures, expecting and demanding the expression of religious appearance. These are two different things.

For women, this often culminates in the question of whether to put on the Hijab or not – Hijab being the most visible and obvious sign of religious appearance and supposedly good moral conduct. Yet, two refugee women in London added another dimension to the complex phenomenon of apparent increase in religiosity, when they told me that they only put up the Hijab to cover up their hair. Khadijah said: 'I did not have the money any more to dye my hair. Even henna was too expensive, and it was also difficult to afford a haircut. My sister did it, and she did a lousy job. I put on the Hijab to cover up my awful hair.' According to Khadijah, there are many women who are motivated by embarrassment and a sense of shame, in terms of their looks, rather than religious reasons. This is not to belittle the social pressures and restrictions which women are confronted with, but to show that one has to go beyond appearances.

The growing restrictions on women's movement and be-

haviour have to be seen in the context of an incredible increase in prostitution, both inside Iraq and in neighbouring countries. Most of the female prostitutes in Jordan, for example, are Iraqi women these days. The imposition by the government of the 'Mahram', a male escort for females leaving Iraq, did not succeed in stopping this trend. The new law does not allow women to leave the country without being accompanied by a male first of kin, unless they are above forty-five years old. This law was enforced after the Jordanian government complained to the Iraqi government about widespread prostitution by Iraqi women in Amman (the capital of Jordan). Another example – and I don't really want to go into this – but you might have heard of honour crimes, which have been legalised in Iraq and are now much more frequent than before.

Aside from growing religiosity, one can also detect a growing sense of superstition, and a turn to spiritual realms. Spirit possession and exorcism, called 'zar', existed before in certain rural areas among uneducated people. But during the past years more and more women have rekindled old traditions and beliefs and turned to healers, exorcists, and witchcraft to deal with their physical and emotional problems. An Iraqi woman who has been working with refugee women who have recently arrived in the UK expressed her shock and disbelief to me. Until a few years ago, she had never heard such an array of stories and beliefs related to spirits and witchcraft. Again, I don't want to pass value judgements – I don't think there is anything intrinsically bad about turning to the spiritual. But it is bad and dangerous if it is in the place of adequate health care or counselling.

Sanctions also seem to have taken their toll on relationships between husbands and wives. Even though there are no concrete figures, it seems that the divorce rate has increased. A case worker with Iraqi refugees in London reported that

there is a very high divorce rate among couples who have recently come to this country. About 25% of Iraqi refugees in the UK are either separated or divorced. A few women stated that their husbands have become more violent and abusive since the sanctions. Widespread despair and frustration, and the perceived shame of not being able to provide the family with what is needed, do not only invoke depression but also anger. Domestic violence has become rampant as women are often at the receiving end of men's frustrations. However, other women told me that their relationships with their husbands improved. Alia, a housewife in her late thirties, said,

> My husband never did anything in the house before the sanctions. He used to work in a factory outside of Baghdad. Now that he has stopped working, he helps me to bake bread and to take care of the children. We get along much better than before, because he has started to realise that I'm working very hard in the house.

Fertility was mentioned before. Family planning has become a big source for tension and conflict between husbands and wives. Before the Iran–Iraq war, all kinds of contraception were available and legal. During the war contraception was made illegal as the government tried to encourage Iraqi women to 'produce' a great number of future citizens to make up the loss in lives during the war. Many incentives were given, such as extension of paid maternity leave. Maternity leave was increased to one year out of which six months were paid. Baby food and articles were imported and subsidised. These days, contraceptives are still not available and are illegal, but women's attitudes towards children have changed because of the material circumstances and the moral climate. Unlike previous times, Iraqi woman are reluctant to have many children. Abortion being illegal, many women risk their health and their lives to have illegal abortions in back-alleys. The director of an orphanage in Baghdad told me two years ago that they are facing a new phenomenon in Iraq: that is, women

abandoning their newborn babies and leaving them on the street. These babies might be a result of so-called illicit relationships but, according to the director, are often left by married women who just cannot face being unable to feed yet another child.

The bleak picture I have sketched out only touches upon some aspects of the numerous ways sanctions have affected women. In no way would I want to suggest that sanctions constitute the only negative force impacting on women's lives, but I have tried to point to those social and cultural phenomena which have emerged during the past years, and which have to be viewed as being mainly triggered by sanctions. Let me finish this talk on a slightly brighter note. Let us not forget that Iraqi women are not just passive victims. And here I'm not talking about those women who are actually linked to the regime: I'm talking about ordinary Iraqi women of different social class backgrounds. Contrary to common media representations of oppressed Arab women, in many ways Iraqi women are more resourceful and adaptable to the new situations than Iraqi men. Small informal business schemes such as food catering have mushroomed. Skills and crafts and the recycling of clothes and other materials give evidence to an incredible creativity. And without suggesting that there was anything natural about women being better human beings, if there is any hope for the future of Iraq, it does not lie with the fragmented and disputing male opposition, but with those who have kept their dignity and remained non-violent and human. Thanks."

SESSION 4: SOCIETY AND CULTURE

'Sanctions from an Iraqi perspective.'

EMAD SALMAN

Emad Salman is Director of the Iraqi Community Association, and is a committee member of the Committee for the Lifting of Economic Sanctions on the Iraqi People (CLESIP).

Emad Salman began his talk by distancing himself and his organisation from the 'ruthless' regime of Saddam Hussein. He sought to convey the effect of sanctions on his own relatives, starting with his father, who first lost his eyesight for want of cheap antibiotic eyedrops and then died when he was not 'prioritized' for the use of the hospital's single remainder oxygen cylinder. This led Mr Salman to chronicle the medical emergencies resulting from sanctions. He also pointed out that Saddam Hussein discriminates in his provision of supplies against those cities which took part in the 1991 uprising against him. More generally, he noted that economic losses have resulted in the spread of crimes formerly unheard-of; those who wish to scrape together an honest living are forced to take second jobs, often ones for which they are desperately overqualified. Increases in prostitution, armed robbery, and even the sale of organs from kidnapped victims suggest the profundity of the moral crisis created by sanctions. He read excerpts from letters he had received from family members, emphasizing their need for the most ordinary conveniences and educational materials. He ended by denouncing Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule, but also castigated the continued bombing and failed Oil-for-Food programme as 'genocide by other means'.

"Before I express my views on this subject as an Iraqi, I would like to say a few words about our Committee for Lifting of Economic Sanctions. The Committee was established last year; its aims and objectives are to lobby and rally public opinion for the immediate lifting of the economic sanctions

on the Iraqi people, who have been the first and foremost victims of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council more than eight years ago. The Committee strongly believes too, that the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein – the most vicious and ruthless regime on earth – is also responsible for catastrophic death inflicted upon the Iraqi people.

Dear friends, how does an Iraqi person see the sanctions? I'll give you some examples starting from myself. My father died two years ago because of the sanctions. I'll tell you how he died. Before his death he lost his sight completely for want of a simple antibiotic eyedrop. He developed an infection and the doctor prescribed the antibiotic eyedrops. But there was nothing in the chemists' in the city where he lived. Then by chance, when I phoned him, he asked me if it was possible to send him the prescribed medicine. I found it here easily; it cost me around £2.50. I packed it into an envelope, addressed it to his home in Iraq and sent it off; four weeks later it came back to me with a label saying that permission had not been granted due to the economic sanctions, and that I should contact the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). I called the Iraq desk and then the sanctions desk. They told me that I had to fill in some forms and it would a couple of weeks to obtain permission. I told them this was really absurd: medicine is exempt from sanctions. But this fell on deaf ears of the people at the DTI. Soon afterward, my father then developed a respiratory infection. The family rushed him to hospital – the largest in the town where he lived. At the emergency unit of that hospital they had only one cylinder of oxygen. The doctors told the family that it was a question of priority to whom they should give the oxygen – to an old man, to a young man or to a child. They urged that 'Your father has seen life – let those children have the chance to live'. And he died the next day.

The economic sanctions have brought real misery and death

to the people of Iraq. Children under five are dying at the rate of one child every ten minutes. Hundreds of thousands of elderly people have died as well. The number of cases of diseases related to cancer has risen sharply – which no one has mentioned so far today – as a result of depleted uranium bombshells used by the US during the Gulf War. Malaria and typhoid have reappeared in a large part of the country. Hospitals lack basic medicine and electricity – which is needed to refrigerate the vaccine against deadly polio and diphtheria. Much of the infrastructure has still not been repaired since its devastation in 1991, including many of the water treatment facilities contaminated by the sewage system. In fact my nephew got hepatitis from water contamination and still suffers from it.

The discrimination policy of the regime has also worsened the situation. For Saddam Hussein, Baghdad – or even just part of Baghdad – is his concern. He has no interst in the population living in the towns and cities south of Baghdad and of course the Kurdish areas. Saddam hates them for the position they took against him during the uprising in March 1991. In fact almost all the factories there were dismantled and either moved north or used for spare parts. Electricity cut-off time can be more than sixteen hours a day. In Baghdad it is officially six hours and in other cities fourteen hours a day but the reality is different. So imagine those sixteen hours each day, in the summer time when the temperature rises above 48°C. They receive a smaller share in the distribution of food and medicine; and sometimes the ration coupon is used as a weapon of punishment, either reduced or even withheld from those not 'with' the government.

Because of the sanctions, the economic cycle is halted, paralysing vital services. For instance the average wage – as has been said many times – is now about $3 to $5 per month while the market prices of subsistence food for a family of

five is $26 per month. Inflation has risen an unprecedented thousand-fold. The fabric of society has been torn apart. Things that never used to happen – or were unusual – have become common. The suicide rate, especially among middle-aged men and women has become alarming. In the southern city of Basra, a father recently committed suicide by poisoning himself and his wife and all his children because he could not feed them. Organised crime such as daylight robbery and kidnapping for ransom is another new phenomenon. Prostitution is endemic. Last week in Baghdad a man was stabbed to death and his belongings stolen from him, even his finger rings, while people watched. Throughout Baghdad and other places, people believe that organised crime is carried out largely by the security forces themselves. Now, parking your car outside your house is adventurous – the next day you'll find it without tires! People are selling their belongings on the street too. Teachers, artists and writers selling their books or paintings is now quite a common sight – we've seen it on TV; or sometimes university professors work as a taxi driver on top of their academic jobs.

This is a letter which I received from a friend of mine. He says that nowadays

> We are living in a hell, a very difficult situation, as you know very well. As an employee, I receive a salary which is enough for me to survive for one day only. My family's so big; I've got three daughters and a son; so I really need your support. I'm working two jobs.... You probably all understand my condition so please don't forget me.

This is a letter which I received from another friend. He talks about how his daughter – this is in August – who got ninety-eight marks out of one hundred in her exams and who wants to go to a medical college. He requested for me kindly to send him a second hand medical book or some instruments. If I could manage to do so, he said, it would be a favour he will never forget as long as he lives. I managed to send him

via a brother who lives in Germany some medical instruments but I don't know whether it will reach him or not. People have now found a way to avoid the postal embargo in this country. You are allowed to send a parcel of less than half a kilo, but it's more than fifty-fifty that it will reach Iraq via Jordan. We no longer write Iraq on the address: we write Jordan and the rest in Arabic. We put 'Jordan, Baghdad...' and in Jordan the postman reads that this is not for Jordan, it is for Iraq, so he takes it there.

My sister also wrote me a letter. She begins as always by thanking me for assisting her (I send her money and goods). She said that she had two telephone bills, one for 28,000 dinar and the other one for 192,000 dinar. 'I need some money, if you could please manage to send me some; and by the way, if you could, send me some aspirin tablets...'. She had received the piece of fabric which I had sent her 'but my sewing machine needs a needle so if you could manage to send it somehow so I could use it...' she writes; 'I also need some skin cream...'. In a telephone call she added, 'I need something but I'm very shy to tell you.' I said, 'Look, OK, go ahead, what do you want?' (in Arabic of course). She said 'some internal clothing' – she needed a bra. I said, 'I don't know your size' and she giggled...really she giggled and laughed and a moment later she broke down crying. I asked her why. She said that this was the first time in a couple of years that she had giggled or laughed.

The sanctions and associated hardship have had an alarming effect on crime – suicide, prostitution, robbery and kidnapping. People are now finding themselves in such a difficult situation such that they have no choice but to sell parts of their bodies too. There is money to be made by international racketeers – these issues came out in Sweden recently. An Iraqi lady – I mentioned that sometimes people go to Jordan to get married to get away from Iraq – was recently in-

volved in a scandal. A racketeer married her and took her to a Gulf state. There she found herself in a room with another twenty women. The next day they took her to hospital, where her kidney was removed. She learned that they were going to take another part of her body but managed to alert somebody in the Gulf who contacted somebody she knew in Sweden.

The education system is collapsing. Schools lack basic requirements – books, blackboards, tables; pencils were barred along with a hundred other items from the list of proposed educational purchases because they were thought to be for (military) 'dual use'. Children are leaving school on a large scale and joining the workforce. Many schools have become places for military training or weapon storage.

The United Nations policy of Oil-for-Food and Medicine which is supposed to ease the burden of suffering on the people never achieved its aims. The economic sanctions have become a punishment for the Iraqi people for crimes they are not committing. Thousands of Iraqis whom I met through my present job have told unbelievable stories about the implications, for their lives, of the sanctions regime's oppression. Many of them strongly believe that neither the regime nor the American administration is interested in lifting the sanctions and to me this is a true statement. On the other hand human rights are systematically and regularly violated by the state. Saddam Hussein is a mass murderer who is responsible for the genocide of at least 200,000 Kurds. 250,000 Iraqi Arabs and tens of thousands of Iraqi dissidents have vanished in the last ten years. We are not talking about the victims of the first or the second Gulf War waged by Saddam Hussein. Max Van Der Staal, the United Nations Human Rights Rapporteur who resigned, reports that Iraq is the greatest violator of human rights since World War II.

Saddam is keeping a strong grip on power by imposing social and political terror. Iraq has turned into a big prison!

Nor is he a victim of sanctions. The people of Iraq are the only victims. Sometimes Saddam Hussein's regime even smuggles out medicine or food bought by the Oil-for-Food programme to get hard currency. The last round of American and British bombing in December 1998 and the daily engagement and bombing since then are adding to the destruction of vital civilian infrastructure and have inflicted heavy losses on the people of Iraq. They say that wars are a continuation of politics by other means. I think that economic sanctions are genocide by other means. There are now three hands strangling the Iraqi people: the hands of economic sanctions, the hands of US daily bombing and the hands of Saddam's regime. The situation has now deteriorated to the point where the international community must act immediately to lift the economic sanctions which hurt the people of Iraq and not the regime. The bombing must be stopped. Support the Iraqi people to achieve their democracy and to be free from terror and dictatorship. Thank you very much."

SESSION 5: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

PROFESSOR HUGH MACDONALD

Professor Hugh Macdonald is Senior Research Associate, School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia; Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Boston University; and Visiting Scholar at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He has taught international relations, arms control and strategic studies at Queen's University, Ontario, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the London School of Economics. He is Director of a Consultancy in International Security and Development. His published works include a book and various chapters on European security and arms control; monographs on the former Yugoslavia, northeast Asia security, and Middle East developments; and numerous journal articles. He originally studied economics with international relations, then Russian studies, and carried out post-doctoral work in the US.

Professor Macdonald placed the attempted regulation of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the international community in a wider context of intrusive weapons' monitoring by UN-empowered agencies, and pointed to connections between sanctions on Iraq and problematic non-proliferation strategies in the international system. He contextualized international efforts to counter Iraq's WMD programmes with information on treaties regulating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; charters that can be used to prosecute violators of human rights. The Iraqi exodus is, prima facie, a violation of human rights by the Iraqi regime, even though some refugees included defectors who provided first-hand knowledge of Iraq's weapons developments.

Yet the story is not so simple. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and under UN sanctions applied against both sides during the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq had breached its agreements with the international community. But recognising that Iraq constituted a 'buffer state' between revolutionary Iran, the

fragile oil-producing countries of the Arab world and Israel, many arms manufacturers – especially those in the US and Britain – co-operated in Iraq's flouting of international controls with the consent of their governments, as the Scott Enquiry indirectly acknowledged. Professor Macdonald characterised the consequent culture of state-run science and industry in Iraq as one of 'exceptionalism', and suggested that Western countries ought not to have been surprised by Iraq's successes in WMD manufacture.

Iraq found itself subjected to numerous UN Security Council Resolutions, economic and other sanctions, a massive military expedition, and weapons inspections by UNSCOM. These mechanisms owed their power and scope to unprecedented co-operation between the US and President Gorbachev's USSR. The legitimacy thus conferred on the UN was irreversible. In today's unipolar geopolitics following the collapse of Russia as a superpower and its renewed alienation from the US, modifying sanctions on Iraq has become dependent on the will of Washington. Moreover, the power of the sanctions regime, and the complexity and cost of the institutional mechanisms so fortuitously developed in 1990–91, far transcend the case of Iraq.

But sanctions regimes are extremely fallible. The history of sanctions imposed on Iraq thus fits within a wider pattern of international relations; it suggests a continuous struggle between a greatly weakened state, determined to regain its sovereignty, and an international community that is increasingly divided over the moral and strategic significance of the sanctions regime.

Professor Macdonald attributes the attainment of Iraq's initial WMD capabilities to unanticipated perseverance and ingenuity, and views this as entirely rational in the context of war with Iran and extensive assistance from allies. Even so, Iraq's later aggressiveness and duplicity in seeking to preserve or reconstitute these capabilities exclude it from the 'Rational Actor Paradigm'.

Sanctions on Iraq, notably including a succession of inspection crises, show that the technical capability to strip away the basis on which a sovereign actor can pursue its determinate national interests is not the same thing as altering those interests. On the

other hand the international community has continuously failed to seize the opportunities afforded by the end of the Cold War and the respite from American-Russian rivalry to conciliate so-called 'rogue states', including most of those which have since developed WMD capabilities. With the final rejection of UNSCOM's inspection teams in December 1998, despite relentless and still continuing aerial bombardment from the US and Britain, the unparalleled legitimacy of the sanctions regime on Iraq has begun to seep away.

Professor Macdonald concludes that there is a paralysis of policy in Washington, London and Baghdad. Efforts at the UN since the summer of 1999 to get agreement on a new monitoring regime (UNMOVIC) have been motivated by strengthening rather than diminishing sanctions. Meanwhile, international concern over the humanitarian disaster brought about by economic sanctions is legitimising counter-sanctions behaviour by many trading companies and their 'home states', including Russia, France, China and numerous regional and extra-regional actors. While this may be 'good' in a moral sense, it undermines the logic of UN sanctions. It also problematises the much more rapid development of WMD capabilities in other parts of the international system.

Stasis over international monitoring and non-proliferation regimes is not just political; it is intellectual and moral as well. The resulting general crisis is analysed in Part II of Macdonald's contribution.

Part I

"The spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and efforts to contain this phenomenon known as *counter-proliferation*, comprise an intellectually and technically difficult area of research. It is dominated by a bureaucratic and military elite, which gathers, processes, publishes, monitors and often suppresses the data on which intellectual enquiry is partly dependent. In the case of Iraq these difficulties are particularly acute. On the other hand, both in the case of

Iraq and the wider phenomena of proliferation, there is evidence of a crucially important process of change in the international system which cannot be hidden by governments and which is not directly under their control. Looking exclusively at the confrontation between Iraq and the international community makes it difficult to see what is happening in this wider context. So, the immediately critical question is, 'What is the relationship between Iraq's WMD programmes, and UN sanctions on Iraq?' Still, that enquiry should include some consideration of wider international politics and morals.

This conference session addresses the question, 'What has been, and is, the relationship between Iraq's WMD and UN sanctions on Iraq?'

Part II of this paper covers some of the main considerations about WMD spread and non-proliferation in the Middle East and within the international system more generally. It provides a glossary of terms and a brief list of printed sources.

A few technicalities

WMD are also known as NBC weapons – nuclear, bacteriological and chemical. NBC should not be confused with a less lethal but sometimes equally offensive broadcasting network. Each category is covered by one or more international treaties.

International treaties on nuclear proliferation include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT, 1970) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, not yet in force). The aim of these agreements is to control the spread of nuclear weapons, while permitting signatories to benefit from peaceful nuclear energy and from stabilising limits on weapons testing. The US Senate recently rejected ratification of CTBT. Subsequently, though other factors also operated, India decided not to adhere to CTBT for the foreseeable future.

Iraq is a signatory of the NNPT (1970). Signatory states

– numbering 186 as of mid-1997 – promise not to develop nuclear weapons and undertake to let their nuclear facilities be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). In exchange for this, they are promised extensive technical assistance with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Safeguards include on-site inspections of declared nuclear installations, and accounting for nuclear materials processed in power and research reactors. Iraq circumvented IAEA safeguards (as several other signatory states have done) in order to divert nuclear materials into a clandestine weapons programme. Consequently, the IAEA no longer enjoys wide international confidence.

The introduction into force of CTBT, which requires fifty-four signatories, would create a 'firewall' between signatories and others. Non-signatory states would be vulnerable to sanctions against any proliferation behaviour, whereas those states accepting the constraints of the non-testing regime would receive appropriate assistance to stabilise their technical and strategic positions.

Chemical weapons are covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC 1997), which aims to eliminate all chemical weapons' stockpiles. Signatories commit themselves to an intrusive inspection regime overseen by the OPCW. The CWC has entered into force. Large stocks of chemical weapons are being destroyed by the US, Russia, Britain etc., subject to OPCW inspection and verification. Iraq is not a signatory of this treaty. However, Iraq subscribed to the Paris Declaration (1989). This reaffirms the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Biological weapons are to be covered by a Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which is still in draft stage. Existing prohibitions rest with the BWC (1972). This bans the possession or stockpiling of toxins. Iraq is a signatory of the

BWC, but never ratified the agreement. There have been many new developments in micro-biological and chemical warfare technologies during the intervening period. Most notably, the crossover between biological and chemical components of weapons has become indistinct. For the time being therefore, prohibitions in force rest with older treaty laws that treat chemical and biological weapons together. Most importantly, the Geneva Protocol (1925) prohibits the use in war of chemical or biological weapons, though not their possession.

Altogether, then, these treaties and conventions constitute strong prohibitions against the use or threat of WMD. Strong backing for their applicability in principle to all countries at all times is provided by the UN system. For example, UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 32/84 (1977) declares the use or threat of nuclear or other WMD illegal. The Genocide Convention (1948) constitutes another strong prohibition: it has been invoked recently in conventional and civil war conflicts. All of these treaties and conventions are, then, subtended to the UN Charter and to the general bodies of the laws of war, humanitarian law, and human rights law, which are often referred to in their totality as Hague and Geneva law.

International criminal law has developed strongly in the last decade through the Ad Hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court of Justice is providing a regulated 'normal' basis for sanctions and punishments against individuals, including heads of state and military formations, who may violate humanitarian law and human rights in civil or international conflicts, whether by giving orders or by carrying out the orders of others.

Background to sanctions

Nuclear safeguards, including inspections of declared nu-

clear installations, are implemented by the IAEA. Several signatory states of NNPT, including Iraq, have circumvented IAEA safeguards so as to divert nuclear materials into weapons programmes. The IAEA is not held in high regard in Washington, but under the NNPT/UN system remains uniquely qualified to act.

Iraq developed chemical weapons, and used these on numerous occasions during its war with Iran in the 1980s, and against Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions. Various charges against Iraq have been refuted or overstated; but there is no doubt that these uses of WMD constitute *prima facie* violations of the laws of war and human rights and have been condemned by the UN High Commission for Refugees and by world opinion. Such condemnations were made prior to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. During and subsequent to that aggression, Iraq committed numerous war crimes. The unaccounted-for disappearance of more than 160 Kuwaiti nationals, who may have been murdered, is just one example in a long list.

Until 1995 Iraq denied ever having developed biological weapons, even though it was a matter of record that it had imported several tons of a culturing medium necessary for developing toxin strains. Following the testimony of a number of defectors, Iraq admitted having a well-established biological weapons development programme. Hence, since 1995 biological as much or more than nuclear weapons have been at the heart of Iraq's disputes with the international community. The lifting or easing of sanctions has turned on whether a sufficient accounting has been provided of facilities that could stockpile or manufacture BW agents.

Several million Iraqi citizens have fled abroad, principally owing to the regime's persecution of political and social dissent. This constitutes one of the highest levels of human rights violations by any state in relation to its own people in recent

times. Iraq's émigré community expresses different views about sanctions in relation to WMD. US sponsorship of the democratic opposition further complicates the situation. But opposition voices are legitimate and well-established on sanctions; they cannot be discounted if the connections between WMD and humanitarian law and human rights are to become more important in future. On balance it seems that the émigré community is turning away from support of sanctions against Iraq: sanctions have minimised WMD capabilities, but have not weakened the regime in Baghdad. On the other hand sanctions have imposed huge suffering on the Iraqi people.

Some features of the Iraqi regime help to explain why it has not succumbed to the most powerful sanctions regime in history.

During its war with Iran, throughout most of the 1980s, UN sanctions were applied against Iraqi imports of certain types of weapons and parts. Many of these original sanctions were applied asymmetrically (i.e. they were aimed at Iran, and could be deliberately flouted by Iraq). Suppliers of parts and weapons included many of the major companies that engage in the arms trade. These companies could only have acted with the acknowledgement and tacit permission of their governments. The Scott Report in Britain demonstrated this. UNSCOM's Reports have not led to publication of the names of western defence firms and private military companies that broke sanctions during the 1980s, though companies defying sanctions during the 1990s have been named. The government of Iraq claims, with some justification, that it has been subjected to 'double standards' by the Western powers.

In some instances sensitive technologies were disseminated to Iraq. Many new conventional weapons capabilities and facilities were built up. Iraq indigenised a state-centred culture of 'exceptionalism' in science and industry ('international

rules may apply to others, but will not be applied against us'). This culture was fostered by all the great powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States. Western countries ought not to have been surprised by Iraq's successes in WMD development. A passage from *The Scourge of Iraq* by Jeff Simons makes the point:

> It was the US, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other states that helped Saddam to build up his military capacity. Through the 1980s these countries showed no concern for persecuted Iraqi minorities or about Iraq's protracted aggression against Iran. On the contrary, these countries actively aided Saddam by providing weapons, technologies, financial credits, intelligence, and in some cases, direct military support. By early 1990, with substantial Western and Russian assistance, Iraq had moved a long way towards acquiring nuclear weapons. And what was true in the nuclear field was also true in other areas of weapons technology. Today, the west, keen to denounce all Saddam's perfidies, shrugs off any responsibilities for shaping events that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But, does not guilt attach to the man who hands a loaded gun to a known psychopath? The West, having helped Saddam to build up a substantial part of his military capability, then resolved to destroy it. [Simons, 1996: pp. 74–5]

This passage raises questions about moral responsibility and consequences that deserve discussion, but move beyond the technical middle ground of this presentation.

Following the war with Iran, for a period of time Iraq was free of sanctions, free to export oil, able to reclaim credit from neighbours like Kuwait, and looked forward to reconstruction and the exercise of wealth and influence in regional international relations. Then came Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, several months of tension and crisis as the UN prepared to use force, and finally the brief Gulf War of 1991. During that war Iraqi forces were driven out of Kuwait, and Iraq was forced to surrender. Cease-fire undertakings allowed the coalition forces and UN and international agencies to inspect, remove and destroy Iraq's NBC capabilities.

The great powers ought not to have been surprised (though

they were) to find that Iraq was within a few months of being able to weaponise a nuclear device. This might have been crude and deliverable only by aircraft, or over a short range surface-to-surface. But a more efficient and longer-range weapon might have been ready not many months after that.

Iraq was subjected to new UN sanctions and to US led military coalition pressures. The principal UNSCRs from the period of crisis and war are 660, 661, and 678. UNSCR 661 provided for a comprehensive trade embargo and other economic sanctions. It was the first in the history of the UN to be passed under Chapter VII powers, which permit the Security Council to use 'all necessary means' (including the use of force) in responding to threats to international peace and stability. UNSCR 678 (29 November 1990), passed by 14–2 in the Security Council, provided for the use of force following a 'grace period' during which Iraq might be persuaded to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. In short, these measures established an air, land and sea blockade, prohibited the export or sale of oil, froze access to Iraq's assets in banks and other investments abroad, and prevented the importation of any goods or materials not specifically warranted by humanitarian needs.

The principal postwar UNSCRs are 686, 687 and 688. Among these UNSCR 687 is the most important. It covers boundary issues, UN Observers, Iraq's weapons programmes, and compensation issues. It stipulates the conditions governing sanctions against Iraq and creates a body, UNSCOM, to inspect Iraq's military programmes outside the nuclear area (in which IAEA would supposedly remain the supervising institution).

UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) in effect made sanctions permanent, and UNSCOM the instrument of their operation. Through time, UNSCOM thus became the most expert and experienced instrument of intrusive inspection, analysis and

intelligence gathering in the entire area of WMD worldwide.

In the nuclear area IAEA retains responsibility for inspecting Iraq's nuclear facilities. IAEA has seldom if ever uncovered evidence of Iraqi violations of the agreements of 1991, whereas UNSCOM has done so repeatedly. But in practice UNSCOM has capabilities and applies standards that IAEA lacks. More importantly, UNSCOM communicates its reports directly to the Security Council. The Security Council oversees the Sanctions Committee. The work of UNSCOM, and of the Sanctions Committee, are funded by direct contributions from member states, which gives the funding states a superior say in the operation of these bodies. Understandably, particularly in the relationship between IAEA and UNSCOM, Iraq has found fertile ground for complaining about the technical legitimacy and legality of many of UNSCOM's actions. This has been the source of repeated confrontations between Iraq and the international community.

This Sanctions Committee from 1991 found itself also dealing with UN sanctions on former Yugoslavia, and later on North Korea. Hence it became a new instrumentality within the international order. This sanctions regime was therefore a child of 'new world order' enthusiasm by the US and USSR, and yet also a product of the confusion and disappointment which developed in Europe and the US once it became clear that the end of the Cold War meant, in some regions at least, 'a new world disorder'.

Even at the outset there was concern that sanctions divesting Iraq of its WMD capabilities would impose an undue humanitarian burden on the people of Iraq. Out of that concern was born a distinction between economic sanctions, which are fairly total across the range of trade and financial instruments; and humanitarian exemptions to sanctions, which supposedly confers exemption on everything needed

to sustain a reasonable level of living for the ordinary people of Iraq.

This led to the so-called 'Oil-for-Food' regime, in which a quantity of revenue from permitted oil sales is placed in a UN-controlled escrow account and then, under supervision, expended to purchase necessary medicines and foodstuffs. The first ad hoc measure of this type was UNSCR-706 (15 August 1991). A regular Oil-for-Food regime was eventually established by UNSCR-986 (14 April 1995). Problems with this regime – which other speakers will deal with in detail – are as follows:

Sales and revenues are handled on behalf of the UN. Funds are placed in an escrow account (now held in France). From this costs of the sanctions regime and of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC are first deducted, before remaining amounts may be expended on humanitarian goods and services, including medicines and foods unavailable in Iraq.

The competent authority for compiling a list of requirements, and for eventually distributing humanitarian assistance, is the government of Iraq, which increases the dependence of people in Iraq on the regime.

Goods available to Iraq under this category are not clearly specified. Iraq may procure goods, including medicines, which are none the less not granted exemption certificates by the Sanctions Committee in New York. There may be other lengthy delays between the procurement of goods and their delivery.

What constitutes a 'humanitarian' necessity is essentially defined by the US through the Sanctions Committee, and has been defined so restrictively as to cause rather than alleviate a humanitarian disaster.

As of the beginning of year 2000, the level of oil sales permitted under the Oil-for-Food regime was approaching the level of Iraq's oil sales in 1990 – around $10.5 billion on an

annual basis. This shows that a steady stream of revenue is now being expended on humanitarian goods. But all the foregoing problems remain. Moreover, this comparison ignores differences in the real price of oil and other goods and services paid for by Iraq and the costs of administering the UN system.

The other main abatement within the sanctions regime is that more recently Iraq has been given permission to import parts and services for the maintenance of its oil production facilities. However, the necessary revenues come from permitted oil sales, and are made available through the escrow account. There is, therefore, a clear and continuing conflict between military-political and humanitarian aspects of the sanctions regime. This is the principal concern in the campaign to raise the permitted level of oil sales still further above present ceilings.

Another aspect of sanctions, less central to WMD issues, is the position of the Kurds and the Shi'a. The government in Baghdad continued to attack areas in the country that had risen in rebellion during the Gulf War. The Security Council defined 'no fly zones' over a so-called 'safe haven' for the Kurds in the north; and an extended security perimeter north of Kuwait's frontier with Iraq, within which the Shi'a could be relatively immune. Currently only the US and Britain fly patrols ensuring that neither the Iraqi Air Force nor ground force units of the Army, Special Forces or Air Defence, enter these zones. In the period December 1998 and September 1999 following the breakdown of Iraq's relationship with UNSCOM, US and British aircraft flew 1,450 patrols, were targeted by SAM batteries on 215 occasions, and used missiles and bombs in retaliation against 120 targets.

There is, therefore, an ongoing low-level war between Iraq and the US and Britain, which the Western powers are currently justifying in terms of the humanitarian protection of

Kurds and Shi'a; but which has far more to do with pressurising Iraq to allow weapons inspections to resume. In turn, Iraq's behaviour typifies its ceaseless struggle to reassert its sovereignty, including its freedom of manoeuvre in the area of WMD.

From the outset, UNSCOM inspection teams found that Iraq's cease-fire and surrender following the Gulf War were meaningless to the process of WMD disarmament. Already under UNSCR-707 (15 August 1991) the Security Council was warning Iraq against detaining weapons inspectors, and asserting their right to inspect installations in Iraq beyond those declared by the regime as WMD sites. For almost eight years an elaborate game was played between the UN and UNSCOM, largely driven by the US and its closest allies, and the regime of Saddam Hussein. UNSCOM has used intrusion, inspection, destruction and subsequent monitoring as its *modus operandi*. Iraq has used concealment, evasion, maintenance, rebuilding and the rapid movement of physical locations, weapons, machinery, parts, data and to some extent human NBC-related capacities in its efforts to limit UNSCOM.

By 1995 it was clear that Iraq's nuclear potential had been reduced to tiny proportions and could be monitored rapidly and precisely by installed sensors for air sampling and for water sampling around the main intake/outlet systems of Iraq's rivers. Huge stocks of chemical weapons and precursors had been tracked down and destroyed. Most of the missiles that might have been used to deliver chemical weapons had been destroyed or disabled: 'worst case' estimates gave Iraq perhaps a handful of hidden SSM that could be made operational and armed with chemical warheads. This did not pose an unacceptable threat to any country in the region. The extent of Iraq's commitment to biological warfare research and development had not been clear previously. The tech-

nology involved in producing, storing, activating and sustaining the deadly toxins and related chemical agents of a BW weapon that is to be delivered to precise targets over long distances is well beyond Iraq. However the knowledge-base and research experience of Iraqi scientists is considerable. Ironically, investigation of the human basis of NBC capabilities led UNSCOM back to the nuclear scientists and engineers who had been working on the original nuclear weapons. It soon became clear that Iraq might be in a position rapidly to revive its nuclear weapons' programme if once it became free of UN sanctions.

This was made the more problematic as, under its 1991 agreements with the international community, Iraq had been permitted to continue research and development of short-range SSM. The principle underlying this limitation on Iraq's disarmament was that no sovereign state should be left without means of defence. However, technology developments in such areas as missile fuels mean that development programmes in short-range SSM can be quite quickly adapted to developing longer-range SSM, especially if a 'shadow' development programme can be maintained in a country's scientific and engineering community. This is illustrated by the long-range SSM developed by India, Iran and North Korea. Although it would not be done rapidly by Iraq, given adequate resources its science and engineering base could develop a three- or four-stage SSM. If Iraq's nuclear scientists have retained their knowledge of how to develop smaller, lighter, nuclear warheads, then the nuclear capability might also be restored over a period.

This hypothetical situation, set out by UNSCOM in its Reports, was fiercely rejected by Iraq. Iraq claimed it was being victimised and made subject to permanent intrusive monitoring and sanctions aimed at undermining the regime of Saddam Hussein. In 1997 and 1998 the stand-off between

Iraq and UNSCOM turned into the threatened use of air power by the international community. Finally, Iraq ordered UNSCOM to leave, and the US and Britain threatened to bomb Iraq.

UNSCOM inspectors finally left Iraq on the eve of a four-day US–British bombing campaign in December 1998 known as Operation Desert Fox, or the 'War of Lewinsky's Dress'. No strategic analyst of repute has been able to explain what it achieved, or was intended to achieve, in such a brief time-span. Iraq subsequently declared UNSCOM's mission terminated.

Following a year of deadlock and hiatus, UNSCR-1284 (17 December 1999) was passed, creating a new monitoring organisation, UNMOVIC. The terms of the Resolution look towards the suspension of sanctions, the completion of work left from the previous period, and the reconstruction of Iraq through increasing oil sales. Iraq has refused to recognise the competence of UNMOVIC and any chief of the organisation so far proposed. It is not clear whether Saddam will compromise with the US over the creation of UNMOVIC. Having stood out for so long, and given that humanitarian conditions inside Iraq are about as bad as they will get, it is difficult to see on what basis Saddam would agree to US conditions for a reconciliation. The most likely outcome is, therefore, a continuing stand-off. Meanwhile, sanctions will be increasingly flouted. But that will not do anything to help the ordinary Iraqi citizen.

Great power politics

Each of the five Permanent Members (P-5) of the UNSC has a veto on action by the UN. The UN may thus find itself unable to act in the face of an international crisis, which was often the case during the Cold War. However, once the extensive powers provided under Chapter VII of the UN Char-

ter are invoked, there is an equally strong propensity for these to stay in place. If one P-5 member is able to oppose the lifting of sanctions or other measures, for instance, the UN becomes hostage to its own previous acts.

Again, a crucial intellectual and moral issue emerges, though beyond the scope of this technical review. The unprecedented sanctions regime put in place against Iraq reflected a shared enthusiasm for co-operation between the US under President Bush and the USSR under President Gorbachev. Almost immediately however, the USSR collapsed. This was in a sense coincidental, a fortuitous event, but it is one of momentous importance in the topic that we are addressing. Russia never subsequently enjoyed the same power or prestige that it had before the collapse of the USSR. And even for example during the recent Kosovo war, it has been unwilling to challenge the US directly on matters profoundly connected with the conduct of the UNSC under Chapter VII. Hence, from the middle of 1991, barely weeks after the emplacement of this comprehensive sanctions regime against Iraq, the international order became strategically unipolar: there remained but one 'Superpower'.

So, what position has been taken by other P-5 members on Iraq and sanctions? China has often dissented from US policies in the area of WMD and sanctions. It has derived advantage from doing so, but has consistently treated Iraq as a problem 'of the Western hemisphere' for the Western powers to deal with. It has therefore criticised, lobbied, occasionally threatened and more often than not abstained in the UNSC rather than using its veto to prevent the US and other members of the P-5 from acting has they choose *vis-à-vis* Iraq.

Until today the US has been able to count upon the cooperation of Britain in managing sanctions, minorities, human rights and WMD issues with Iraq. France has also been broadly co-operative, although more rhetorically critical. At

the same time, going back to the confrontation of 1990–1991, France has sought to make common cause with Russia and Germany in defining an 'alternative' to US domination of Western strategy.

Since 1995, France and Russia have made clear they will not agree to new sanctions or to new and different military strategies against Iraq and its WMD. France and Russia have lobbied for an easing of the sanctions regime on Iraq, even beyond the existing Oil-for-Food regime. While not confronting the US and Britain directly over the use of force and UNSCOM, these countries have confirmed Iraq in much of its opposition.

This is partly because the US and Britain could use their veto powers to refuse to end existing sanctions. But it is also because the US remains without qualification a Superpower that no other great power seeks actively to confront. Furthermore, the sanctions regime directed against Iraq (and originally crafted largely for that purpose) itself underpins today the gamut of WMD counter-proliferation in the international system.

The P-5 share active general interests in limiting the spread of NBC weapons, whatever particular interests may divide them on a case-by-case basis. Thus the US needs co-operation in managing North Korea from China and Russia; but Russia and China cannot ignore American influence with Pakistan (or India). Israel and Iran might go to war, or might decide to collaborate, driven by WMD considerations: none of the great powers can be indifferent to the course events might take, whether or not they have active interests in developing the capabilities of either actor.

So a synthetic but possibly useful 'great power perspective' on sanctions against Iraq today can be suggested. Sanctions were instituted through pooling knowledge held by different powers about Iraq's WMD programmes. Post-hostilities in-

spections confirmed that Iraq had been close to weaponising nuclear devices. The international security order since 1991 has been unipolar; but opposition to US strategy towards Iraq has grown steadily. Iraq is no longer seen as an imminent, or the most significant, threat to international stability. The general dislocation of Iraq has led to a humanitarian catastrophe of forbidding proportions. Several UN P-5 countries continue to be owed large sums by Iraq from earlier arms sales and other contracts. Just as Iraq is bound to rebuild its economy and social structure once freed from sanctions, so numerous countries anticipate benefits that are hardly likely to go to American or British companies, at least as long as the present regime remains in power. A fortuitous consequence of international developments a decade ago is that any substantial change in the sanctions regime depends on the will of Washington. On the other hand the UN sanctions regime has taken on an independent institutional life: it is difficult to envisage any of the great powers willingly abandoning it.

As to Iraq: despite paying an opportunity cost of perhaps $25 billion annually in oil revenues foregone, it has almost compulsively continued to hide WMD assets. This is widely attributed to the oppressive nature of the regime, and to the totalitarian personality of Saddam. But it is almost certainly also attributable to the ethos and structure of that culture of exceptionalism identified earlier.

Toward conclusions

Iraq's pursuit of NBC weapons may not now seem to be so shocking as it did in the past. It is clearer now than eight years ago that both Superpowers practised selective proliferation to their preferred allies. Iraq, by managing to elude full monitoring by its Superpower allies and by playing both off against the middle, came close to achieving a nuclear weapons delivery capability. This might have made Saddam mas-

ter of Kuwait and director of a coalition of states opposed to Israel and Iran. What the consequences would have been we are free to speculate. What can be said is that this was a major technical achievement for a developing country created by time-honoured methods of human intelligence, patience, deception and skill in technology transfer.

The equal and opposite conclusion is that national technical means of verification have proved extremely fallible. It was scarcely believable (except, it must be said, in Israel) that any Arab country could have been so enterprising and skilful in doing what Iraq did. Subsequently Iraq has demonstrated a mixture of stubbornness, perversity, ingenuity and perseverance in seeking to circumvent or terminate the counter WMD regime imposed by the UN.

It is not clear what Iraq has achieved by its conduct, or how it could fit within the 'Rational Actor Paradigm'. This is of overriding importance. The paradigm is not about moral conduct: it is about the calculus of force and war. Strategists examine all states that possess WMD, or that will become NBC countries in future, to investigate whether there is evidence of a capacity to behave beyond crudely defined 'interests of state'.

A 'Rational Actor' is one whose possession of NBC weapons is accompanied by development of the structure of state and government to a stage where the prospective gains and losses of the threat or use of force are set in a social framework. That framework stipulates war to be a political process, one in which an adversary is coerced to comply with the will of another. This, rather than death and destruction, is what defines and limits victory. Governments perceive themselves as responsible and answerable to societies for the social and economic consequences of war. What is done to the adversary, in social as well as military terms, matters. In short, the threat or conduct of war is bound about by conventions

of interdependence, proportionality and self-limitation in the management of escalation. There may or may not exist an explicitly moral constraint, namely that the use of NBC (as distinct from their threatened use) would always be *irrational*. Certainly if such a rational belief is held by statesmen, its foundation must lie in natural law.

Though it has been largely lost sight of, this is the problem of Iraq. To all intents and purposes Iraq's nuclear and chemical capabilities are non-existent. Iraq does not have a biological weapon that it could use in any meaningful way. Yet since 1995 concern has focused on Iraq's persistent efforts to develop biological warfare capabilities and agents, and the near-impossibility of eradicating this heavily know-how dependent capacity. It follows that the US continues to have incredibly strong negative power in this area. The existing CWCO, an implemented CTBTO, any future BWCO — all these vital institutions in a system that has a coherent counter-proliferation capability will depend on some modified form of the experiences of UNSCOM and its successor UNMOVIC.

As a general conclusion from the strategic analysis of Iraq and sanctions it must be said that the UN system is still not very good at managing the long-term issue of a state which consistently seeks to evade its responsibilities under international agreements. This issue has arisen more recently in other forms, for example in Serbia and Kosovo. It seems likely that while the Western powers remain bound by the conceptual framework of the 'Rational Actor Paradigm', they will choose in future to act more forcibly and more quickly towards 'rogue states'. This logic is dangerous; but it appeals to avoiding the recurrent difficulties of crisis management with states that are determined to face down the sensitivities of Western democracies.

The losers in every significant international crisis since the

end of the Cold War have been ordinary people. In the case of sanctions against Iraq, a potentially wealthy country has been ruined, and its people have been subjected to economic, social and political conditions that are unacceptable, even intolerable, by the standards of development today. It is not clear how soon those conditions will be alleviated. Sanctions are losing their grip and their political significance. But there remain unsatisfied concerns about Iraq's WMD strategies in future. Probably no significant improvements will occur until sanctions are suspended or lifted. It seems unlikely this will happen soon.

Thank you."

Part II

'Peace in the Middle East: WMD Problems and Prospects.'

While the NNPT, MCTR and related non-proliferation architecture remain important to the status quo in regions and globally, this has been undermined by: (i) the diffusion of technologies and 'embodied human capital'; (ii) the emergence of new centres of power; (iii) specific treaty violators.

Case study work on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East suggests that proliferation incentives, and logic, are strong for a significant number of states, and that the inter-regional features of proliferation are growing.

New strategies of prevention, containment and 'rehabilitation' are required. Issue areas include: suppliers' regimes; international sanctions; preventative diplomacy; security umbrellas; crisis management; introduction of stabilising technologies; and regional institutions.

Defence against WMD and contingent planning for coercive use of force will remain central components of an evolv-

ing *status quo*. But both are acquiring new features. For example, TMD is now being examined by Japan (in association with S. Korea) and by Israel (in association with Turkey and Jordan) as a possible response to regional WMD spread.

Only the US, Russia, certain European NATO countries and Israel possess significant 'hands-on' experimental data with ballistic missile defence. But new types of 'defensive strategy' are emerging and impacting the non-proliferation field. Iraq and Serbia have exchanged experiences of hiding, dispersal, using dummy targets, and 'duelling' with ground-to-air radar. North Korea has been cited as a possible conduit of WMD technology to the Middle East and Balkans.

This suggests that while proliferation incentives originate in threat-specific perceptions of security (*e.g.* mutual fear between India–Pakistan, Iran–Iraq, N. Korea–S. Korea), the recourse to proliferation may entail a long-term, widespread, international search to put together the conditions for a self-reliant WMD capability.

Because of this long-term commitment, which most states decide against making, it is less clear whether the logic of proliferation is also rooted in insecurity; or whether it is also/alternatively rooted in a social-scientific 'can-do' community connected into broader national development aims.

There is significant case-study evidence from India that the latter complex of factors may be as strong, or stronger, than inputs by the professional military and foreign service.

This is a significant issue. For instance, investigation is needed of whether WMD proliferation in the Middle East is or is not closely correlated with regional conflict and stability issues in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). WMD proliferation in the Middle East will impact the region in the short/medium-term; and in the medium/long-term will impact Europe, NATO, and other actors. In turn, WMD spread in south and south east Asia will impact the Middle East within

the foreseeable future. Iran may soon have medium-range SSM. Israel and Saudi Arabia are directly affected. Delivery capabilities being developed by India will bring Iran and major parts of China within range in a few years. As well as those countries already mentioned, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan have significant short-range SSM delivery capabilities against their immediate neighbours. The Gulf War of 1991 showed that Iraq could at that time strike a number of neighbours in the region.

The present prospect is therefore that, whether checked or not, a significant number of Middle East and South Asian states will in future achieve nuclear and/or other WMD options, due to the consequences of technology diffusion, globalisation of markets, arms trade behaviour, and activities by treaty violators/non-participants.

This suggests that new intra-regional and inter-regional strategies for dealing with the multiplication of WMD options are urgently needed.

Six more specific issue-areas might be analysed:

Proliferation behaviour by a class of dealer states (including Russia, North Korea, Pakistan). These states share a 'double helix' feature: blockages to economic and/or regime development; possession of an advanced science and technology base. Analysis of this feature may help to explain how the conduct of dealer states tends to directly challenge norms of order and strategic equilibrium in regions; and prospectively challenges these structures on a global basis.

A wider class of dealer-client relationships (e.g. China–Saudi Arabia). The common feature of the behaviour of states in this class of relationships may be a 'paired ambivalence in development' (e.g. advanced science/poor country for China; low technology/great wealth for Saudi Arabia). The consequences of dealer-client partnerships are observable not only through the diffusion of advanced military capabilities; but

also in accelerated change of regional inter-state power relationships. The longer-term ramifications of dealer-client relationships might challenge strategic equilibrium at a global level (i.e. create new global polarities).

New dimensions of linkage are being created in the spread of WMD. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the reconfiguration of central Asian states and societies, and the growth of 'privatised' (often illicit) trade and finance links to and from the Middle East (and other regions), are by now familiar features of a changing international order. Less familiar is how these new features interact with older-established WMD issues to create a new economy and culture of proliferation. The long-term consequence of new linkages may be to subvert existing domestic political structures.

The absence of settled regional security structures, (not only in the Middle East, but also in South Asia and prospectively North East Asia) and the existence of proliferation pressures affecting smaller states, non-state actors, and groups espousing new justifications for war may create new sources of sub-national and international conflict. This kind of interaction demands empirical investigation and new conceptual analysis. For example, a number of countries may become dominated by 'scientific-strategic elites'; it is not known how these elites might view each other in different national contexts (e.g. India and Iran).

The unipolar strategic dominance of the US upholds the global regime of non-proliferation, and at the same time partially undermines it. The US can act unilaterally, and deems it necessary to do so in numerous cases. But this engenders conflict with other major actors. In the case of Iraq in recent years this has virtually negated the possibility of agreement among the P-5. Such unipolarity may partly explain the proliferation behaviour of other great powers: Russia, China and France.

An association may exist between the weak state structures of many of the sovereign actors pursuing WMD options, and those new forces of social and political change referred to under (3) and (4). This affects Iran, Iraq, India, North Korea, and other states. This association could, through time, bring about a partial return to anarchy in regions. For instance, what would happen if US-driven opposition to Iraq resulted in a civil war? The same or similar questions could be posed in numerous cases.

All of this suggests that:

Established arms control and military-policy practices remain very important. States pursuing WMD options are likely to be confronted by the existing great powers. Legitimacy for the threat and use of force derives from the non-proliferation 'architecture' of the 1970's. This needs to be redefined. Meanwhile, given that the P-5 have divided interests among them, there is a growing probability that states may 'take the law into their own hands'. In effect this is what Iraq alleges against the US and Britain over the 1998 bombings.

WMD proliferation in the Middle East (and other regions) is 'everybody's problem'. This will become apparent in the long-term; but it is not self-evident. A shift in counter-proliferation thinking is needed to demonstrate how and why that is so.

Distinctive new challenges to strategic stability are emerging. These challenge the aims and suppositions of globalisation.

There is a need to thoroughly re-examine the 'principle', entrenched in the NNPT and related understandings, that possession or spread of WMD is contrary to international law.

If pursuit of WMD options requires modified sovereignty by would-be proliferating states, then a new 'social contract' requires to be established among all states. Existing non-proliferation principles and practices cannot cope with the re-

quirements of such a new 'social contract'.

Most states (or corporations) involved in proliferation are also usually – at some level – aspiring participants in 'global governance', and all in any case require and benefit from economic inter-dependence. Examples abound. Russia seeks to join the G8. China is negotiating to adhere to the WTO. Iran seeks to free itself from US sanctions and containment. Iraq must satisfy a UN-sanctions regime so as to resume normal development. India may wish to adhere to CTBT to emphasise its credentials as a peaceful nuclear power. Pakistan, despite its military power, is on the verge of economic collapse. North Korea must import food to sustain its population, but relies on aid and pays for necessary imports largely through defence sales.

This points to a fundamental link between WMD spread, non-proliferation strategies, and economic and technological development in non-military terms.

Recognition of that link is missing from disparate responses by the international community (e.g. UNSCOM for Iraq; Dual containment for Iran; KEDO for North Korea; Ad hoc sanctions and limited diplomatic-military dialogue for Pakistan and India. The multiplication of issues, and of diverse responses, increases the incoherence of counter-proliferation strategies.

It may be simplistic to say that if there were more even economic development on a global basis, there would be less WMD spread. Nonetheless, according to the analysis provided here, there clearly are linkages between security and development within WMD proliferation issues.

A 'restated' principle of sovereign limitation needs to be successfully articulated and implemented. To contain WMD spread; but that must incorporate a corollary principle of compensating economic development if WMD options are foregone.

Under the NNPT this linkage is restricted to an exchange between prohibitions on Nuclear/WMD spread, and the 'peaceful' spread of nuclear technologies with IAEA inspection and verification. This linkage now seems obsolete.

The IAEA regime has proved manifestly inadequate to preventing weapons-related diversification of nuclear material from inspected facilities.

Discourses are needed with suppliers, 'dealer states', 'dealer-client' partners, and putative proliferators if issues of diversion and theft are to be more effectively countered.

Much of this discussion may be suitable 'Track-II' territory, in which technical experts, commercial interests and academics can generate new thinking and design new proposals more quickly and effectively than governments and bureaucrats working at a formal inter-governmental level.

Inter-regional experience and discourse need to be utilised in order to create a genuinely 'global' basis for an eventual new regime.

Linkages between WMD spread and humanitarian issues, such as the tragic case of Iraq demonstrates, need to be analysed carefully. This is so partly because it is masses of innocent civilians who suffer from sanctions and the use of force. It is also likely, however, that when peoples support their governments' WMD programmes (as in India), they do so because WMD symbolises an equalisation of status with the prevailing great powers. If the symbolism were reversed, peoples would understand that WMD efforts divert scarce resources from non-military development. That linkage can only establish itself if there is an accepted positive feedback loop from relinquishing WMD options to gaining added development resources for civil societies.

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SESSION 6: DEPLETED URANIUM

'Depleted Uranium and its effects in Iraq.'

PROFESSOR DOUG ROKKE

Professor Doug Rokke currently teaches environmental engineering and nuclear physics at Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Alabama. He has been involved in emergency response and disaster preparation activities for over twenty years. He has written, directed, and edited numerous training films associated with emergency response, and worked as a consultant for news and documentary programmes for the BBC, as well as in the US, Canada, Germany and France. His combat operations and medical military experience spans over thirty years from the Vietnam War through Operation Desert Storm to the present. During Operation Desert Storm he was originally assigned as the 12th Preventive Medicine Command health physicist and as a member of Bauer's Raider's, the 3rd US Army Medical Command Theatre nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare special operations planning and teaching team. He helped develop and teach decontamination procedures and designed casualty treatment facilities. After completion of the ground war he was reassigned to the Theatre Depleted Uranium Assessment Team as the team health physicist and medic. He had responsibility for identifying, planning, and implementing the clean-up of all US Depleted Uranium equipment, providing initial medical care recommendations and emergency medical care for contaminated casualties. He was recalled to active duty in the US Army between 1994 and 1995 as the Depleted Uranium Project Director. During this time he conducted research to develop radioactive materials management procedures and to write education and training curricula. Dr Rokke has concentrated his efforts for over eight years on the environmental clean-up of depleted contamination and ensuring that medical care is provided for all DU casualties.

Dr Rokke provided a shocking testimonial on the effects of depleted uranium munitions use during the Gulf War. He outlined the chemical and physical properties of DU, describing it

as a by-product of uranium enrichment processes. The plentiful supply of DU held by the Department of Energy, and its exceptional efficacy as a penetrator of armour, make this radioactive substance a crucial part of the arsenal of the US and its allies. Despite this, and despite the existence of a memorandum from the Manhattan Project in 1943 clearly indicating DU's toxicity, the full consequences of its use were not known until Dr Rokke and a team of US Army and civilian technicians were commissioned to investigate it following the Gulf War. In accordance with his directives, Dr Rokke compiled training manuals and videos for assessing, containing and cleaning up DU munitions; but these comprehensive materials were not disseminated throughout the Allied military force or to the civilian medical personnel treating affected populations. He found that DU munitions lose approximately 40% of their mass on contact, leaving 60% of the radioactive rod intact. Often, unexploded ordnance remains which poses a tremendous hazard. Moreover, contaminated dust spreads over impacted surfaces such as tanks and trucks, as well as up to twenty-five metres away from the point of explosion. Unless physically removed, this dust can be unsettled (for example, by children climbing in abandoned equipment or reclaiming toxic war souvenirs), causing radioactive particles and heavy metals to be inhaled or ingested. Rokke's team made several explicit recommendations: the immediate clean-up of all affected sites, medical screening for anyone possibly exposed to DU, strict use of protective and detection equipment, and prevention of recycling any materials possibly contaminated. He cited the prodigious health concerns associated with DU exposure, including lymphomas; neurological impairments; skin, teeth and gum disorders; gastro-intestinal and respiratory complications; and genetic and sexual dysfunctions. Nonetheless, the military authorities did not comply with these recommendations; many of the civilians in Rokke's team who became DU casualties were even refused health care by their employer, the US Army. Rokke asserted that this miserly refusal is motivated by financial concerns: the governments responsible are reluctant to admit their culpability even to their own soldiers, hoping to avoid massive settle-

ments and reparations for a war crime against the citizens of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo and Serbia. In his own crusade against DU, Rokke demands that it be banned permanently, and that environmental remediation and medical attention be the first concerns of the nations responsible for its use. He provided some graphic slides to illustrate the effects of this terrible weapon.

"Thank you. As we start, there's one thing I want to make very clear. Information about depleted uranium did not come from Iraqis or from a foreign government, but the hazards, the known problems, the warnings came from the United States Army's own team assigned to clean it up in Iraq. This needs to be very clear up front.

What is DU?

Depleted uranium (DU) is actually uranium 238. U-238 is a non-fissionable residue of the uranium enrichment process. Some confusion seems to exist, or rather the US Department of Defence and British Ministry of Defence officials try to confuse individuals by claiming that internalised DU contamination is natural uranium rather than DU. This is an unethical subversion of fact, because natural uranium contains 99.2% by weight U-238 while DU contains 99.8% by weight U-238. However, there seems to be some evidence to suggest that a small proportion of other toxic heavy metals may also be present. U-238 emits alpha particles at 4.2 Mev and 4.15 Mev which cause significant internal ionisation with consequent cellular damage. In addition, daughter products emit beta particles and gamma rays which may cause further radiological damage. While DU may not be an external hazard, it is an internal hazard – which is why its use as a munitions with consequent inhalation, ingestion, and wound contamination and environmental contamination pose significant and unacceptable risks.

What are its physical properties?

Depleted uranium or U-238 has an atomic mass of 238. Its half life is 4.468 billion years; its natural occurrence is 2.1 parts per million. Uranium is silver-white, lustrous, malleable, ductile, and pyrophoric. This makes DU an ideal metal for use as kinetic energy penetrators, counterweights, shielding and armour. DU's high density and pyrophoric nature are the two most significant physical properties that guided its selection for use as a kinetic energy penetrator.

Where does DU come from?

Uranium hexafluoride is the non-fissionable residue or by-product of the uranium enrichment process during which fissionable Uranium 235 and Uranium 234 are separated from natural uranium. Depleted uranium is refined from Uranium Hexaflouride (UF6). The United States Department of Energy has so much UF6 stored at various sites that any use that increases disposal of this waste product is very welcome. Consequently, economic recovery may supersede health and environmental concerns. The US Department of Energy recently shut down the Oakridge National Laboratories because of uranium contamination.

How is DU used by the military?

DU is used to manufacture kinetic energy penetrators. Each kinetic energy penetrator consists almost entirely of Uranium 238. Let me be very clear: these penetrators are not coated, they are not tipped, they are solid Uranium 238. The rounds that are currently in the inventory in the United States, produced by the US munitions industry and given to Canada, Britain and other countries include:

- a 7.62 mm, or individual machine gun;
- a 50 calibre or .5", or crew serve missile;

- a 20 mm round with a mass of approximately 180 grams;
- a 25 mm round with a mass of approximately 200 grams of solid uranium;
- a 30 mm round, where each individual round has 280 grams of solid uranium, and which in Kosovo fired at a rate of 400 pounds per minute of solid uranium;
- a 105 mm round with a mass of 3500 grams;
- and a 120 mm round, with a mass of approximately 4500 grams of solid uranium – not coated, not tipped, but solid uranium.

DU is also used in armour, ballast or counter weights, radiation shielding, and as proposed by the US Department of Energy as a component of road and structural materials. All of these current or proposed uses are designed to reduce the large stockpiles left over from the enrichment process.

It is important to realise that DU penetrators are solid uranium and each one is left on the terrain, within or on an impacted equipment, or within impacted structures. DU fragments or oxides in the form of radioactive heavy metal contamination are also present. To put this simply, who would want thousands and thousands of solid uranium pencils in their backyard? Nobody that I know of – and especially at these masses.

I'm the individual that got tagged to clean it up. My team got tagged to clean up the mess. Just a handful of military officers, including me, a US Army officer assigned to this mission by Army headquarters, and civilians.

When were the hazards of DU munitions known?

The possible hazards were known before the use of depleted uranium munitions during the Gulf War. In 1943, a letter from the Manhattan Project to Brigadier General Groves who was in charge of the project discusses the use of DU as a terrain contaminant, a gas warfare instrument for inhalation and

ingestion, and a contaminator of the environment. In 1943 they knew explicitly that the deliberate release of uranium dust would cause respiratory problems within days of anybody exposed and permanent lung damage within a few months to a few years. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm here to confirm it 100%. We've got people who've already found out what happens. My team members are dead. Out of the primary team, twenty-one are dead – one-fifth of the staff. That's the Army's own team, the AROT team. Iraqis are dead, British are dying, children are dying.

However, the famed Los Alamos memorandum came to me in Saudi Arabia, indicating that

> There is a relatively small amount of lethality data for uranium penetrators either the tank-fired round version or the Gowie 8 round from the A10 support aircraft. The recent war has likely multiplied the numbers of DU rounds fired by orders of magnitude. It is believed that DU penetrators are very effective against Iraqi armour. However, assessments of such will have to be made. There has been and continues to be concern regarding the impact of DU on the environment. Therefore, if no one makes the case for the effectiveness of DU on the battlefield, DU rounds may become politically unacceptable and thus be deleted from the arsenal. If DU penetrators prove their worth during our recent combat activities, we should ensure their future existence (until something better is developed) through service DOD proponency. If proponency is not proved, it is possible that we stand to lose a valuable combat capability. I believe we should keep this sensitive issue in mind, whenever after action reports are written.

It's a clear directive not to tell the truth because DU is like going from the bow and arrow to a nuclear bomb on the battlefield: it's the most effective weapon they have. But if your enemy survives, you'll have to pay.

What was our mission?

A United States Defence Nuclear Agency memorandum written by LTC Greg Lyle that was sent to our team in Saudi Arabia stated that "As Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), ground combat units, and civil populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq come increasingly into contact with DU ordnance, we must prepare to deal with potential problems. Toxic war souvenirs, political furore, and post conflict clean-up (host nation agreement) are only some of the issues that must be addressed. Alpha particles (uranium oxide dust) from expended rounds is a health concern but beta particles from fragments and intact rounds is a serious health threat, with possible exposure rates of 200 millirads per hour on contact." The average individual dose limit in the United States is 100 millirads a year! Twenty minutes and we've exceeded it on contact.

This memorandum, the reports that we prepared immediately after Operation Desert Storm as a part of the depleted uranium assessment to recover DU destroyed and contaminated US equipment, the previous research, our own and other's expressed concerns, led to the publication of a Department of Defence directive which required that we:

1. 'Provide adequate training for personnel who may come in contact with depleted uranium equipment.
2. Complete medical testing of personnel exposed to DU contamination during the Persian Gulf War.
3. Develop a plan for DU contaminated equipment recovery during future operations.'

It is thus indisputable that United States Department of Defence officials were and are still aware of the unique and unacceptable hazards associated with using DU munitions. It has not been complied with, not for my team, not for the British, not any of the Iraqis, nor anybody else.

What did we find at Desert Storm? What happened in Iraq?

What we found can be explained in three words: 'OH MY GOD.' Uranium penetrators lose up to 70% of their mass on impact, creating fixed and loose contamination with the remainder passing through the equipment or structures to lie on the terrain. On-site observations suggest that the mass lost about 40%, which forms fixed and loose contamination leaving about 60% of the initial penetrator. That means for each of the 900-and-some-odd thousand rounds of the 30 mm fired in the Gulf War, and I'm not sure how many in Kosovo, that 120 gms or more contaminated all around these vehicles for each individual round. The remainder of that rod is just laying out there someplace for women and children to pick up. And ladies and gentlemen, they did pick it up, and they are picking it up still.

Equipment contamination included uranium oxides, other hazardous materials (it's a complex mixture), unstable unexploded ordnance, and by-products of the exploded ordnance. In addition, other radioactive materials were detected and could pose a risk through inhalation, ingestion, or wound contamination. In most cases except for penetrator fragments, contamination was inside destroyed equipment or structures, on the destroyed equipment, or within 25 metres of the equipment.

After we returned to the United States I and two others (with assistance) wrote the Theatre Clean-up Plan, which was reportedly passed up through US Department of Defence to the US Department of State and consequently to the Kuwaitis. However, it is obvious that none of this information ever was given to the Iraqis. Consequently, although we knew there were and still are substantial hazards existing within Iraq they have been ignored for political and economic reasons. Iraqi

representatives have asked numerous times for DU contamination management and medical procedures but they have been rebuffed by US Department of Defence officials. They've come up to me, they've asked me, and while we stood there those officials said, 'Sorry, we're not going to help you.' This is now occurring again in Kosovo. Dr Bernard Rostker, assistant secretary of Defence and deputy of the Army, was recently quoted as saying that he did not see any reason why the US should tell where DU was used in Kosovo. That you can confirm by going to the Canadian Broadcasting Company, the Silver Bullet, website at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/du/index.html.

What did we produce from our findings?

I was recalled to active duty in the US Army and assigned to the US Army Chemical School located at Fort McClellan, Alabama as the DU Project Director and tasked with developing training and management procedures. The project included a literature review; extensive curriculum development project involving representatives from all branches of the US Department of Defence and representatives from England, Canada, Germany, and Australia; and basic research at the Nevada Test Site located north-west of Las Vegas, Nevada to validate all the procedures.

The products of the DU project included three training packages of approximately twelve hours. This was supposed to be taught to everybody; we finished it in December 1995, including three video tapes: 'Depleted Uranium Hazard Awareness,' 'Contaminated and Damaged Equipment Management,' and 'Operation of the AN/PDR 77 Radiac Set.' I think many people have seen these as they've been on the BBC and in other areas around the world. In addition to those films, the draft DU and Low Level Radioactive Material contamination management procedures including a

United States Army Regulation: 'Management of Equipment Contaminated with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities' and a US Army Pamphlet: 'Handling Procedures for Equipment Contaminated with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities.'

Although these products were all completed and ready for distribution by January 1996, the US Army, US Department of Defence, British, German, Canadian, and Australian officials disregarded directives and did not implement or have only partially implemented portions of the training or management procedures. Obviously while only a few US personnel have been trained, the training and management plan have not been given to all individuals and representatives of governments whose populations and environment have been affected by DU contamination. This deliberate omission is a crime against God and the citizens of the world!

Based on previous research and the DU project, what were the recommendations?

The DU project and review of previous research reinforced the original conclusions and recommendations that we (the US Army's experts) developed while still in Saudi Arabia and which are just plain simple common sense. The recommendations are:

1. All depleted uranium contamination must be physically removed and properly disposed of to prevent further exposures.

2. Radiation detection devices that detect and measure alpha particles, beta particles, x-rays, and gamma rays emissions at appropriate levels from 20 disintegrations per minute up to 100,000 dpm and from .1 millirem per hour to 75 mrem/hour must be acquired and distributed to all individuals or organisations responsible for medical care and environmental remediation activities involving DU or U-238 and

other low level radioactive isotopes that may be present.

3. Medical screening of all individuals who did or may have inhaled, ingested, or had wound contamination to detect mobile and sequestered internalised uranium contamination must be completed. That includes the Iraqi women, children, men, everyone in Kosovo, England, Canada, the United States, everywhere. And yet, as of last Thursday I couldn't get primary medical care for all of my team members, including the individual who buried all the trash for me in Saudi Arabia, and his father, a civilian. I can't even get the guys who are responsible for environmental clean-up to provide medical care for my team members. They won't acknowledge it. I sent a report up to the four star general in charge of all this, and he didn't even respond. No response whatsoever. People in his own headquarters are sick and he won't even take care of them.

4. All individuals who enter, climb on, or work within 25 metres of any DU-contaminated equipment or terrain must wear respiratory and skin protection. This equipment must be distributed to every place where DU is. But instead British, Canadian, and US troops are in Serbia and Kosovo right now without any protection, not to mention those civilians in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where this stuff was fired who lack any protection whatsoever.

5. Uranium 238 contaminated and damaged equipment or materials should not be recycled to manufacture new materials or equipment. Nonetheless, court cases already documented the recycling of scrap metal from the Gulf War: it's showing up in cooking pots and pans and automotive products.

Instead, what has occurred?

Visual evidence, personal experience, and published reports verify that:

1. Medical care has not been provided to all DU casualties.
2. Environmental remediation has not been completed, even though three of us wrote the report for the US Department of State in 1992.
3. DU contaminated and damaged equipment and materials have been recycled to manufacture new products. (Guess what's going to happen in Kosovo and Serbia?)
4. DU training and education has only been partially implemented if at all.
5. DU contamination management procedures have not been distributed.

The United States Army Material Command Health Physicist told me during a conversation on November 8, 1999 that their office will not release the DU medical treatment protocols nor the DU contamination management and remediation procedures to all those who are affected by depleted uranium contamination. He's in charge! We work for them! As of November 8th, they were refusing medical care and environmental remediation.

What adverse health effects have been observed, recognised, treated, and documented?

The answer to this question is extremely difficult. Deliberate denial and delay of medical screening and consequent medical care of not only US friendly fire casualties who inhaled, ingested, and had wound contamination but all others with verified internalised exposure makes actually knowing what has occurred difficult. Although myself, physicians, and other scientists and medical personnel recommended imme-

diate medical care during March, April, and May of 1991 and many times since then, the United States Department of Defence and British Ministry of Defence and consequently the United States Department of Veterans Affairs are still reluctant to provide thorough medical screening and necessary medical care. Verified adverse health effects from personal experience and personal reports from others with known DU exposures include:

- reactive airway disease,
- neurological abnormalities (from heavy metal poisoning; it's like eating lead or mercury),
- kidney stones and chronic kidney pain,
- rashes,
- vision degradation (again that's a neurological problem caused by affecting the optic nerve),
- night vision losses,
- gum tissue problems (individuals report all sorts of teeth and gum problems),
- lymphomas (several of my team my are dead from lymphoma) and other various forms of skin cancer,
- neuro-psychological disorders,
- short term memory loss (let me tell you how frustrating that is as an actor. I now have to take my script off to the side and learn my lines between scenes),
- uranium in semen (you may have wondered about birth defects? Well, they've happened here in England and in Iraq. You get uranium in the chromosomes and guess what comes out strange),
- and sexual dysfunction.

Let's make something clear. The war was a complete toxic battlefield. We had hazardous materials (not just DU) all over the place when I was called to clean up the Army's Seventh Corps materials dump. We detected these hazards after we blew up the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. In

the tanks there's a whole mixture of hydrocarbons, everything imaginable; DU is just one element in the toxic cocktail.

Today, serious adverse health effects have been documented in employees of and residents living near the uranium enrichment facilities at Puducah, Kentucky and Oak Ridge, Tennessee – the latter was just shut down. Additionally, employees at uranium manufacturing or processing facilities in New York, Tennessee, and the Four Corners area of south-west Colorado have reported adverse health effects similar to those reported by Gulf War DU casualties. And Iraqi physicians have approached me in Washington, and at the Centre for Disease Control in Atlanta, saying that Iraqis are sick. They've shown me pictures. Your own British College of Surgeons, made up of the best physicians in the world, has verified this. Iraqi physicians are reporting serious adverse health effects upon their population.

However verifiable correlation between uranium exposures and adverse health effects may not be possible because of deliberate delays. Even when verified medical evidence attributing adverse health effects to DU exposures is available, official recognition and documentation has been erratic at best. For example during 1994 and 1995, United States Department of Defence medical personnel at an US Army installation hospital removed, separated, and hid documented diagnoses from affected individuals and their physicians. These medical records were retrieved only recently, but probably too late for many individuals. This practice of deception and the destruction of evidence continues and consequently exposed individuals are not receiving adequate and effective medical care. This will continue as long as the United States, British, Canadian and other governments are permitted to ignore the emerging evidence and deny medical care to all individuals who have been or may have been exposed to DU or U-238 and other contaminants created as result of the use of DU

munitions. The sanctions and consequent limited distribution of DU medical care protocols and contamination management procedures cannot be justified.

If sanctions are lifted or they acknowledge their responsibility to provide medical care to the British and Americans affected, then they have to acknowledge their responsibility for medical care for the Iraqi women and children. They have to acknowledge that the sanctions are causing deliberate and wilful harm. As our retired Senator from Alabama told me a couple of days ago, it's all about money. If they have to admit what happened to the soldier, they have to admit exposure to civilians. Injuring civilians is a war crime. The decision during the Gulf War to use every possible measure was a tactical decision based on killing the enemy. There were consequences we did not totally understand. Today we just have to recognise those consequences, accept responsibility and go on.

I briefed General Schwarzkopf personally. I've talked this over with medical experts around the world. The individuals who spoke up, in the United States and internationally, include prestigious physicians who were consequently fired. The same is happening in England. Although I am not a physician I have been involved in teaching and providing emergency medicine for over 20 years as a frontline combat medic and thus the following recommendations are based on that experience and common sense applications of emergency medicine and simple health physics principles.

What should be the priorities for medical care?

Medical care must be planned and completed to identify and then alleviate actual physiological problems rather than placing an emphasis on psychological manifestations and continued testing. These people are not crazy. Warriors, civilian employees, non-combatants, enemy personnel and I are sick and deserve care for the complex exposures that have resulted

in observed physiological effects. Medical care for known uranium exposures should emphasise (concern in parentheses):

- neurology (heavy metal effects),
- ophthalmology (radiation effects),
- urology (heavy metal effects and crystal formation),
- dermatology (heavy metal effects),
- cardiology (radiation and heavy metal effects),
- pulmonary (radiation and heavy metal effects),
- immunology (radiation and heavy metal effects),
- oncology (radiation and heavy metal effects),
- gynaecology (radiation and heavy metal effects),
- gastro-intestinal (systematic effects),
- dental (heavy metal effects), and
- psychology (heavy metal effects).

What should happen next?

In February 1991, I was tasked to clean up this mess by headquarters and the Department of the Army by name. I and my team are going to finish the job. But the international community and all citizens of the world must raise a unified voice in opposition to further use of depleted uranium munitions. They must force those nations that have used DU munitions to recognise the immoral consequences of their actions and assume responsibility for medical care and thorough environmental remediation. Specifically:

1. Depleted uranium munitions and the use of depleted uranium must be banned. This recommendation coincides with the United Nations representative of Iraq who said that he

> hoped that the draft resolution on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction (document A/C.1/54/L.26) would specifically name depleted uranium, so that it could be prohibited for use in military purposes. The use of such depleted uranium by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1991 had led to an environmental disaster in Iraq.

Iraq didn't identify that disaster, my team did. Many scientists, governmental representatives, medical professionals, and private citizens also are urging prohibition of uranium munitions. We should also include in this list of affected countries Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia, Puerto Rico, Okinawa, the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, and England. In April of this year, myself and a few other individuals were called up to Washington DC to discuss the use of this in Kosovo. We sat with members of the Cabinet, the President of the United States and others from the Department of State and warned them. We got to the end of the meeting and the head guys in charge promised'don't worry about it, we won't use it'.

2. All individuals who were exposed or who may have been exposed to any form of depleted uranium and its various integral contaminants or other contaminants created during combat, research, or training activities must receive a through physical examination and medical care. This must be in order to alleviate or cure the physiological consequences caused by inhalation, ingestion, or uranium wound contamination.

3. All depleted uranium penetrator fragments, depleted uranium contaminated equipment, and depleted uranium oxide contamination must be cleaned up and disposed of at secure sites. We returned twenty-fourvehicles destroyed by US friendly fire from Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It took trained nuclear physicists with university degrees in a special facility that cost $3 million over three years to dispose of those.

4. Therefore, in conclusion, all sanctions must be lifted to enable completion of medical care and environmental res-

toration concurrently with the reinstatement and continuation of monitoring actions to verify destruction and thus prevent the future use of weapons of mass destruction. I want to emphasise this. We've got to get rid of it and make sure it's never used again. The men, the children, all citizens of the world should not be affected by something that lasts 4.5 million years.

In conclusion, my recommendations are based on doing what is right for God, my country, all warriors, and the citizens of the world. I urge everyone to support these recommendations to resolve the lingering and expanding health and environmental effects of uranium munitions use.

Commentary on Slides

- This is a 120mm DU round. In it is a single bullet of 4500 grams of uranium.
- This is a 120 mm round in flight, fired from an M1 tank. It's pyrophoric. We shot it at an Iraqi T72 tank that I brought back from Saudi Arabia. I had responsibility for a captured equipment project which redistributed Iraqi assets to all the allies and friends.
- This is a DU impact from a 120mm round. It's very distinctive: you can see the melted and reheated uranium around the hole. The hole is very clean, very round, about 7 or 8 cm in diameter. Inside there's nothing but rubble and what we call 'crispy critters'.
- This is a comparison – this is really good, the US Marines did this shooting for me – of a 120mm round on the top and a 25mm round on the bottom. Again you can see the uranium contamination: it's a lot less but the majority's inside the equipment.
- That's the inside. It looks dusty, doesn't it? That's all solid uranium dust. This vehicle was completely clean before we shot it. We were in that vehicle within two to three

minutes after it was hit. This is what our team breathed. This is what the Iraqis breathed, this is what the British breathed, this is what the children breathe when they climb back in the equipment. Totally confirmed by research. Known in 1943 as shown in a memorandum to General Groves, head of the Manhattan Project.

- Well, it's not just metal that we go at, we can have a lot of fun with wood. We shot up all kinds of wooden bunkers and buildings with DU. This is a 25mm going into a 4" x 4", leaving uranium oxide dust and contamination on the wood. So you don't need to hit something hard with this to make a mess.
- If you're going to be around DU contamination, climbing in it, crawling in it, doing any work with it whatsoever, this is the appropriate equipment that you need to wear.
- This is the only team that exists to clean this up in the world today. Just us in the picture. That's it. There isn't anybody else. Full protection, fully encapsulated, no inhalation, no ingestion, no contamination on your skin. The women, the children, the Iraqis that are climbing on the tanks are ingesting it, inhaling it, getting it on their skin, without this equipment. They're going to become sick, like my team. Or die, like my team.
- This is another contaminated and destroyed M1 tank. Two rounds. Dave, another one of my team members, is there. He's a civilian; nobody takes care of him, he's been denied medical care for eight years. He's got kidney problems, respiratory problems and rashes.
- Everybody climbed on, crawled on, without any warnings or any protection whatsoever. Thousands and thousands of vehicles still dot the landscape in Iraq. I think everybody here has seen the videos from the BBC and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; it's all over the television. We've been working on it, as we speak a French team are

doing more research. There is no question: contamination is there. It does not go any place unless it's physically removed.

- The bad thing about DU is, that when you hit something you have incomplete combustion. There's a fire, but the DU round doesn't blow up – it fragments off like shaving wood off of a stick, and those shavings catch fire. Igniting a DU round would be like taking thousands and thousands of very small marbles in my hand, setting them all on fire and throwing them out at you. Guess what happens? The munitions don't explode: they burn, and become extremely unstable. So if you've got a partially destroyed piece of equipment and munitions laying around, all you have to do is touch it and it'll blow up. That's what has happened with unexploded ordnance: it blows up in everyone's face. Men, women, children, dogs, it's indiscriminate: it doesn't care. All the Iraqis, the Kosovars, or the Serbs have to do is come near it and it blows up. My team had the highest death rate in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, trying to clean this up. Three of my guys died at Doha. I've still got their commendations that I never gave them in my briefcase. I'd love to give them to them.
- Now this is proper radio active equipment. No equipment existed to measure this radiation, so my team designed this probe in 1994–95. This is a beta-flick handheld probe that our team designed and tested out in Nevada. The US Department of Energy, I repeat, the US Department of Energy would not allow us to use British or US chemical warfare defence equipment 'because it's not safe': we had to wear theirs instead. And guess what the Iraqi children, soldiers, and everyone else had? They don't have anything now.
- A closer shot of measuring it. We're using this stick because there's unexploded ordnance in there. Standing out-

side is no problem, but if I'm going to reach inside there, all I've got to do is touch the unexploded ordnance, and it – for you chemists, the picric acid or ether that turns into peroxide – becomes unstable.

- Another tank contamination, you can see all the residue being airborne, suspended all around there. We've put sand and uranium all over the place. The gentleman on top died of lung cancer. This other one in the foreground is another team member, also dead. He's not wearing any respiratory protection, no skin protection; nobody's been warned, nobody's been told, no equipment has been distributed, and it still hasn't.
- This is a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, or what's left of it after impact. Another one – both the same vehicles there, one after another different rounds. There is radioactive contamination all over the inside of these vehicles, contamination all over. And they say there's no contamination up in Iraq? No one was hurt in Iraq? Our team flew in by helicopter to provide decontamination medical care because no medical personnel would touch them.
- During the Gulf War you not only had uranium contamination but radioactive material all over other equipment. The Iraqi and Soviet equipment was chock full of radioactive materials – not just as DU rods but as gauges, dials and other equipment. This vehicle is the remains of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle that was hit by a Hellfire missile fired by an Apache helicopter. Everybody died, we dug a hole and buried most of them but people are in there still. And the uranium contamination's all over.
- So now we have thousands and thousands of vehicles all over Iraq Kuwait and Kosovo. You've got to clean and move them. T72 or T62 whatever you have, you still have to move them. We got four big cranes to lift this one up (that thing weighs 72 tonnes), put it on a flat-bed truck, and

sealed it all up. Once you button them up, then you wrap them up like a Hershey's Kiss – that's a gumdrop candy with a wrapper on it. You don't want contamination spreading off this equipment, you want to contain it until it can be disposed of properly. If you can clean this stuff up, affix the contamination, put some cardboard over it, it's not a radiation hazard. But it must be physically removed or covered up. The whole highway of death north of Basra was not because of anything fired: it's all DU. Every vehicle was hit by DU. Repeat: every vehicle was hit by DU. The A10s came in, the tanks went in and boy, it was like a turkey shoot (as we call it in the US).

- Well, the other problem we had was clothing. Clothing gets contaminated. We did the research to find out if you get uranium out of your clothing and we found out you can't. Hence the coveralls. It's not an external radiation hazard, but you don't want radiation on your clothes, especially if they're the only clothes you've got to wear. And it can't be washed out without contaminating the washing machine.
- During some research done in the facility in New York found that air contamination went 28 miles (about 35 kilometres). We measured contamination in the air based on amount of particulates. This cascade impactor is a device that measures how much contamination is in the air by showing the particle size and contribution. This is another monitor, incorporating a fan that blows it through. You can see the centre fan and the whole thing, the end of it, down to the bottom. We discovered that the uranium contamination – now think about this – is submicron in size, from .15 micron on up in size. So no matter how long it sits there, until physically removed it will settle down and every time someone goes in there it will scatter again. It's like pouring a large pile of talcum powder on your desk,

then smacking the desktop. This is what the Iraqis reported when they were hit, this is what the Americans reported when they were hit, this is what the British reported. Whenever those children climb in or on these vehicles, from today until 4.5 billion years from now, this contamination is resuspended. We found that it must be physically removed or it will be resuspended for eternity. If you work on it without respiratory and skin protection you will get sick. This is what got me, this is what got my team, this is what is getting the Iraqis, the British and everyone. DU is a nightmare, an absolute total nightmare.

SESSION 7: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

'Experiencing Iraq today.'

NIKKI VAN DER GAAG &
FELICITY ARBUTHNOT

Felicity Arbuthnot is a freelance journalist who writes on environmental and social issues. She has visited Iraq over a dozen times since 1991. She is currently working as a Leader of Research for Carlton Television and returned from a trip to Iraq in October 1999.

Nikki Van Der Gaag is a co-editor at the *New Internationalist*, a monthly magazine on development issues. She has recently edited an edition on Iraq and has a long-term interest in Middle Eastern affairs since living in Lebanon in the mid-1980s. She recently visited Iraq with Felicity Arbuthnot. She has worked for Oxfam, the Minority Rights Group and the World Council of Churches and written and produced a rage of articles and materials on global issues.

Felicity Arbuthnot's many visits to Iraq reporting on the effects of sanctions has taught her that disputing the reliability of statistics is irrelevant in the face of the obvious magnitude of suffering in Iraq. She illustrated what infrastructural damage, food shortages, and especially the continual bombing of civilian targets (even flocks of sheep) mean in the context of the individual lives. Her powerful narration of a recent visit exposed this hidden suffering. Arriving recently in Baghdad, she was greeted by a massive pile-up due to a sudden power failure – which disabled phones, so no ambulance could be called. At her hotel, she met one man whose family had been horribly wounded by an explosion on a makeshift stove, now a common consequence of electricity and fuel shortages. One of Iraq's few remaining plastic surgeon, who was working on the man's disfigured baby, was himself recovering after being stabbed by a demented patient. Ms Arbuthnot recalled Denis Haliday's eerie experience looking for a flat to rent,

and told of an academic reduced to selling all his treasured books. Others are cut off from family members who are earning money abroad. Revisiting a hospital where she had met children suffering with cancer, Ms Arbuthnot was shocked to learn that they all had perished. Her speechlessness on meeting the survivors of families destroyed by bombing dramatized the guilt shared by all citizens represented by the United Nations – all of us.

Ms van der Gaag has recently visited Iraq while researching for the October issue of New Internationalist *magazine's special feature on Iraq. She conveyed her impressions of this first visit, drawing attention for the first time at this conference to the country's culture riches. Compared to other Middle Eastern countries, she said, Iraq appears normal on the surface; but the stories of individuals and their families bespeak a wrecked core. She met families whose suffering had been exacerbated by the drought of summer 1999. Ms van der Gaag showed slides of the historic, but now sadly neglected site of Hatra. Her guide, embarrassed about his dishevelled clothes, expressed his regret at how few visitors now share his love and pride in this, one of Iraq's many archaeological treasures. She also met the famous Iraqi sculptor Mohamed Ghani, who has persisted despite the difficulty in obtaining materials to create many expressive works inspired by the sanctions. She then showed photographs of cancer clinic in a Baghdad hospital, where her experience confirmed that cancers cluster around bombed regions; she also highlighted how the lack of equipment and infrastructure hampers medical treatment. Finally Nikki van der Gaag passed around some of Iraq's valueless money to demonstrate the effects of rampant inflation.*

Felicity Arbuthnot

"Thank you, and thank you to the organisers for inviting us. Not only have I broken my arm, but I have also broken my glasses; I need a minder! I was listening yesterday and thinking perhaps, fascinating as all the academic material is, and necessary though it is, we were in some ways a little in danger of getting embroiled in 'are 6,000 children a month

dying? Are 4,000 children a month dying? Are the Iraqi figures absolutely accurate? Should we be doing it this way? Should we be doing it that way?' You know, we've being hearing a lot recently about mass graves. Imagine a mass grave: does it matter whether it's 6,000 children, 4,000 children a month? Last July the generally agreed figure was 10,700. Imagine a mass grave every month of those sort of proportions. We also talked a lot about the infrastructure. Although we usually hear about food and medicine, the implications of the collapse of the infrastructure is one of the huge hidden casualties of the embargo.

I thought I'd just put these discussions in the context of my experiences on the visit I came back from a couple of weeks ago. One of the things I noticed, by the way, was how unchanged some things are after four months. The British and American planes are still bombing the most bizarre targets every day in an ongoing, undeclared war. One statistic I read last night said there had been just over 1,500 attacks since last December. They include flocks of sheep and with them the small child shepherds who mind them. Now one could say that one flock of sheep in a remote area that might have been fairly near to something else was an unfortunate mistake. But two is a little careless and frankly three, four, five gets a bit iffy, I think. Two days before my last trip, I rang up the MoD and asked if they knew they were bombing flocks of sheep and what they had to say about it. They didn't miss a beat: 'we reserve the right to take robust action if threatened,' they said. So I gave up. I was going to bleat, 'What, against sheep?' but I gave up. Anyway, they took robust action again, two days before I arrived in Iraq, and yet again they blew apart a flock of sheep and three small child shepherds who mind them, just between Amiyra and Basra. A week before that (in a not very smart incident) they totally demolished a car carrying foreign journalists in the town of

Ur, which of course the Pope had planned to visit in December. I think it was possibly a shot over the bows of the Pope, rather than over the bows of Saddam, for once.

But getting back to my trip: I arrived very late in Baghdad after a nightmare overland journey from Oman, as there haven't been flights since the embargo was introduced on Hiroshima Day 1990. Immediately a tragedy struck. Just as we drove into Baghdad all the lights went out due to one of the ongoing power cuts. Sometimes they last up to eight hours in Baghdad and in Basra sometimes you don't see power at all for days. All the cars are in such a disastrous state, that instantly, in the dark, everyone got disorientated and there was a massive pile up, a really horrendous one. We got out to try to ring for an ambulance which was difficult in the dark. They have now got a few ambulances because quite recently a large consignment came through, so we thought we'd go and ring one of these magic new ambulances. But, of course, when the electricity goes out, so do the telephones, and there was nothing we could do.

When we finally got to the hotel a man ran up to me – someone I recognised as part of security at that hotel. As it turned out, he thought I was a doctor because a delegation of doctors was arriving a couple of days after that. He was just repeating over and over again, 'My wife, my baby! My wife, my baby.' He was making desperate gestures with his face and his body but I couldn't understand the rest of it. It transpired that there has been this spate of burns recently. When the electricity goes off, either people buy (if they can afford it) these very dangerous lamps which routinely explode, or they cook on makeshift stoves. It is easy to go wrong there, and often if somebody bends forward their clothes catch fire. If they're very poor they just put a wick in a bottle of kerosene and often the bottle explodes. So the new, hidden disaster is burns accidents. Five weeks earlier, his wife had been

cooking when the lamp had exploded. The three year-old child, his little boy, had been watching. The wife was so badly burnt that she lost her breasts. The little boy's face was burnt, his whole body was burnt, and he asked if I could help.

I couldn't even think, let alone help. As you know we hadn't slept for twenty-four hours. I told him come and see me tomorrow night, but I couldn't think what to do. He turned up the next evening in the hotel with this little sort of broken doll in his arms. This child of three years old had no face left, there were no recognisable eyes, there was no recognisable nose, no recognisable mouth, he had lost an ear, his other ear and his face was stuck to his shoulder. It's not since we saw that terrible, haunting image of the soldier frozen against the window in the Gulf War that I've ever seen anything like that child. He'd had, like his mother, five operations in five weeks. But the plastic surgeon, a very eminent man called Dr. Alabashia who's well-known throughout the Middle East (also a wonderful sculpto, and painter) who worked all through the Iran–Iraq war putting people back together again, had been trying to work on this little boy. But he had been stabbed by a patient who'd lost his mind, so he was out of action. And when I related this to an Iraqi friend, she just looked at me and said 'the whole of Iraq's losing its mind' and moved on.

But anyway, we, myself and a friend pooled the dollars that we could (which would have been enough to get him private surgery and medicine on the black market – what medicine he needed – we thought, we hoped, if of course he could find another plastic surgeon). One of the hidden consequences of sanctions is this horrendous brain drain mentioned yesterday. More and more people, even people who swore they'd never, ever leave, are leaving because they have to earn hard currency to provide for their own family, in a country in which a kilo of meat is equal to a university professor's salary.

Denis Halliday, who of course resigned in disgust as Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Iraq, happened to be there at the same time and he said, 'You know Felicity, there's another hidden casualty; when I came to Iraq, people were offering me homes to rent for hard currency because the families needed the money. They were the homes of people who had fled, and I'd go into them and find the clothes still in the wardrobe, the change still on the bedside table, the records, the tapes still in their containers.' He told me that he had to ask not to see this any more, he said that he felt like an intruder in someone else's home.

Then, of course, there's the selling. As is well-known, people sell all their belongings to survive and to provide for their families. And often, when they have nothing left to sell, whole families commit suicide. I heard the story about a friend of one of my friends, who is a man of seventy and an academic who'd collected books on his travels since he was a child. He had three rooms of floor-to-ceiling books that were his friends, his life. One day he walked through the rooms and he talked to them and he said, 'All my life I've looked after you, I've lavished my money on you and I've loved you and now I have to ask some of you to care for me'. And he gathered a few and he went to the Friday market where precious, personal collections are sold, bit by bit, and he sat there, week after week, his friend told me, with the tears running down his face, and now he has not one volume left. To me this again encapsulated one of hundreds and hundreds of stories, I mean hundreds, not only of the heartbreak of no food or medicine, but what has been called the 'intellectual genocide' of this embargo.

Then there have been what have ironically been known as the 'Schindler passports', opportunities to get families out for around $10,000. I met a young man who'd actually had two families, he and his wife had had a son in their twenties and

then they'd had two more children later on. Three years ago an even younger child died of malnutrition. At the time when the son and his wife had got the money to go, they'd sold their house to get out through Turkey. The father sent the other two children, the sisters, with them and his children were passed off as his son's children, so they got to Germany. The wife, of course, after the grief had abated a little, realised the terrible, terrible mistake they had made. They begged me to help them get to Germany. There was nothing I could do. I've never seen such desperation in two people's faces. The wife was silently crying and crying – she was clearly in a state of total mental collapse. I asked him, 'how long has your wife been crying?' He replied, 'three years.' She'd actually gone blind with crying.

I went back to a paediatric hospital I'd visited in February. The doctor hugged me and said it was lovely to see me. Then she reminded me of the children I had written about last time I was in Iraq. She was terribly sorry but not one of them survived – and that included seventeen children of mature weight, although so many live births now are under-weight due to malnourishment of mothers. This, incidentally, poses a real question about advocating breastfeeding; if you're that malnourished, you're not really in a position to breastfeed. I just thought, 'I wonder what UN resolution those children are in contravention of? Those babies that were hours old, days old, that didn't even have a working incubator, didn't even have oxygen.'

I'd just like to end, if I may, on two aftermaths of bombing. At the site of one 'robust bombing' in January, for which the US ultimately apologised, 'the information was wrong, it had been an error'. It was in Basra, where seventeen people were killed. When I visited, a man with haunted eyes suddenly came out of a small house and joined the crowd that gathers when rare strangers arrive. The crowd parted and fell

absolutely silent. He produced three very battered, fingered photographs, from his pocket of three laughing children, all under seven. They were his children; they had been bombed in this 'mistake'. And one other really haunting, haunting image was of another of the bombings, the one that Nikki and I photographed in June, where we found the graves of four small children who had been blown to bits with the sheep. The grandfather and the father were also killed, and we found the children's uncle and also their mother. I think one of my abiding memories will be of this small woman, very dignified, no education, sitting on the smallest mound of her six-year-old son, Salman. Eventually I went to her, searching for any words, any words that could address this. Her hand was icy, icy cold on that sweltering day as she suddenly looked at me with great dignity and said, 'I need nothing from any of you, but I would just like to meet the pilot of that plane.' I heard even in her grief this very courteously-unsaid Iraqi revenge curse – 'if I drink of his blood it will not be enough.'

I am absolutely convinced that when history is written with truth, then this embargo on Iraq will go down with the firebombing of Dresden, with the Holocaust and with Hiroshima. What makes it absolutely unique is that this is being done, not by some machete-wielding butcher in Rwanda, not by some despot, but in our name, the people of the United Nations."

Nikki van der Gaag

"The purpose of this session is to give you an idea of the faces and the people behind all of the talk of the statistics and the facts and figures that we heard yesterday. I'm also going to talk about the people we met and the things we saw in Iraq. I went in May and June with Felicity to produce a special issue of the *New Internationalist* magazine on Iraq. The idea was to put a human face on what's happening to the

people, as so much of the talk seems to be about the President and the geopolitical situation. Today I want to talk and show a few slides representing the history and the culture of Iraq, and the people themselves.

I hadn't been to Iraq at all before when I arrived in May, but I had lived in the Middle East. So when I arrived at the bus station after a night's journey and staggered off the bus, I thought, 'this just looks like a typical Middle Eastern country.' But the longer I stayed there, the more I realised that if you start on the outside, on the surface, it seems as though everything's OK – Felicity describes it as an onion – but the further you dig in, the more you realise that things are just not working. The electricity isn't working, the sewage systems aren't working, the street lights aren't working. We had a near accident because the tire on our car was coming to pieces. The health system which were so brilliant ten or fifteen years ago is completely deteriorating. There's no infrastructure, there are no communications. We talked to a young man who's doing a computer course; he said there is one ten-year-old computer for the whole group of students. I've never been anywhere where there is such a sense of isolation. You can't get there except by bus, you can't talk to people in the outside world, you can't get information from outside the country. It feels like a country in a prison. We visited Babylon, we visited Nebuchanezzer's palace, we saw the Hanging Gardens, we went to the ancient monument of Hatra, of which I want to show you a few pictures; but all the museums are closed and all the beautiful artefacts had to be hidden away. We were the only people in this incredible place.

This is Hatra, which is surrounded by a huge wall several kilometres in circumference. Many of the ruins are quite well preserved. We were shown round by a guide called Adnan, who stayed there for ten days (it was a long way from anywhere) and then had ten days off [figure 7.1]. He took us

figure 7.1: Hatra

around incredibly lovingly, and was delighted to be showing someone around – I think he probably guided about one person each week. There were the visitor's quarters and a hospital with beautiful little carvings of snakes. There were these three amazing temples with beautiful carvings and Aramaic script; huge arches, all carved there in very intricate detail. I wish I could give you an idea of the size and the awesomeness of the whole place as it rises up out of surrounding desert. It was interesting to see that prior to the Gulf War, there had been quite a lot of reconstruction work going on in this and a number of the sites we visited. Rusty cranes waited there with piles of bricks, but nothing had gone on for ten years. Some of the reconstruction I think archaeologists here would question – for instance, they'd actually rebuilt Nebuchanezzer's palace on top of the old foundations. Nonetheless, it all just stopped, and now it is completely neglected. There were lots of other sites in Iraq that I visited but I just wanted to give you a glimpse of one to show the rich cultural heritage.

This was just a family that came up to our car as we ar-

figure 7.2: Hatra family

rived in Hatra [figure 7.2]. The old lady was incredibly concerned because not only did she have very little food to feed her grandchildren, but she also had nothing to feed her goat. As people probably know, the summer of 1999 has seen the worst drought in living memory – so on top of everything else, things aren't growing. All the crops are about half the size they ought to be. They desperately need some rain.

This was Adnan our guide [figure 7.3], who, when I asked him if I could take a picture got rather embarrassed. When I said that I'd take it wherever he wanted it to be taken he said 'OK, but please don't take my shoes.' I looked at his shoes and they were completely falling to pieces. It seemed the ultimate irony.

We then met Mohamed Ghani, who is one of Iraq's famous sculptors [figure 7.4]. You see his sculptures all around Baghdad, in the rest of Iraq, in Paris, Damascus...all over the Middle East. He is the most incredible character. He spent a lot of time studying in Italy. He had this Aladdin's cave of a



figure 7.3: Adnan

workshop with the most beautiful things in it which he was keen to show us. These are little carvings, carved figures. You can see only a few in the picture – there were three hundred of them in all and when we asked what they were, he said they were the shapes of the women who wait, the shapes of the women who are bowed down by the grief of losing their children. He has a whole row of them. For me they were incredibly evocative of the women you see in long black robes with that shape.

There were other embargo sculptures. In one, the days of the week are inscribed on huge stones. Under each one are little figures bowed down under the weight of daily living. When I asked him why he put the writing of the days in English and not in Arabic, he said 'because I want the world to know what's happening'. Another embargo sculpture shows a child reaching up to his mother. She can't reach down to him and her breasts are dried, without sustaining milk. It's enormous, about twice my size. He told us a story about how

his workshop was bombed. He is never going to give up, but he has no materials to work with; he's got no wood.

Finally I would like to show you some pictures of the hospitals. We went to the Al Mansour hospital in Baghdad amongst others, a specialist cancer hospital where we sat through a cancer clinic. The interesting thing was first that the clusters of cancers were grouped around the places which had been heavily bombed, and second that it seemed to me many were the same kinds of cancers. Doug Rokke yesterday talked about the cancers in the US being similar: acute neuroblastic leukaemia, kidney problems. There were very similar clusters of kinds of cancers in the hospital in Baghdad.

So this is Ahmed, who is wearing a traditional scarf to cover the fact that he's had chemotherapy and so lost his hair [figure 7.5]. They do now have some chemotherapy drugs but not nearly enough; prior to Oil-for-Food they didn't have any at all. Although they have the drugs now, they don't have the equipment to administer them (canulas and things like that).

figure 7.4: Mohammed Ghani

figure 7.5: Ahmed

Ahmed is actually on his third course of chemotherapy and is responding well, but there are lumps in his stomach, so they're worried about him.

This is Iman, nine years old with acute neuroblasitc leukaemia [figure 7.6]. A lot of these people must travel a very long time and a very long way to hospital, and it's difficult for their families to get them there for treatment on a regular basis. Another boy, David, who we'd met the day before, a lovely little boy, had the same kind of leukaemia, but they were very pessimistic about his chances. The amazing thing was how many children came not just with their mothers but with their fathers as well. There were queues of people outside as the children were brought in so lovingly by their parents. As I looked at their faces, I could not imagine having children there; what must they be going through?

I wanted to show people some Iraqi money. These are 250

figure 7.6: Iman

and 100 Dinar notes. In 1989 one of these was worth £5000. Now they're worth about 50p. They can buy you about two eggs; but a toothbrush, for example, would cost 1500 Dinar. A doctor or civil servant earns about 3000–3500 a month. So that note, 250, would be a fair bit of a doctor's or a professor's salary. That kind of inflation is unimaginable; but not only do they lack money to buy things, and commodities are all very expensive, but many things that are just not available to purchase anyway. Try to imagine living on $2 a month with a family – I don't know how they do it. But of course a lot of people don't. I saw a large number of the death notices posted for a period of time after someone dies. I asked Felicity what they were – I was surprised to see so many. She said that there are more and more of them every time she goes. The streets are literally festooned with these things. It brings home how many Iraqis don't survive – as we know from the statistics we heard yesterday.

I want to finish with a quote from Butros, a Christian. He was talking about how he had three kids and he couldn't afford to buy them the things he wanted to buy them, although he had a garden and some food (one wonders how contaminated it was). He said, 'we're like animals. We can only think of food and drink. We can't hope to have new furniture, new curtains, clothes for the kids, or anything for the house.... But you know what the worst thing is? The worst thing isn't all of this. The worst thing is they've taken away our dreams."

SESSION 8: ANTI-SANCTIONS CAMPAIGNS

'Popular anti-sanctions groups in the UK.'

MILAN RAI

Milan Rai has been a co-coordinator of Voices in the Wilderness UK, a leading anti-sanctions campaign group, since 1997. The group violates sanctions by taking medicines and children's toys to Iraq. He travelled to Iraq in February and August 1998, and is a founding member of ARROW (Active Resistance to the Roots of War). He is the author of *Chomsky's Politics* (Verso 1993).

Mr Rai spoke from personal experience as an activist in the anti-sanctions movement to catalogue efforts made by groups and individuals to shift government policy. The first groups existed even before Iraq was forced out of Kuwait, but in 1991 an upsurge of concern, fuelled by new reports on the situation in Iraq, led to the establishment of more groups. Between 1991 and 1998 groups came and went; he calls these the 'years of despair'. In 1998, two major turning points – the February crisis and December bombing campaign – led to mobilisation and increased activity. This was also a year in which campaigners faced arrest for breaking sanctions and imprisonment for civil disobedience. The National Co-ordination Meeting brought together groups from across the country, each with a different emphasis and variety of campaigning methods. What these groups have in common is a belief that inspection and sanctions relief must be de-linked as an essential pre-condition to a solution of the humanitarian crisis. However, the movement faces a public perception, moulded by the media, government and political parties, that the target is Saddam Hussein. Mr Rai related some of the personal experiences which had moved him personally as an activist, including a visit to Iraq with Voices US, and ended with a demand for radical rather than incremental improvement in the fortunes of Iraq's 22 million people.

"The title I've been given is popular anti-sanctions groups. I don't really want to try and investigate the area of the criteria for popularity. I'll just be grateful that Voices is probably deemed a popular group because we've been invited to present this section.

Anti-sanctions groups: I think there is a small minority of groups which one can say are part of the anti-sanctions movement whose campaigning demand is the end of all sanctions against Iraq. But I think that most groups are focused on the fact that there is a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and have come to the judgement that in order to solve the humanitarian crisis, one of the essential preconditions is the lifting of the comprehensive economic sanctions – the non-military sanctions. And so they focus on that particular issue and don't necessarily have a position against military sanctions, diplomatic sanctions and a whole raft of more selective sanctions which don't have this impact on the general population.

On a historical note, there were anti-sanctions groups of the former kind, in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait, who were just against sanctions completely. I like most people in the anti-war movement didn't really take those arguments very seriously, didn't really give them a hearing. I think that was wrong actually, because although I think I probably would have still had the same view about sanctions, roughly speaking, if I had engaged with those arguments, I ignored them because of the nature of the groups who were putting them forward. I think that's always a mistake. You should always take arguments seriously on a serious issue, regardless of whom they're coming from. So I think I should have taken those arguments seriously, just like it's necessary to take the arguments of the Foreign Office seriously and so on.

So there were groups who were anti-sanctions even before Iraq was forced out of Kuwait. In 1991, there was an upsurge of concern. The International Study Team conducted a mam-

moth survey of the conditions of civilians in Iraq, and that led to a lot of activity by a whole number of groups and publications including the *New Statesman*, which led to the setting up of Medical Aid for Iraq. Two of the people involved in the International Study Team are in the audience. Bella Bhatia helped put out this book: *Unheard Voices: Iraqi women on war and sanctions* which is an excellent and, I think, unsurpassed discussion about and by Iraqi women about the situation. And Jean Dreze in 1991 produced a more academic economic work focusing on hunger and poverty in Iraq. Again, I would say that this has not been surpassed in laying the groundwork for understanding the economic mechanisms by which sanctions have caused hunger and poverty in Iraq. It is published by the LSE as well as in a journal. The International Study Team ended up transforming itself into the Centre for Economic and Social Rights in New York and this is one of their reports: *UN Sanctioned suffering*: *A Human Rights Assessment of UN Sanctions on Iraq*, which I also recommend.

So a lot of things happened in 1991. From a personal point of view, a vigil started up from a peace group that I was involved in called ARROW – Active Resistance to the Roots of War. And that vigil is still going outside the Foreign Office every Monday evening. You're very welcome to come along – 5.30 till 7, the corner of King Charles Street and Whitehall.

So between 1991 and 1998, different groups in Britain and elsewhere in the world launched all sorts of initiatives. Many groups came and went in Britain. Basically I would sum them up as 'years of despair'. People felt that there was a huge wall and we were all banging our heads against it.

In 1998 there were, I would say, two major turning points. One of them came with the February crisis. A mass mobilisation, mass demonstrations against the threat of bombing

against Iraq, brought people face to face and more actively concerned with the issue of sanctions against Iraq. Then in December last year there was Desert Fox. Again that was a *military* action, but it also galvanised political activity and thinking and concern about the impact of sanctions on civilians in Iraq as well.

In February last year, there was a bit of a personal turning point for me when I went to Iraq with Voices US and Martin Thomas, a student nurse. When we came back, we got arrested for breaking the sanctions and threatened with prosecution. That didn't materialise in the end. In December, alongside the letter-writing and faxing and demonstrating and so on, there were also more instances of civil disobedience. Sylvia Boyes from Iraqi People First in Birmingham was moved to write on the cenotaph to communicate a sense of how these losses were being felt in Iraq. Gabriel Carlyle and Andrea Needham wrote messages on the Foreign Office for which they received prison sentences. Gabriel received a forty-five day prison sentence for writing an anti-sanctions slogan on the Foreign Office.

And I think that nationally and internationally, those two turning points really broke up the log-jam. There was a sense of activation, a sense that something had to be done and something could be done.

Last December was also, not far from here, the birthplace of the National Co-ordination Meeting, called together also by CASI, which is a co-ordinating mechanism for over a dozen anti-sanctions groups around the country. And there are groups, some of which are represented here today, from Sheffield, Coventry, Manchester, Milton Keynes, Cambridge, London and further afield. The ones I've just named have, I think, weekly street vigils or street stalls. What has brought us together is our belief that the comprehensive economic sanctions do have to be lifted in order to solve the humani-

tarian crisis. Some of us also tackle issues to do with bombing and so on. Different groups have different styles and different emphases. But we try to share information and try to co-ordinate joint action. The kinds of things that have been done include classical civil disobedience like sit-downs and so on, street vigils, marches, leafleting; petitioning (the National Petition is coming to its culmination next weekend); letter-writing to MPs, the Foreign Office, or the Prime Minister; sanctions-breaking (including postal sanctions-breaking which you can do from the comfort of your own sub-post-office). People have gone on sanctions-breaking and fact-finding missions to Iraq. There's campaigning by e-mail, people circulating information through paper newsletters as well. We share information when we meet at the National Co-ordination Meeting.

And fundamentally what it's about is talking to our families, our friends, people we work with, our fellow students, our fellow worshippers, fellow party activists, fellow trade-union members, people in our communities who we are trying to persuade that there must be a policy change. We're also trying to persuade them that they have not only to adopt an opinion but actually to take action, to put pressure on the government to achieve that policy change. What is the policy that we want to have changed? Well, currently and since the end of the Gulf War, successive governments have had the policy of prioritising disarmament over the health of the civilian population. So the inspection crisis has been indissolubly linked to the humanitarian crisis. And in the National Co-ordination Meeting, the groups that have come together are saying we need to de-link these two crises. Whatever happens in terms of the inspection crisis, we must solve the humanitarian crisis. We believe it can only be solved if the economic sanctions are lifted. That's not enough to solve it but that's an essential pre-condition.

The government is putting forth a resolution at the Security Council, which we'll hear more about later in the day. I'm not going to go into the details of that resolution. I'll just note that it was summed up by the *Economist* with these words:

> A recent British and Dutch proposal supported by the Americans insists that the Iraqis provide a more thorough account of their nastier weapons programmes and allow international inspectors to return to Iraq. In return, it envisages "a slight loosening of the economic embargo."

The Anglo-Dutch proposal is based on recommendations from the Humanitarian Panel set up by the Security Council earlier in the year. The Humanitarian Panel described its own recommendations by saying they may lead to 'incremental improvements' in the situation. Well, we've heard different accounts of the situation in Iraq. I think it's clear to anyone who's a genuine humanitarian that what is needed is not incremental improvement but drastic change.

Our biggest problem as an anti-sanctions movement, in my personal view, is the public perception (which has been moulded by the media, the government and all political parties) that there's one man living in Iraq all by himself with a little retinue, and that he is what all of this is about. And what our movement – which is a very grand term to use of a loose collection of groups – but what the anti-sanctions movement is about is saying, 'There isn't one man living in Iraq – there are twenty-two million people and they are suffering because of a policy which our government has been pursuing.' And that is a moral burden which those of us who are living in this country have to shoulder. And it's a responsibility which we have to discharge. The government likes to tell us about our rights and our responsibilities. We have a responsibility to the people of Iraq. And we have the right to discharge that responsibility in a number of ways.

So, I'll finish there. That's a background introduction.

I'm sure people will have comments and questions and I know that the wisdom to answer all those questions is out there in the audience so I feel no burden of responsibility up here."

Afterword, 22 February 2000

The recent resignations of Hans von Sponeck, UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, and head of the World Food Programme in Baghdad, indicate once again the depth of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the immorality of Western attempts to shrug off responsibility for the human disaster created by the comprehensive economic sanctions.

The resignations demonstrate also the emptiness of UN Security Council Resolution 1248, offered by Britain and the US as a solution to both the inspection and humanitarian crises. The key issue remains the linking of these two crises, the central goal of 1248. This objective deliberately postpones the recovery of the Iraqi public health system, and significant reductions in child mortality and child malnutrition, until Washington and London and Baghdad can agree on a disarmament verification and monitoring process. As Human Rights Watch points out, this flies in the face of the Security Council's responsibility to implement unconditionally the recommendations of the Humanitarian Panel which reported to the Council a year ago:

> The Council has an absolute duty to address these urgent humanitarian needs without regard to the debate over the most effective way to secure Iraq's compliance with the Council's demands.

Serious observers are painfully aware that the lifting of the economic sanctions cannot by itself solve the myriad human problems caused by ten years of destruction. Much more will be needed for the people of Iraq once more to enjoy a decent level of public health. The tragedy is that those who dominate the international community are not even willing to allow the beginnings of real reconstruction.

Economic sanctions are not the only obstacle to solving the humanitarian crisis, but they are the largest. They must be removed.

SESSION 9: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

'Sanctions and the Middle East.'

CHRIS DOYLE

Chris Doyle is the Senior Information Officer at the Council for the Advancement of Arab–British Understanding, where he has worked almost continuously since 1993. He has a degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies from Exeter University, and is a regular contributor to various Middle East journals including *Middle East International*.

Chris Doyle spoke on attitudes both public and private in the Arab world to the sanctions regime. Though no formal research has been pursued into these attitudes, he observed from personal experience and from the media the sympathy Arabs share with the suffering of other members of the umma, *or extended Arab–Islamic community. The aggravations of sanctions and the fear of air bombardments are familiar emotions throughout the Middle East. So too is distrust of government and the unreliability of the media. Although new forms of communication are relieving some of the latter suspicion, Doyle perceived that many Arabs believe in a conspiracy against themselves and their neighbours. He recalled the double standard which characterises Western (and especially US) policy on Israel in support of this belief: despite occupying foreign territory and supplying other nations from its WMD capabilities, Israel does not undergo even a token censure from Washington. This favoritism suggests to Arabs that sanctions against Iraq are intended to protect Israel. That Western governments cannot be trusted is evidenced by the US's effective collusion in the suppression of an Iraqi insurgency it had encouraged. A feeling of shame at the continued dependence of the region on the US is coupled with distress at the dehumanization of Arabs peoples – the rhetoric of Tony Blair or the callous disregard for Kenyan dead being two recent examples. Doyle questioned whether Iraq could be effectively re-integrated into the*

Middle Eastern political arena, even if the Iraqi regime were overthrown. Indeed, sanctions and Operation Desert Fox participated in making Saddam's regime less reviled, turning antagonism toward the US and British governments. Doyle anticipates that this antagonism will persist long into the future.

He concluded by highlighting recent developments in official positions taken by Middle East states to Iraq and its predicament. He identified specific interests which helped to determine these positions, including traditional hostilities or desires for regional stability. Although Iraq possessed the natural and human resources to become a major regional power, its aggressions against its neighbours is a cause for anxiety amongst Arab governors. These factors result in an ambivalence towards Iraq amongst political leaders, which does not however lessen the damage done to American and British relations with the Arab world by the sanctions regime.

"Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for inviting me to speak to this excellent conference. I have been immensely impressed both with the quality of debate here and also the way it has been organised. I am very grateful to be here and I have learnt a great deal.

The title that I was given was 'Sanctions and the Middle East' and what I propose to do is to give a very broad analysis of Arab viewpoints on sanctions – not just on Iraq – both at a popular level in the Arab world and also to fly some ideas about what Arab governments are thinking and what their policies might be in the future. I also intend to touch briefly on how sanctions have affected perceptions of the West, in particular Britain and the United States, and what might be the possible consequences of that.

Why is this important? One of the reasons that has been given as justification for what has happened in Iraq over the last decade is that intervention, militarily and with the embargo, has occurred in order to create regional security, as a

result of the threat to security that Saddam has posed. Therefore one has to ask: is the region concerned about this threat to the security? Is this a justified claim made by the United States and Britain?

First of all, a quick overview of sanctions in the Middle East. In particular the Arab World and the wider Middle East have had an increasing number of sanctions imposed on them over recent years – this was mentioned in a broader context by Professor Garfield yesterday – the most damaging, obviously, being those imposed on Iraq. Sanctions come in various forms, be they:

1. UN sanctions
2. Unilateral sanctions – (US mainly)
3. Extra-territorial sanctions[1]
4. Targeted sanctions – arms sales etc.
5. Personal sanctions.

By extraterritorial sanctions I mean this: the United States passed legislation whereby they would penalise companies from third party states who were investing above certain figures in the oil industries of Iran and Libya and in Cuba, in a so-called Iran–Libyan Sanctions Act and the Helms–Burton Act. Both of these largely failed. And indeed more targeted sanctions have occurred, particularly in terms of arms sales.

Sanctions, as was also stated yesterday, have been seen as a cheap alternative to war. You do not have the issue of body-bags, the consequent costs of military conflict. They are also a vehicle to protect strategic interests – as we know, in terms of the Middle East, these are oil, access to oil, oil prices.

Therefore the Arab public, because of these sanctions (and sanctions in of the Arab world have been imposed most notably on Iraq, Libya, and Sudan), has become increasingly aware of sanctions and their effects. Many of them have had to live through them. In addition to the sanctions I mentioned earlier, Palestinians, for example, have to live under closures which

constitute an embargo, closures which prevent them from trading externally or even travelling internally within their areas. The Lebanese have had their ports blockaded. They also know waht daily bombardments are like. Many, many people within the Arab world have had some sort of experience, obviously not to the same extent as Iraq, of interference from outside in their economic and daily lives.

Also I would say that Arab governments and peoples are also very aware, as is Iran, that if they fall out of line it could happen to them. To quote the immortal words of a former England football manager, 'If history repeats itself, I think we can expect the same thing again.'

So there is this backdrop of sanctions increasingly being used by the United States. I want now just to turn to snapshots of what popular perceptions of sanctions are. I say it is a snapshot because there are not any real surveys or opinion polls about what Arab public opinion is on this issue. One can garner this through the press and talking to people on the street. So this is a snapshot over a period of time and various perceptions that *I* have – and of course I look at this as an external viewer. I am not an Arab: bear this in mind. I would be interested to hear from Arabs in the audience what they feel about this.

First of all, there is a massive difference for Arabs – and they understand this very well – between the people and government. In their part of the world, there is such a distance between the government and the people that they look very differently at the American and British governments from the American and British people. Because of this distance, because they often would not want to be associated with their own governments, frequently they do not necessarily associate ordinary British people with the policies of the British government. There have been few instances of extreme violence against ordinary British and American individuals in

the Middle East because of this dissociation between the two. It does not always apply but as a generality I find this to be the case.

The next thing is, that when Arabs (and Muslims as well) read about what is happening in Iraq and discuss it, they are discussing from a much different viewpoint from ourselves. They are part of a society which is much more collective. It is not a society of individuals. There is a profound sense of what they would call the *umma* – the Arab–Islamic nation. For them, it is a very unnatural thing to have these borders. They feel very passionately about what is happening to their brethren in Iraq. There is a very strong identity with them. This would also apply, say, to the Palestinians. It would apply to other people within the Arab and Muslim worlds who are suffering. Hence, there were profound feelings of anger and resentment over what had happened in Bosnia and Chechnya. For example, one associates Saudi Arabia with being pro-sanctions – but many Saudis, as individuals, have given very generous charitable donations to Iraqis. They do not see any distortion between that and rightly so. The general Arab view is that it is the sanctions that are to blame for the additional suffering of the Iraqi people.

And there are other things that also inform Arab public opinion. Mentioned yesterday was the conspiracy theory. In various areas of the world, the conspiracy theory actually acquires more status than news reports. And there are reasons for this – you should not blame these people for entertaining conspiracy theories. When you have newspaper reports you do not trust and you do not trust governments and you probably do not trust Western spokesmen, conspiracy theories are often infinitely more attractive. It fits your view of world events. The Western media is seen to be Jewish/Zionist dominated – coverage of Iraq is therefore portrayed from an Israeli perspective. Word of mouth has infinitely more power. And

if you are a shopkeeper in Alexandria, you feel these theories might be true. You will believe the rumours you have heard about the death of Princess Diana. You will believe that Saddam Hussein is an agent of the West or various other conspiracy theories many of you may well have heard. And these will have a great deal more credibility amongst much of the general population than might be reported. I could quote you various people to whom I have spoken who say 'Saddam is the agent of the United States. He enabled the United States and the West to control the resources and the wealth of Arabs.' These are popular perceptions. So when the United States and Britain push forward their arguments about sanctions, the audience in the Arab World is intuitively sceptical. They look for hidden agendas which may or may not exist. But against that, the levels of debate and awareness are improving, I would suggest, by increasing exposure to more modern forms of communication, the Internet and satellite TV. So I do expect – and research needs to be done – that there will be some changes over the next decades or long-term changes in how information percolates around the Arab world.

The other issue of conspiracy theory we should always stress here is the pervading sense of intelligence services being responsible for everything. This is something which you perpetually hear about: 'the CIA did this, Mossad did that.' Yet again, I do not blame the people for thinking that, given their circumstances.

The issue of double standards is another perception that is very widely held throughout the Arab world. They are aware of this issue and they believe it applies there. It does not imply any support for Saddam Hussein. Whilst Iraq has occupied Kuwait, Israel still occupies the lands of three countries and every Arab knows this. Israel remains the one country in the Middle East with a nuclear arsenal – estimates would

say, over 200 nuclear weapons. It also has a chemical and biological weapons capability. And, as far as Arabs are concerned, nothing is done. It is brushed under the carpet. Not even a token attempt is made to curb Israel's potent weaponry. You may have read recently that Israel yet again has been exporting high-tech weaponry to China – which shows that it is not a particularly safe ally for the US. And when Iraq did use chemical weapons at Halabja, it took three days for the Americans even to come out and protest. The perception is that those countries not amenable to towing the Washington-dictated line are liable to sanctions, while those who pay homage to Capitol Hill are allowed leeway to abuse human rights and ignore UN Security Council Resolutions. Israel, Turkey and Indonesia are cases in point. They have all occupied territory and oppressed people in their territories, largely without censure. Israel alone is in violation of over fifty UN Security Council resolutions.

There is also a perception of double standards in having supported or even armed various regimes, including Iraq – of turning a blind eye to its excesses and then, later on, launching a war. These arguments have been referred to. But I have a slight caveat on this double standards issue and when it is raised. The UK–US government response is that you cannot compare Iraq to other regimes such as Israel and Turkey. My answer to that is simple. The double standards debate does not depend on matching crime for crime, equating one crime with another, but is an insistence on upholding international and humanitarian law. I would not advocate, for example, the invasion of Israel, the parking of a US aircraft carrier off Tel Aviv with demands that Israel withdraw from the Golan Heights, or that the total sanctions embargo that has been imposed on Iraq be transferred to Israel. However, here is a country which is violating international law, as is Turkey, and there should at least be some token censure, some sort of real

attempt to bring them into line. And this is what Arabs see not happening. This is what they are painfully aware of. Many Arabs see the sanctions issue in terms of ensuring Israel's security as much as the Gulf's.

Another common Arab feeling is a great sense of betrayal. Speaking to Arabs, you will find this a common thread in their conversation. People still refer to the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement. And more recently, many Arabs remember that the US, having urged Iraqis to rebel against Saddam in 1991, clearly betrayed them in a very deliberate fashion. The Iraqis were allowed to use helicopters after their specific request to do so was granted, effectively giving them the means to crush the rebellions. Palestinians, for example, greatly identify with this sense of betrayal.

Another theme is humiliation and shame. This goes back slightly to what I said about a collective sense of *umma* – the collective community. And, for some time, the Arab world in general has suffered from this sense of humiliation and insecurity – notably as a result of Israel's success and its crushing defeat of the Arabs in 1967, but also because of the intrusion of external powers into the area without any form of censure, for example for the bombing of Sudan last year.[2] Also, the dependency and reliance of many states in the region on external patronage causes shame – formerly it may have been dependence on the United States and the Soviet Union, now predominantly in the uni-polar world just on the United States. So the total and continued destruction of Iraq that we have heard so much about during this conference feeds into those feelings of humiliation and anger. Iraq, to most Arabs, was the great hope. It is the only country with hydrocarbon wealth, with water and with the human resources to become a true regional power. It would be the one that could challenge Israel, the one that could stand up and perhaps defy the West. This is how it was viewed. So many Arabs see that the

consequent destruction of Iraq was actually part of a plan to ensure Israel's security as much as that of, say, the Gulf's or the oil question.

Furthermore, the treatment of Iraq feeds an Arab feeling and a Muslim feeling that if Iraq were not an Arab or a Muslim country, then the colossal loss of human life would not have been tolerated. Another example I could give is the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania last year.[3] Two hundred and forty-one Kenyans died, and ten Americans died. There were some rather callous comments by the US Secretary of State regarding the 241 Kenyan victims, who were largely ignored. This, yet again, feeds very much into these feelings. Blair referred to 'putting Saddam in his cage'. This resonated in the Arab world – the idea of an Arab being identified with an animal here, yet again the assumption that they can be treated like this. So I would suggest that these feelings of humiliation, shame, anger, and betrayal provide fertile ground for more extremist tendencies. Given that the overwhelming population of the Arab world is very young, it could have very serious ramifications for the future.

I am going to touch very briefly – as it has already been mentioned – on the attitudes of the Iraqi people. They will never forget what has happened. They remember the excellent British–Iraqi relations at all levels. Can we really expect a return to anything like that? I rather doubt it. I was told once about one Iraqi doctor living in London, who continually reminds his children that, although they are in Britain, and even though he likes Britain, they must never forget what the British have done to their country. There are going to be long-term consequences in terms of perceptions of ourselves and what we have done.

I would also suggest that it will be very difficult to have an alternate government in Iraq in a post-Saddam era that can be in any way legitimate, representative, democratic, and at

the same time have anything close to really warm relations with either the British or the Americans. I cannot envisage a truly democratic government actually wanting to have the sort of relations that we used to have with them fifteen or twenty years ago.

And then also there is something that perhaps has not been touched upon enough and in enough detail. What would be the Iraqi attitude to other Arabs? When sanctions were lifted against Libya, Qadhafi very much turned towards Africa. And it was very much in protest at what he and other Libyans felt, that the Arab nation as a whole, as a collective, had actually let them down, betrayed them. They had not broken sanctions, they had not backed up the Libyans. This was a widespread feeling. Libya had an alternate destination to look at. So what will Iraq do? Can Iraq be re-integrated into the Arab world, given that there are also feelings that perhaps the Arab world has let them down as well? It does not have the alternative that Libya does, of another backyard to look at. So I would suggest that Iraq will have difficulties reintegrating into the Arab world and it will be a very uneasy relationship for a very long time. I would also suggest, in passing, that the Libyan strategy turning to Africa, by the way, is also partially because it knows that if it were to get too involved in the Arab world, its policies would probably incur the wrath of Capitol Hill. And likewise, Iraq might also (if it cannot accept, for example, American policies *vis-à-vis* the Middle East Peace Process) want to veer away from the Arab world, where it must run headlong into American policy.

There is also the question of 'Can the regime be overthrown? Will the Iraqi people rise up against Saddam?' I think this is an important point that must never be forgotten. It is not Saddam that has to be overthrown. It is a regime that has to be overthrown. It is a regime that has an intense, very massive structure; a lot of people are co-opted

into it; a vast number are very dependent on it. It functions very much as a patronage system. To overthrow it will not be easy. Assassinating Saddam will not solve the problem. There are a lot of other people – as Denis Halliday has said – beneath Saddam Hussein who are equally as nasty and vicious, evil, whatever you would like to call it, who could take over, not least of whom are his sons.

It would be wrong if I did not mention Israeli attitudes here because they are an important factor. There is obviously public concern over what Saddam Hussein, and indeed any successor regime in Iraq, might do. Israelis will, of course, remember SCUDs falling on Israel, although they proved largely ineffective militarily. But they did provoke fear. As one leading commentator put it in an Israeli newspaper: when Prime Minister Netanyahu and the defence minister Yitzhak Mordechai during last year's attacks were trying to calm public concern, they said there was nothing to worry about; but the first way to create panic is to tell the public there's nothing to worry about. And indeed they were worried.

One intriguing question will be, if a serious offer of peace with Israel is put on the table by the Iraqi government in a public forum, what would their response be? My belief is that Israel, having been a major player in pushing the containment policy against Iraq, will probably turn it down. There is no unity of view within Israel. There was one leading Israeli general who actually did say a few years ago that Saddam was the best friend that Israel has. Without Saddam Hussein, the full potential of Iraq could be unleashed.

The military action last year reinforced Arab public opinion. There was very widespread disgust with Operation Desert Fox. And indeed at a state level, this was replicated. The Arab League opposed the attacks and there were demonstrations in various Arab capitals, notably Cairo – even President Mubarak stated on TV, that 'there is not a single Arab coun-

try which backs a recourse to force against Iraq – and all are preoccupied by the lot of the Iraqi people.' I believe that this was part of a response by the governments to public feeling on the issue.

As a result of this Anglo–American hostility against Iraq, there has also been a consequent reduction in animosity directed towards the person of Saddam Hussein. He has become, to some extent, a symbol of defiance of the West. But that should not be confused with any sort of feelings of liking for him as an actual individual. It is Saddam as a symbol of defiance. This has resonated particularly with Palestinians who were hoping that the bombings in 1991 would produce some change, that Saddam Hussein would be able to stand up to Israel. But it is the symbol of Saddam Hussein, I should stress, that is admired.

There is also an increasing lack of trust in the Americans and British, particularly after the revelations about spying within UNSCOM. The image of the uncaring West is being reinforced, as implied earlier.

There is also the issue of the American military presence. It is now being perceived as permanent. What was in 1991 seen as a temporary basing of American troops on Arab soil in Saudi Arabia in particular, is now seen as long-term. The American Defence Secretary, William Cohen, in his recent tours of the Gulf, restated that there were no plans to move American troops out and indeed, they are actually going to be expanding and reinforcing bases in Kuwait. So this is feeding this air of permanence. Osama Bin Laden has used this to garner support against the infidels in the holy land of the Arabian Peninsula. Prince Sultan does not refer to them as American and British soldiers but UN soldiers. Also recently, during Cohen's tour of the Gulf, most Arab commentators noted the links between the recent rise in oil and increased US pressure to purchase more arms. So there is this percep-

tion that the Arab states, if they do not directly pay immediately for what is going on against Iraq, will eventually pay through arms purchases. And there was quite a lot more vocal feeling and a lot of press articles against this in various newspapers in the Arab world.

I am now going to make some comments about the Arab states' attitudes. First of all, in 1990, the entirety of the Arab state system was totally divided. It certainly weakened the Arab world and was disastrous for it. States that had previously been rich were now finding themselves in a state of debt. It was an unheard-of situation for many of them. But since then, their policies have veered further away from the US–UK policy on Iraq; and increasingly they are taking into account public feelings against sanctions. And this is just one of the considerations that they take into account. I would also like to raise a couple of others.

They do take into account the threat of Saddam Hussein. The adjacent states in particular are conscious of the threat that Saddam can pose. They do not trust him, they do not like him. This threat could come in several forms, not just territorial aggression. The aggressive attacks on individual Arab leaders emanating from Iraq have reinforced this view. There are some perceptions within the Gulf that he could stir up trouble amongst, say, Shi'a communities. So there is unease about what he might do, especially if he still remains in 'his cage'. The oil-producing states, of course, are conscious of the release of more Iraqi oil into the oil-market and the consequences that might have. But also, they are increasingly conscious of the loss of Iraq as a regional player. This has created a dangerous power vacuum in the area. Stability is always the word in the Gulf. You notice the way that stability and security are always mentioned in the context of the Gulf. And they realise the need to have Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran. So a reintegrated Iraq could restore this balance

of power in the region. Indeed you could say that the Gulf is an area where success in not appreciated, in terms of states. They do not like states going too far ahead. They do not like them to succeed much more than anybody else. So they like a certain degree of equality of power in the area.

As far as Kuwait is concerned – we must mention that – it is clear that Kuwait, quite naturally, will never overcome its natural fear of its northern neighbour. Iraq continues to make slightly contradictory statements about Kuwait and its territorial integrity and even in future years this is likely to be raised again. So they are going to remember that. That said, there have been various associations within Kuwait who have actually opposed sanctions.[4]

Iran also has a very interesting position. It is neutral on the issue of Iraq and has moved very tentatively towards the Iraqi government in recent times. But I suspect that, because of traditional enmity and after that horrendous war,[5] this will be very careful and a very tentative move.

Likewise, in terms of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states, internal differences mean that there remains no unified position coming out of the GCC. Essentially, if there is one, it wants to decouple the issue of sanctions from Iraq's reintegration into the Arab world. By that I mean that you can lift sanctions but do not expect Iraq necessarily to be welcomed back into the fold unconditionally without other things being sorted out first. And it does tend to be true (this is a generalisation perhaps) that the further you get away from Iraq in the area, the more anti-sanctions they tend to be. You can understand that it is easier for Morocco to have an anti-sanctions policy. Moroccans do not have to live in the immediate area. And the further south you go down, even in the Gulf, you will probably find more concern raised publicly about sanctions. Sheikh Zayed made a very well-reported almost *cri de cœur* about Iraq and how they could have al-

lowed it to happen to a brother Arab nation.

Turkey like Iran does not want to see a power vacuum. Hence its frequent incursions into northern Iraq. The Turks also have a clear economic interest, claiming to have lost $30 billion in earnings over the last decade.

Very briefly, Egypt and Syria, obviously key states, have made tentative moves towards yet again warming relations with Iraq. And there have been significant statements, at least in public. Amr Mousa, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, has said that sanctions should be lifted, on the basis that they would support anything that would benefit the people of Iraq. Syria likewise has also slightly warmed to Iraq, but I think it is more of a case of keeping all its policy options open. Syria does not like to close off its options and as Syrian–Iraqi relations historically have never been particularly warm, I suspect that traditional suspicions will prevail.

There is perhaps an unspoken wish: that the United States will go ahead, remove the Iraqi regime, eliminate the problem neatly and cleanly and then get out and let the region resolve its problems. However, no Arab leader will come out with this, and will immediately distance himself if it goes wrong. The preferred option is that Saddam and his regime to be overthrown from within.

Generally, as I said, Arab states are going to be moving towards more vocal, more public opposition of the United States. Be reminded of course that there are often different private and public positions. I should mention that Iraq for the first time since 1990 chaired an Arab Council meeting in September.

Arab states have several options before them. I would suggest there are three: the reintegration of Iraq, maintaining the status quo, or the overthrow of the actual regime.

Arab states obviously do not control those three possibilities. But there is a lot of debate about which ones they prefer.

And I think increasingly there is a belief that they will have to accept Iraq's re-entrance into the international system with Saddam Hussein in power. The longer sanctions go on, the more entrenched in their attitudes and the more vociferous in their condemnation Arabs will become. For Arabs, the continuation of the sanctions will undermine UK–US reputations, and indeed that of the UN Security Council.

Nine years on, the sanctions policy has failed. It is a policy that has caused utter devastation in Iraq. And this is something that, I believe, the Arab world will not overlook for much longer. Thank you.

[1] Notably the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. This Act had provisions to penalise any company investing more than $40 million in the oil industries of either Iran or Libya.

[2] The United States launched a cruise missile attack which destroyed the Al Shifa factory in Khartoun on 20 August 1998.

[3] US Embassies were bombed on 7 August 1998.

[4] For example, the Kuwaiti Medical Association

[5] The Iran-Iraq War 1980-88

SESSION 10: THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

'Address to the Security Council.'

JON DAVIES

Jon Davies works at the Middle East desk at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which he joined on leaving university in 1990. He spent a year working on Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda before undertaking two years of full-time Arabic language training in London and Cairo. He worked for the British Embassy in Kuwait from 1991–1993, then returned to work in the Cabinet Office as an analyst on Gulf issues. He is now head of the Iraq section in the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office.

Jon Davies addressed the conference about 'The British Government's policy towards Iraq and the current proposals to the United Nations Security Council' on condition of speaking off-the-record. He has kindly supplied the following document, a statement by UK representative to the United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstock, responding to the adoption of SCR 1284. The text of that resolution is appended at the end of these Proceedings.

"The UK has, since the adoption of the SCRs which followed the end of the Gulf War in 1991, regarded it as one of the most important responsibilities of the international community, and in particular the Security Council, to hold Iraq to its obligations under those SCRs; and thereby contain the threats posed to the peace and security of the region, especially that from weapons of mass destruction. For the Security Council to discharge its obligations with regard to international peace and security, we must ensure that its decisions are not persistently challenged or eroded by defiance.

Our work on Iraq throughout this year has been dedicated to finding a new approach to the international community's

dealings with Iraq, firmly set in the framework of a collective responsibility exercised within the UN. The Amorim panels gave us an excellent start. It is in that spirit that the UK led the negotiations preceding this resolution, and why we have worked tirelessly to find an outcome which, while meeting our own national concerns, was the basis for adoption by the Council.

We now have that new way forward. We have a resolution which:

- preserves the original standards for international disarmament;
- establishes a new monitoring and inspection arrangement for Iraq, in the shape of UNMOVIC, which we wish well;
- improves the Oil-for-Food programme, making more money available – primarily by removing the ceiling on Iraqi oil sales – and setting out ways to make sure it can be spent as efficiently, quickly and appropriately as possible, to the benefit of the Iraqi people. We will work to ensure the 661 Committee works in that spirit;
- draws perhaps belated attention to just how dire Iraq's response has been to its obligations on missing Kuwaiti citizens and property;
- and, most significantly of all, sets out a series of clear, logical steps, using the new concept of suspension, to help move matters forward on sanctions and allow the Iraqi people once again to live a more normal existence.

The Council has approved this concept, as a way of maintaining the integrity of the previous resolutions while marking out the way forward. The UK strongly endorses it, and sees it as a valuable step toward the full lifting of sanctions, which we have always said should immediately follow Iraq's fulfillment of its obligations under SCRs.

The criteria for suspension are clear, and rooted in Iraq's

obligations under existing SCRs. They give the international community the necessary reassurance that suspension can only occur if Iraq finally changes it attitude and begins to act according to the rules of international law. If we have had to establish a process for that purpose which involves calling for the responsible judgement of the Council at steps along the way, that too is sensible: this can only help the emergence of trust in Iraq and stronger agreement within the Council on how to deal with it.

Some argued that the resolution should be designed to Iraq's specification. That would have meant abandoning the previous resolutions, and was clearly not a credible approach. A more serious point is whether Iraq will cooperate in its implementation. Iraq's track record and its recent rhetoric are hardly encouraging. That makes it all the more important that we the Council do everything we can to turn this resolution into a reality, starting now. That means action across the board: on weapons of mass destruction, we need to select someone able and experienced as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC; on the humanitarian side, the 661 Committee has urgent work to do to make the humanitarian programme bigger and better; and we look forward to the early appointment of a coordinator on the Kuwait-related issues.

If Iraq chooses to turn down the opportunity of this resolution, then it is the real loser. The international community has set out the way ahead. This new resolution shows clearly how the members of the Council want to deal with Iraq, starting from a common platform of action which is both rigorous and fair.

We of course regret that some members of the Council felt unable to join the majority and vote in support of the resolution, despite their participation in eight months of painstaking negotiations and eleventh hour efforts to find further ways to achieve consensus. The resolution we have just adopted, as

the majority have recognised, was an extraordinary achievement, and fully in the interests of Iraq and of the Security Council. To argue for further delay is to argue for more time without even the prospect of monitors returning to Iraq and more time waiting to put into effect the improvements to Oil- for-Food which everyone wants to see.

I would close by urging you all, and above all those who abstained, to play your part in making this resolution work. If we can, it will be to the advantage of the people of Iraq and the region, in the interests of the future authority of the United Nations, and to the great credit of this Council."

SESSION 10: THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

'Iraq/Adoption of the Security Council Resolution: Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'

ANIS NACROUR

Anis Nacrour is in charge of Middle Eastern, Central Asian and African affairs at the Diplomatic Chancellery at the French Embassy in London. Previously, he has been first secretary at the French Embassy in Doha, Qatar, advisor to the French Embassy in Bahrain, and a member of the French Delegation to the General Assembly to the United Nations, as well as Assistant-General Consul in Chicago. In 1996, he was seconded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He holds a doctorate from the political science faculty of the University of the Sorbonne.

Dr. Nacrour's remarks to the conference on 'the French proposals to the UN Security Council' were off-the-record. Instead of his speech, we supply here two statements: the first by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explaining France's abstention from the vote which approved SCR 1284; the second (in French, with a translation provided) a response by Mr Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a question posed in the French National Assembly.

New York, 17 December 1999

"1. The Security Council has just adopted a resolution following a year of negotiations instituted after the weapons inspectors left Iraq and the events of December 1998. During this period, France has spared no diplomatic effort to rebuild Security Council unity in support of a realistic solution to the Iraqi crisis. Since January, we have proposed both the

reinstatement of a renewed inspection system in Iraq and the principle of easing sanctions.

2. We are pursuing two objectives. The first is to ensure regional security. To this end,inspectors must return to Iraq to monitor weapons. This cannot be achieved by force – Iraq's co-operation is necessary. The second objective is to resolve the disastrous humanitarian situation in Iraq by proposing a lifting of civil sanctions. These strike unjustly and harshly at the Iraqi people. These two objectives are partially connected: it is futile to expect Iraq's co-operation without a credible prospect regarding the future of sanctions.

3. With regard to these objectives, the resolution includes three positive elements. First, the creation of a renewed arms control commission. It will be professional and independent, and will operate on a more collegial basis to avoid having a single person make the most important decisions. Second, the prospect of a suspension of sanctions, the first step toward their lifting, offers a new incentive for the Iraqi authorities. And finally, humanitarian measures will begin providing relief to the people of that country.

4. In order to convince Iraq to accept the return of the inspectors, we had proposed a temporary suspension of sanctions after a brief probationary period. That idea, which was accepted by everyone, now constitutes the core of the resolution.

We wanted, however, a simple, objective and credible criterion for deciding on the suspension of sanctions. That criterion is the observation of progress in Iraq's co-operation with the new arms control commission. That notion was indeed included, but the wording remains ambiguous in the text that was voted upon. We would have liked to see a greater effort to eliminate that ambiguity in the writing of the text, Indeed, it does not give the Security Council's approach the full force of an incentive, which was desirable. In particular, the text of

the resolution lends itself to biased interpretations that, by moving away from the notion of progress, would in fact have as their objective an indefinite delay of any decision on sanctions. Such an attitude can only lead to new crises.

That is why we are abstaining,

5. Since January we have asserted that the Security Council must turn toward the future. This is more necessary than ever before. We will be very vigilant with regard to the implementation of the resolution in accordance with its spirit and its objectives. The Council must now approve the appointment of the new president and the organisation of the arms control committee, and define the humanitarian measures. This could be an opportunity to rid the text of the resolution of its final ambiguities and to regain the Council's unanimity, for the full exercise of its authority.

If, as we hope, the Security Council demonstrates a will to work in a spirit of consensus to clearly and realistically apply the guidelines set forth in this resolution, France will contribute to it without reservation or limits.

Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une quéstion d'actualité à l'Assemblée Nationale.

Paris, 7 décembre 1999

Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Député, la position de la France reste extrêmement claire dans ce travail au sein du Conseil de sécurité pour élaborer une nouvelle résolution.

La situation actuelle concernant l'Iraq est extrêmement mauvaise, à la fois parce que la population continue à souffrir des ravages provoqués par l'embargo, dont j'ai dit à plusieurs reprises que c'était un procedé primitif et inutilement cruel, et d'autre part par l'absence de contrôle en matière de sécurité régionale quant aux éventuels programmes de réarmement du régime iraquien. C'est donc mauvais sur les deux plans.

C'est pour cela que depuis un an nous avons fait des propositions qui ont développé en tout cas la discussion au sein du Conseil de sécurité. Nous avons accepté de travailler sur la base d'un projet de résolution britannique, parce que celui-ci inclut une grande partie de nos propositions. Ce débat se poursuit avec les Américains, les Britanniques, les Russes, les Chinois, ainsi qu'avec les membres non permanents. L'objectif reste le même: rétablir un systeme de contrôle qui garantirait la sécurité régionale, ce qui nous permettrait de suspendre l'embargo dans des conditions sur lesquelles nous sommes encore, à l'heure où je vous parle, en train de discuter, puisque c'est cette semaine que nous allons savoir finalement si nous arriverons à un texte que nous pourrions accepter ou non.

Answer by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hubert Védrine, to a question in the National Assembly.

Paris, 7 December 1999

Mr President, Mr Deputy, the position of France remains perfectly clear in this endeavour at the heart of the Security Council to develop a new resolution.

The current situation facing Iraq is extremely bad, on the one hand because the population continues to suffer the ravages incurred by the embargo, which I've called on numerous occasions a primitive and uselessly cruel process, and on the other hand by the lack of control over regional security matters according to which the Iraqi regime will eventually structure its rearmament program. It is thus inadequate on two levels.

It is for this reason that we've been offering propositions since last year that have, in any case, advanced the discussion at the heart of the Security Council. We have agreed to work on the foundation of a project based on a British resolution because it includes a large part of our own propositions. The debate has been pursued with the Americans, the British, the Russians, the Chinese, as well as with non-permanent members. The objective remains the same: to re-establish a control system that guarantees regional security, which would allow us to suspend the embargo under conditions which, even as I speak, we have just been discussing. Therefore, this week we will finally know if we have reached a text that we could accept or not."

SESSION 10: THE BRITISH & FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

'Between Iraq and a Hard Place: A Critique of the British Government's Narrative on UN Economic Sanctions.'

ERIC HERRING

Eric Herring, MA, MSc(Econ), PhD is a Lecturer in International Politics at the Department of Politics, University of Bristol. He was formerly Visiting Scholar at George Washington University, Washington DC, and Social Science Research Council MacArthur Fellow in International Peace and Security at Columbia University, New York. In September 1996, he was election monitor in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the International Crisis Group. Dr Herring's publications include the following books: (co-author Ken Booth) *Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies* (Mansell, 1994); (author) *Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes* (Manchester University Press, 1995); (co-editors Geoffrey Pridham and George Sanford) *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (Leicester University Press, 1994, revised edition 1997); (co-author Barry Buzan) *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); and (editor) *Preventing the Use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Frank Cass, forthcoming March 2000).

Dr Herring's talk followed talks given by Jon Davies and Anis Nacrour, and he quoted them several times in his talk. As they were speaking on condition that it was off-the-record, these references could not be recorded here.

Dr. Herring outlined and evaluated the British Government's narrative on the sanctions, namely, that Iraqi suffering is due not to sanctions, but to Iraqi obstruction, and that the UK is doing all possible to minimise the suffering. This narrative, he argued, can only be maintained by omitting facts and misrepre-

senting UN documents. Iraq has only partially complied with Security Council resolutions, but it is important to note that the US has violated UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687 by asserting that sanctions will persist so long as Saddam Hussein is in power. The UN Boundary Commission also violated this resolution by redrawing the border in favour of Kuwait, where only recognition of the border was required.

Dr Herring also discussed the Anglo–Dutch proposed UN SCR. He acknowledge that there were some positive proposals (e.g. reduction of the time taken to approve contracts), but wondered why, if these measures were possible now, they had not been implemented before. He also criticised its insistence on 180 days of compliance before the suspension of sanctions, arguing that 'compliance' would be subject to interpretation and political considerations [Ed. note: SCR 1284 decided on 120, not 180, days of compliance]. Although the process had edged forward as a result of the government's increasing embarrassment, there was still the danger that this might be merely a PR job to civilise the sanctions just enough to make them permanent.

Dr Herring concluded by raising questions about the claims made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). He argued that the FCO didn't acknowledge the scale of suffering in Iraq, but exaggerated the threat posed by non-nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The aims of the sanctions policy were confused, sometimes about WMD, sometimes about Saddam Hussein, sometimes about just saving face. He argued that an embittered Iraq under a future ruler would be even more likely to want WMD, and a better preventative measure might be to stop supplying WMD technologies to such regimes. Certain means are beyond acceptability, whatever the end. Lastly he emphasised the importance of continuing to engage in dialogue with the FCO.

"I'd like to thank the organisers of the conference for inviting me. It's been a magnificent occasion. I feel privileged to be part of it. It's better than nineteen out of twenty aca-

demic conferences I go to, so thank you very much indeed. (I'm going to try and do something about academic conferences after this.) Secondly, I'd like to thank Jon and Anis, I have to say especially Jon. He's 'Daniel in the lions' den'—he's not Daniel but he's in a lions' den and so I'm glad he spoke up. And I think it's very important that we do communicate to each other directly and remain human beings when we're doing so.

Before I get into my specific response, I have written a paper and if people want a copy they're welcome to one, but I'm not just going to summarise my paper. What I have done over the last two days is to listen to all the tremendous contributions and taken notes and tried effectively to construct a response to what we talked about before, and to what Jon in particular was going to say; to channel some of the comments of the last couple of days. I hope I succeed in that—I'm not trying to speak for you all. I am trying to distill some of the arguments.

My current research is on investigating the process by which goods get put on hold or blocked. I'm trying to contact as many people as I can. What is striking is how the people running the system don't actually know what's going on with it. It's absolutely striking—I will come back to that and substantiate it.

I use the word 'narrative' because we tell ourselves stories about how the world is. The world doesn't come to us unperceived. We have to grope into the dark and construct a reality. Now I want to talk about the UK government's narratives. The first is that the Iraqi suffering has nothing or little to do with sanctions. The second is that nearly or all of the suffering is due to Iraqi obstruction. And the third is that the United Kingdom is doing everything to minimise the suffering.

Now, my argument is that that narrative can only be sus-

tained by leaving out many of the facts and by misrepresenting the UN documents on which they're supposedly based. My paper's called 'Between Iraq and a Hard Place'. As many people have said, the Iraqi people are suffering because of the actions of that government and people like Sandy Berger. They're being torn apart between these two horrendous forces.

As far as who is violating Security Council resolutions: at one level, Iraq has failed to comply in many significant ways. It has partially complied, we all agree on that. What I would also point out is the United States has constantly violated UN Security Council resolution 687 by saying the sanctions are here to stay (Madeleine Albright) even if Iraq complies with the Weapons of Mass Destruction requirement. They want to get rid of Saddam Hussein. That is a violation of 687. The second violation—there was a mention about the boundary commission. Well let's go back to George Joffé. What happened was that the UN boundary commission re-drew the border in favour of Kuwait and George Joffé quite rightly said, that's storing up trouble for the future. That's a violation of 687, which required recognition—not moving the border but recognising the border where it was. And also, incidentally, that body was chaired by one of those paragons of international virtue, an Indonesian. Let's bear that in mind.

Moving on to the particular proposal, it was initially a UK–Dutch proposal to the UN. I went through it and Jon was kind enough to help me go through the details of it. The first thing to notice is that it is proposing big changes in the humanitarian system regardless of what Iraq does on weapons of mass destruction: specifically that there is to be a target of two days to approve humanitarian supplies. What I want to know is, if it's possible to do them in two days now, then what has been happening for the last four years, five years whereby it takes up to 66 days? So they didn't need sixty days. You can't have it both ways. Either you can do it in two

days or you can't.

The second thing here is that there's to be an approved list of supplies and so on that the Secretary General can simply approve—if it's medical, if it's educational and so on. These things can all just go through and there's no need to muck about with it. If that's true now, it was true all those years ago as well. We shouldn't have had to deal with it. You can't have it both ways. Either you really had to scrutinise these for months to make sure they were all OK, or you don't. Now I know that there's going to be a new committee set up that's going to have a list of dual-use items and I went through with Jon one particular case: the heart and lung machines that have been denied because the computers that run them have Pentium chips, because they can be used for military purposes. Now the idea is that this committee will have a list of things that says, even if the computers have Pentium chips, then they can still go through if they're linked to medical equipment and so on. That would be an improvement. But what we're realising is that even with this possible improvement, all is in the politics here. It all depends on how this committee operates, if it really manages to wrench it from the grasp of the Americans and improve it. So I'm hopeful that that could be an improvement.

The next element of the current proposal is that there should be 180 days of compliance with specific goals and then there'll be a suspension of the sanctions. Again, it all depends because we've already had all these years of it where they say, 'Well if you give us this information, then you're complying.' How long is a piece of string? How much is actual compliance? Again, if it gets taken out of the hands of the Americans, then things will get defined as compliance (and we could have been there years ago). But it all depends on how this is carried out.

So what's going on with this resolution? The Iraqis are

saying 'Look, it's just old wine, new bottles.' I don't know. It may be. One hopeful sign is that the process has been shifted along slightly, by all the pressure, all the wonderful efforts of people like yourselves to make this more and more embarrassing and humiliating so that the British government is uncomfortable with the existing situation. So, good, you're doing the right thing. It's working. Keep it up.

The Iraqis have already rejected the Anglo–Dutch proposal. That's something to bear in mind. And what we've got to be careful about is that this doesn't just become hijacked in a completely different direction. Who are you trying to isolate? If we're trying to isolate the Americans and make progress, great. If this is just another PR job to get the Security Council united, then it becomes the world body against Iraq. I have no problem about standing up to Iraq but I have a problem about the thing being hijacked by the United States along the way. So we've got to be very careful.

Looking at the contents of it, some of it does worry me. I'll give you an example: it demands Iraqi co-operation on mine-clearance. Those nasty Iraqis—too right. It doesn't say, 'and we demand co-operation on Depleted Uranium clearance.' Absolutely nothing there. I hope that will be introduced into the resolution, but don't hold your breath. It also demands that Iraq prevent delays at the warehouses. But those delays at the warehouses, as the UN documentation shows, are not coming from Iraq, they're coming from the Sanctions Committee which is preventing the transport, the refrigerated trucks, the computers and so on. So if you're going to demand the delays stopped, look to who's actually causing them.

So that's my concern with the resolution: that it can go either way; that it can be just a way of keeping the whole thing going—and this is the next big problem. We're not talking about ending sanctions. We're talking about suspen-

sions. It may be that all this is going to do is civilise the sanctions just enough to keep them permanent. That's my worry.

Which brings me to my last section. I thought the best way to conclude was with a series of questions. I've tried to give myself what I would call the hardest questions for someone like myself who is an opponent of these sanctions. Here's the series of questions.

First of all, does the Foreign Office understand the scale of the suffering being inflicted by the sanctions? The Foreign Office says yes, and insists that it's not that high. My response is yes and no. On the one hand, we know quite a lot of the horror. But I'm astonished at how much of the horror I didn't know about. I just want to remind us of some of the contributions to this conference: Depleted Uranium, the Iraqi exodus, a society in prison without hope, prostitution, the tearing apart of families. I just didn't realise just how bad all these things were that frankly the new resolution is not going to stop. If you look at the undermining of the humanitarian programmes, I suspect that the British society doesn't realise this. We're talking about democratic control of policy. I would like the British public to be educated on this issue and see what they would choose—I bet they wouldn't choose these sanctions.

The next question is: does the Foreign Office understand the scale of the threat of Saddam Hussein with Weapons of Mass Destruction? The Foreign Office say: yes and it's incredibly high. They say that the reality of the threat is not in doubt and it has been contained. Well, whenever someone tells you something is not in doubt, it's doubtful, believe me. Here's a first thing: nuclear weapons are a big threat. Chemical and biological weapons actually aren't nearly so effective at killing large numbers of people, I'm bound to say. And Halabja actually proves that, rather than goes against it. But

the problem is not that the threat has ever existed and is now contained. The problem is that the threat has been hyped to a ludicrous degree, where the Foreign Office says things like, 'Iraq could produce enough chemical weapons to kill the world's population three times over.' Only if everyone stood still while they individually administered a drop. I'm running, I don't know about you! They don't have the delivery capability, thank God for that. The problem is, the threat has been hyped in order to it in make the threat look big in comparison with the deaths through sanctions.

Moving on: are the sanctions actually aimed at preventing Saddam Hussein from getting Weapons of Mass Destruction? To the Foreign Office it's obvious that that's what the sanctions are about. However, sometimes it's about getting rid of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Sometimes it's about overthrowing Saddam, sometimes it's merely about slowing down the acquisition of weapons he's probably going to get one of these days anyway, and sometimes it's about saving face for the UN along the following lines: 'He's survived, he's got secret programmes, he's miles behind on nuclear weapons but he's got some chemical and biological capabilities. We don't want to admit it and we don't want to just drop the sanctions and say we've failed although of course we got rid of a lot of Iraqi capabilities along the way.' I am worried that the policy is little more than keeping the sanctions in place until it's the next government's problem.

Next question: do the sanctions make it less likely that Iraq will get and use Weapons of Mass Destruction? The Foreign Office says yes and we need to keep the pressure up. There's something in that for me. But it's also entirely plausible that sanctions, as they have been conducted, will make it more likely that in the long run an utterly embittered and vengeful and West-hating Iraqi society, probably not under Saddam Hussein actually but with someone more vengeful

and more hateful, will be absolutely determined to get those WMD and, if necessary in a conflict, use them. If I were someone in the Iraqi elite, I would do my damnedest to get those WMD because of their value in deterring the West in future, at the very minimum. And what George Joffé said, I think, is very true: we're creating a huge reservoir of hostility, hatred, and resentment, and a lot of it, I have to say, is justified. What I need to hear is not merely this kind of lame resolution but also about what is going to be done to rebuild our relations with an entire society: the people in this room are doing more on that front than the entire British government is. I think that's going to be incredibly important for the future. Next thing on WMD: wouldn't it be nice if we just didn't sell the technology in the first place? The British government says, 'Oh we're worried about this technology.' People like us were campaigning for years saying this man is a monster—the Foreign Office only discovered it recently.

Which leads to my last two points. First of all, are the sanctions an acceptable way of trying to stop Saddam Hussein doing anything, whether it be getting weapons of mass destruction or anything else? The Foreign Office's answer is yes. My answer is no, because we're inflicting actual mass destruction now against a possible threat of mass destruction in the future. There are certain means that are beyond acceptability. If you know there's a criminal out there you can't take the criminal's family aside and do terrible things to them to make the criminal come forward. And that, I think, is a proper analogy in this case.

This leads to my last point: what's going on with the Foreign Office and the United Kingdom government and what they're saying? I often wonder, 'Do they believe what they say?' I think they probably move around. Sometimes it's just propaganda and they know the truth, but it does worry me that they get caught up in their own reality as they talk to

each other day to day. So I think this kind of forum could do the best thing possible, which is to talk to people who don't have the same world view. And similarly, I seriously do hope, in spite of my robust comments, that Jon and I will continue talking about this afterwards. Regarding the UN authority, it's a pity Jon slid back into the old story. It's the United States, Britain and Iraq that are flouting the authority of the UN while everybody else, and especially ordinary Iraqis, are caught in the middle.

Thank you for listening."

APPENDIX 1:

United Nations Resolution 1284 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting, on 17 December 1999.

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998, 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998, 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999 and 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999,

Recalling the approval by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in pursuance of paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),

Welcoming the reports of the three panels on Iraq (S/1999/356), and having held a comprehensive consideration of them and the recommendations contained in them,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and the need for Iraqi compliance with these resolutions,

Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991),

Concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and de-

termined to improve that situation,

Recalling with concern that the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), have not yet been fully carried out by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property it had seized, and noting with regret that Iraq has still not complied fully with this demand,

Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution,

Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account that operative provisions of this resolution relate to previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter,

A.

1. Decides to establish, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which replaces the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the

Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification;

3. Reaffirms the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and co-operation of UNMOVIC;

4. Reaffirms its resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolutions and statements of its President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard to co-operation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information will apply in respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMOVIC may fully discharge its mandate;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, within 30 days of the

adoption of this resolution, to appoint, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the Council, an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC who will take up his mandated tasks as soon as possible, and, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC which will meet regularly to review the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions and provide professional advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including on significant policy decisions and on written reports to be submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General;

6. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, within 45 days of his appointment, to submit to the Council, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General, for its approval an organisational plan for UNMOVIC, including its structure, staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training procedures, incorporating as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, and recognising in particular the need for an effective, co-operative management structure for the new organisation, for staffing with suitably qualified and experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from international arms control organisations, and for the provision of high quality technical and cultural training;

7. Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing moni-

toring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise;

8. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA, drawing on the expertise of other international organisations as appropriate, to establish a unit which will have the responsibilities of the joint unit constituted by the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996), and also requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in consultation with the Director General of the IAEA, to resume the revision and updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applies;

9. Decides that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of UNMOVIC and the IAEA in relation to their work under this and other related resolutions on Iraq;

10. Requests Member States to give full co-operation to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates;

11. Decides that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets, liabilities and archives of the Special Commission, and that it shall assume the Special Commission's part in agreements existing between the Special Commission and Iraq and between the United Nations and Iraq, and affirms that the Executive Chairman, the Commissioners and the personnel serving with UNMOVIC shall have the rights, privileges, facilities and immunities of the Special Commission;

12. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every three

months on the work of UNMOVIC, pending submission of the first reports referred to in paragraph 33 below, and to report immediately when the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational in Iraq;

B.

13. Reiterates the obligation of Iraq, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals referred to in paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), to extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and calls upon the Government of Iraq to resume co-operation with the Tripartite Commission and Technical Subcommittee established to facilitate work on this issue;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, to report every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq, and to appoint a high-level co-ordinator for these issues;

C.

15. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

16. Underlines, in this context, its intention to take fur-

ther action, including permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

17. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions taken;

18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995), decides that this group will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee for each individual project, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq;

19. Encourages Member States and international organisations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an educational character to

Iraq;

20. Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995);

21. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximise, drawing as necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian organisations, the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the humanitarian programme are utilised as authorised, to bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of this paragraph;

22. Requests also the Secretary-General to minimise the cost of the United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

23. Requests further the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

24. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian

needs which have been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services;

25. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the Secretary-General, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to the nature of the items to be supplied, and requests the Secretary-General to notify the Committee of all applications for humanitarian items which are included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;

26. Decides that Hajj pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and resolution 670 (1990), provided timely notification of each flight is made to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995);

27. Calls upon the Government of Iraq:

(i) to take all steps to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid delays at its warehouses;

(ii) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill among others, and to allow freer access, without any discrimination, including on the basis of religion or nationality, by United Nations agencies and hu-

manitarian organisations to all areas and sections of the population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition;

(iii) to prioritise applications for humanitarian goods under the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

(iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six months in their places of temporary residence;

(v) to extend full co-operation to the United Nations Office for Project Services mine-clearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq and to consider the initiation of the demining efforts in other Governorates;

28. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector, not later than 60 days from the date of the adoption of this resolution and updated thereafter as necessary;

29. Expresses its readiness to authorise additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 28 above, in order to meet the humanitarian purposes set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, including oil industry experts, to report within 100 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on Iraq's existing petroleum production and export capacity and to make recommendations, to be updated as necessary, on alternatives for increasing Iraq's petroleum production and export capac-

ity in a manner consistent with the purposes of relevant resolutions, and on the options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq's oil sector, including investments, subject to appropriate monitoring and controls;

31. Notes that in the event of the Council acting as provided for in paragraph 33 of this resolution to suspend the prohibitions referred to in that paragraph, appropriate arrangements and procedures will need, subject to paragraph 35 below, to be agreed by the Council in good time beforehand, including suspension of provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

32. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraphs 15 to 30 of this resolution within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

D.

33. Expresses its intention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and from the Director General of the IAEA that Iraq has co-operated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfilling the work programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the Council is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Council's resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Council, and subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other than those referred to in

paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or those to which the mechanism established by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;

34. Decides that in reporting to the Council for the purposes of paragraph 33 above, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will include as a basis for his assessment the progress made in completing the tasks referred to in paragraph 7 above;

35. Decides that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA reports that Iraq is not co-operating in all respects with UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited items, the suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council decides to the contrary;

36. Expresses its intention to approve arrangements for effective financial and other operational measures, including on the delivery of and payment for authorised civilian commodities and products to be sold or supplied to Iraq, in order to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items in the event of suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above, to begin the elaboration of such measures not later than the date of the receipt of the initial reports referred to in paragraph 33 above, and to approve such arrangements before the Council decision in accordance with that paragraph;

37. Further expresses its intention to take steps, based on the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 30 above, and consistent with the purpose of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, to enable Iraq to increase its petroleum production and export capacity, upon receipt of the reports relating to the co-operation in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA referred to in paragraph 33 above;

38. Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the

relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that resolution;

39. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and expresses its intention to consider action in accordance with paragraph 33 above no later than 12 months from the date of the adoption of this resolution provided the conditions set out in paragraph 33 above have been satisfied by Iraq.

APPENDIX 2:

Glossary of Terms.

Active Resistance to the Roots of War (ARROW): Peace group which holds an anti-sanctions vigil every Monday evening outside the Foreign Office in London.

Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr: The president in Iraq from July 1968 until his retirement and replacement by Saddam Hussein on 16 July 1979.

Amiyra: Suburb of Baghdad, and the site of a large air-raid shelter hit by two US bombs during the Gulf War, resulting in between 300 and 1000 civilian casualties.

Amorim Panels: The three separate panels established by the United Nations Security Council on 30 January 1999, to provide by 15 April 1999 recommendations for future action. The panels were constituted to review the progress in the disarmament field, the humanitarian situation and with regard to Kuwaiti missing persons. All three panels were chaired by Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim of Brazil. The humanitarian panel recognised the grave nature of the humanitarian situation in Iraq and produced detailed recommendations for the Security Council in their approach to sanctions on Iraq.

Anglo-Dutch Proposal: Proposal for Security Council Resolution being put forward by the British and the Dutch in 1999, in response to the impasse created after the withdrawal of arms inspectors in December 1998. This was discussed at the conference and outlined by Jon Davies. It formed the basis for SCR 1284 of December 1999.

Arab nationalism: A political movement which became widespread towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, striving for the political unity and independence of the Arab world. It reached its height with the merger of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, but has been in decline since the break-up of the UAR in September 1961, and especially since the June 1967 war against Israel. Arab Nationalism's foremost modern articulators have been the Ba'th party and President Gamal Abd al-Nasir of Egypt.

Asylum applications: Applications for residence by an individual claiming to be at risk from persecution in their own country based on their right to asylum by international law.

Ba'th Party: A pan-Arab political party created in September 1940 in Syria by Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, to strive for Arab unity and independence and socialism. "Ba'th" means renaissance or rejuvenation. It has had branches throughout the Arab world, but has achieved greatest success in Syria and Iraq, where rival and competing wings of the Ba'th party form the ruling parties in each country. In Iraq, Ba'thists formed a key element in the republican revolution led by Qasim of July 1958, but after further persecution, led the coup of February 1963. Internal coups within the Ba'th party continued until July 1968 when the current ruling faction came to power. In Syria, the Ba'th party has been in power since March 1963. In the remainder of the Arab world, Ba'thism has been in the decline since 1967.

Babylon: Ancient city now identified with a town in Iraq.

Bacteriological Weapons: Classified as a Weapon of Mass Destruction, these involve the use of viruses to inflict damage.

Baghdad Pact: Agreement formed in February 1955, when Iraq, Turkey and the UK formed a pro-Western military co-operation alliance, in line with the US plan for a "Northern Tier" to the Arab world to contain the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism. Attempts to expand membership to other Arab countries failed due to the rise of the 'Non-Aligned Movement', and was finally terminated with the republican revolution in Iraq in July 1958.

Balfour Declaration: Letter of November 1917 from the British Foreign Secretary to Lord Rothschild, pledging to create a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, in advance of the British conquering of Palestine from December 1917. This was the first official endorsement of the transformation of the overwhelmingly Arab territory of Palestine into what became the State of Israel.

Baseline data: Earlier data with which to compare changes in the state of a population.

Basra: Iraq's major southern city and port.

Fazad Bazoft: A freelance British journalist of Iranian origin employed by the *Observer* newspaper who investigated alleged explosions at an Iraqi military site and was arrested. Tried for espionage, he was later executed in Abu Ghreib prison, although Diane Parish, a nurse working in Iraq who was arrested with him, was later released.

British Indian Army: Britain's army in India during the colonial period. It undertook Britain's campaign in what was to become Iraq during the First World War.

British Mandate: In 1922, the League of Nations (the precursor to the United Nations) awarded the territories of the former Ottoman Empire to European powers to administer. Britain held the mandate over Iraq, Transjordan (modern Jordan) and Palestine, and subsequently divided the boundaries between and within these countries.

Camp David Accords: The peace agreement accepted by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel at Camp David, Maryland after negotiations overseen by US President Jimmy Carter in September 1978. Egypt became the only Arab country to recognise and have full diplomatic relations with Israel. A full peace treaty was signed in March 1979.

Cash component: An amount of money as part of the Oil-for–Food programme. With this Iraq could purchase things either locally or from abroad which it did not directly order through the programme. It has long been felt to be overdue as it could provide for repairs, and other unforeseen infrastructure needs or local costs of implementation, including installation and staff training. As has been pointed out recently, the UN cannot spend money training Iraqi doctors or teachers. The programme in the autonomous zones in the north of the country have always had a cash component.

Central and southern Iraq: Fifteen of Iraq's eighteen Governorates under the control of the Iraqi government.

Chapter VII of UN Charter: The section of the UN Charter that enables the Security Council to authorise measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, including military operations (Article 42). Article 41 from this chapter allows for the establishment of sanctions regimes.

Chemical Weapons Convention: International agreement which aims to eliminate all significant chemical weapons stockpiles which came into force in 1997.

Chemical Weapons: Weapons involving use of gas and other chemicals classified as a Weapon of Mass Destruction.

Child mortality rate: The number of deaths of children under five for every 1,000 live births.

William Cohen: American Defense Secretary since 1997.

Cold War: Global confrontation between a capitalist bloc led by the US and a Communist bloc led by the USSR, lasting from the end of the Second World War until the breakdown of Soviet rule in Central Europe around 1989.

Communist Party of Iraq: One of the key groups behind the July 1958 revolution in Iraq, and it became highly influential in Qasim's government. The party was heavily persecuted by the Ba'thists after the coup of 1963, and have never been allowed to function openly since then, leading to persistent animosity between the Soviet Union and Iraq until the end of the Cold War.

Comprehensive Sanctions: A combination of economic, military and political sanctions adopted by the United Nations member states, rather than unilaterally.

Council for the Lifting of Economic Sanctions of the Iraqi People (CLESIP): UK based Iraqi opposition group which campaigns against sanctions and US/UK bombing.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Agreement forbidding nuclear tests by signatory states, opened for signature in 1996. To come into force, the five major nuclear weapons states must ratify it. Russia ratified in April 2000, but the US Congress has so far refused.

Depleted Uranium (DU): Uranium 238, an extremely dense form of uranium, produced as a bi-product from nuclear power. It is used in ammunitions for the purpose of armour-piercing by the United States armed forces despite serious concerns about its safety.

Desert Fox: see Operation Desert Fox

Doha: the capital of Qatar.

Dual use items: Technology or equipment suitable for military as well as civil usage.

Euphrates: One of Iraq's two principal rivers.

Evaluation component: The resources and time allocation for evaluating the success or failure of an aid project which is structured into the plan of

the project.

Exit Tax: A tax that must be paid when leaving Iraq. In 1999 it stood at 400,000 dinars or US$500.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): The British government agency responsible for foreign affairs.

Gaza Strip: a small coastal strip of territory in historical Palestine, in which over a million Palestinians currently live. It was administered by the Egyptian government from 1948 to 1967, and occupied by Israel in 1967. It is partly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, and it is one of the most crowded regions in the world.

Mohamed Ghani: Iraqi artist featured in the September 1999 issue of the New Internationalist magazine and in John Pilger's March 2000 documentary, 'Paying the Price'.

Golan Heights: A mountainous region of historical Syria occupied by Israel in the 1967 war.

Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC): An formal alliance of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates set up in May 1981 to counter the perceived threats of Iran and the Soviet Union. It strongly supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. Due to ongoing disagreements between the members of the GCC, it is a politically inactive institution, although it has fostered economic links.

Gulf War: The war between the Allied forces led by the US in and Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990.

Halabja: Kurdish town in Northern Iraq. From 16th to 18th March 1988, while under the control of a pro-Iranian Kurdish militia, it was attacked by Iraqi aircraft using a variety of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX, killing some 5000 people and exposing many more to severe long term health difficulties.

Hashemite: relating to the descendants of the historical guardians of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina, who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. In particular, the descendants of Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali of Mecca, who raised the Great Arab Revolt in 1915-1916 against the Ottoman Empire, take this name. Although the Hashemites were expelled from the Arabian peninsula in 1916, members of the family became the monarchies of Syria (in 1920), Iraq (from 1921 to 1958) and Jordan

(from 1921 to the present day).

Hijab: Special clothing worn in public by Muslim women.

Human Rights Watch: With Amnesty International, one of the world's two best known organisations dedicated to the protection of human rights.

Humanitarian Co-ordinator: Head of United Nations' programmes in Iraq stationed in Baghdad. Officially the head of the Office of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator (UNOHCI). To date, both heads of the Humanitarian Co-ordinators of this body, Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, have resigned due to their frustration at the failures of the Oil-for-Food Programme and the humanitarian disaster caused by sanctions.

Humanitarian Panel: see Amorim Panels.

Internally displaced people: Refugees remaining within the borders of their country.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): This body was created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 to oversee inspections of all declared nuclear installations. It is responsible for discovering, destroying and monitoring Iraq's military nuclear capability under SCR 687 and subsequent resolutions.

International Study Team (IST): a team of 87 researchers in agriculture, electrical engineering, environmental science, medicine, economics, child psychology, sociology and public health. Their August 1991 visit to Iraq's thirty largest cities in all 18 Governorates and rural areas throughout the country provided one of the first independent assessments of post-war Iraq. Sponsored by UNICEF, the US MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck Foundation and Oxfam-UK. Their study is cited as a source by later UN documents.

Invasion of Kuwait: Undertaken by Iraqi forces on 2 August 1990; this led to the Gulf War.

Iran-Iraq War: This commenced with Iraq's full-scale invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. Initial Iraqi advances were reversed by strong Iranian counterattacks from 1982, reaching their culmination when Iran occupied Iraq up to the Tigris river in 1985. Both sides attacked each others' oil facilities, and from 1985, each others' capital cities. Iraq extensively used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and civilians, as well as against

the Kurdish population of Iraq, many of whom fought in support of Iran. Iraq pressed for a cease-fire from July 1985, but Iran only accepted it in July 1988 after the US joined the war against Iran. Up to two million people were killed in this war.

Iraqi Corner for Democracy: A UK-based Iraqi opposition group.

Islamic Revolution in Iran: The overthrow of the Shah, from the Pahlavi dynasty, in January 1979 in a mass movement led by the Shi'a clergy. The proposal for an Islamic Republic was accepted by referendum in April 1979, and a new constitution was promulgated which gave ultimate political power to the Muslim clergy.

Israel: The state created in part of the territory of historical Palestine in May 1948, as a national home for the Jewish people.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni: Figurehead of the 1979 Iranian revolution, a Shi'a cleric in exile from 1964. He became the supreme leader of the country after the Revolution, and stayed in this position until his death in June 1989.

Krypton's Affair: During 1989, in the wake of the British Customs success in preventing the transfer of "super-gun" components to Iraq, the Iraqis did succeed in acquiring some Krypton timers which are essential to the proper operation of nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein made the news of the Iraqi success public at a major Arab nationalist conference in Baghdad, as demonstration of Iraqi determination to pursue what it considered its legitimate security objectives.

Kurdish autonomous region (KAR): The three Governorates in the North of the country that are now under local and UN administration. Acknowledged by Security Council Resolutions to be a part of Iraq. Also known as Iraqi Kurdistan.

Kurdish people: Ethnic group living in parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey.

Lebanon: Multi-confessional state on the Eastern Mediterranean, created in its modern form by the French in the 1920s to ensure Christian predominance.

Levant: a slightly archaic term for the islands in and countries neighbouring the Eastern Mediterranean.

Literacy Rate: A standard measures of national educational attainment;

the percentage of the population to have passed some measure of literacy. A variety of measures are used.

Local purchasing: The purchase by an aid programme of goods and services local to the region in which they are working. Local purchasing arrangements are preferred by aid programmes when they are possible as they support the affected population's economy, essential to the population's ability to recover from crisis. In contrast, as aid is usually given freely to an affected population, purchases from abroad may further damage the population by requiring that the domestic economy compete with free imports.

Mahram: Male escort for Muslim woman, either husband, or close male relative.

Manhattan Project 1943: US nuclear bomb project in which many of the effects of uranium on humans were investigated including the affects of Depleted Uranium.

Marsh Arabs: Common name for ethnic group of Shi'a Muslims living in the marshes of Southern Iraq.

Marsh Areas: Flat area in southern Iraq. Following the 1991 civil war, this inaccessible area was used as a refuge from the government of Iraq. The government of Iraq has consequently drained large parts of the marshes, destroying much of this unique ecosystem, and has converted some of the land to agricultural purposes.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 1992: A document which the Iraqi Government wanted all NGOs to sign in 1992 which would allow them to continue to work in Central and Southern Iraq on the condition that they do not work in the Northern Governorates. All but Oxfam and Care (Australia) did not sign the memorandum- Oxfam has since withdrawn from central and southern Iraq.

Ministry of Defence (MoD): UK Ministry for defence.

Yitzak Mordechai: Senior Israeli Minister in the Netanyahu and Barak cabinets, serving most prominently as Defence Minister from 1996 to 1999, before he resigned after rows with Netanyahu, and took the lead of the new Centre Party. He is of Iraqi Kurdish origins.

Mossad: Israeli secret service.

Hosni Mubarak: President of Egypt since the October 1981 assassination

of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat. He has strongly allied himself with the US after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

National Co-ordination Meetings (NCM): Meetings of UK groups opposed to the non-military sanctions on Iraq. The first was held in Cambridge in December 1998; they have continued at roughly six week intervals. The National Petition (see below) was a project of the NCMs.

National Petition: A petition launched by eleven UK organisations on the ninth anniversary of the imposition of sanctions, August 2 1999. It called for the lifting of the non-military sanctions on Iraq.

Nationalist Revolution 1958: Overthrow of monarchy by a wide variety of Iraqi nationalist and communist groups in February 1958, led by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, and the creation of Republic in Iraq.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): Defensive military alliance founded in 1949 as a response to the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellite Eastern European states. Its original members included USA, Britain, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands. Other European states such as the Republic of Germany and France joined later. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact it has redefined its role to enable a response to the instabilities of the former Soviet Union. The first time NATO troops were deployed under UN leadership was in the Bosnian civil war 1992-1995, and NATO was responsible for the bombing of Serbia in 1999.

Binyamin Netanyahu: Prime Minister of Israel from May 1996 until the early elections of May 1999. From the extreme right-wing Likud party, he resigned leadership of the party on losing the election.

New world order: A term coined by President George Bush in a period of post-Gulf War euphoria for the post-Cold War era in which the spirit of internationalism is preserved through the United Nations and supported by the remaining superpower, the United States.

NGO Working Group: Group within the United Nations responsible for liaison with Non-Government Organisations.

Non-governmental Organisation (NGO): Any organisation within civil society working for development.

No Objection Procedure: The procedure used by the Sanctions Committee, whereby if any member of the Committee objects to materials that are

proposed to be exported to Iraq, the supplying contract will be rejected or put on hold. Until recently the decisions of the Sanctions Committee have not been made public. This lack of transparency has led to charges of abuse and delays in supply of humanitarian goods to Iraq.

No-Fly Zones: Zones in the north and the south of Iraq set up by the US, UK and French governments in 1991 and 1992, respectively; the southern zone was unilaterally extended towards Baghdad by the US government in September 1996. The US and the UK prevent Iraqi aircraft from flying in these zones (France no longer supports them); they do permit Turkish aircraft to attack Turkish Kurdish guerrillas in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is permitted as the planes patrolling the northern zone fly out of Turkey's Incirlik air force base.

Northern Governorates: see Kurdish autonomous region.

Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical weapons (NBC):. Also known as ABC weapons (atomic, biological and chemical) or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT): One of the main international conventions to come into effect in 1971 in which signatory states, which numbered 186 in mid-1997, and of which Iraq is one, promise not to develop nuclear weapons in return for the promise of extensive help in developing peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Also, the nuclear weapons states accept a commitment to begin negotiations to bring about complete nuclear disarmament.

Office of the Iraq Programme: UN office based in New York to co-ordinate UN programmes pertaining to Iraq.

Oil Crisis: In common usage this refers to the rise in oil prices following the agreement of OPEC countries in 1973 which had extensive economic impact world-wide.

Oil-For-Food Programme (OFF): The programme initiated by SCR 986 (April 1995). It allowed Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil in order to settle compensation claims resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, pay for the running of UN programmes in Iraq, and import supplies to meet some of its humanitarian needs. The programme has expanded with time so that, as of 31 January 2000, Iraq had sold US $21 billion of oil, allowing delivery of US $6 billion in humanitarian supplies. The Oil-for-Food programme operates in 180 day Phases, at the end of which the

Security Council typically extends it for another 180 days. Phase VII began on 12 December 1999.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): The body created by the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 to oversee its implementation. Following states' declaration of their chemical facilities, they are inspected and certified by the OPWC.

Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC): The predominantly Middle Eastern cartel established in 1960.

Operation Desert Fox: Name of 17 - 20 December 1998 US/UK bombing campaign against Iraq.

Operation Desert Storm: Name of action taken by allied forces in the Gulf War in 1991.

Ottoman Empire: A dynastic empire originating in north-west Anatolia in the 15th Century it expanded to the Eastern Arab world, most of North Africa and Eastern Europe. Gradually driven out of Europe and declining in power, it joined the Axis powers in the First World War. After surrendering in 1918, it was occupied by the Allies who divided the territories between themselves in the San Remo conference of April 1920. The Ottoman Empire was formally dissolved in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Palestine: The territory on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, which reached its current form under the British mandate from 1923. It was divided on the recommendation of a UN Special Committee from 1947, with some 77.4% becoming the State of Israel. It has been fully occupied by Israel from 1967.

Phase VII: The most recent phase of the Oil-for-Food Programme which began on the 12th December 1999.

Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi: Leader of Libya since September 1969.

Qasim: 'Abd al-Karim Qasim: Led the nationalist revolt in Iraq against the monarchy in February 1958, and became president of Iraq. Initially supported by a wide range of factions, he came to rely more on the support of the Communist Party of Iraq and ethnic minority groups, and persecuted members of the Ba'th party. Saddam Hussein was part of an assassination attempt on him in 1959 and was forced into exile. He was finally overthrown by a Ba'thist coup in February 1963, and was executed

by firing squad.

Red Line Agreement: An agreement that controlled Western interests in oil in the Middle East after the Second World War. Only colonial powers that had interests there during the time of the Ottoman Empire could continue exploitation of the reserves.

Revolutionary Command Council: The central governing committee in Iraq.

Salah al-Din: Legendary warrior, of Kurdish origins, who fought against the Crusaders. His origins in the village of Takrit have been extensively exploited by Saddam Hussein's regime, to claim an equation of the bravery of the two 'warriors' who come from the same place.

Sanctions Committee: A committee composed of all Security Council members to manage and evaluate a UN sanctions regime. Often referred to by the Resolution establishing them; the Sanctions Committee for Iraq is therefore the 661 Committee.

Sanctions: A broad term for a penalty or a counter-measure. Particular types of sanctions include cutting diplomatic ties, arms embargoes freezing bank accounts of decision makers in a target state, assassination or comprehensive economic embargoes.

Schindler Passports: Colloquial name for expensive exit visas from Iraq.

General Norman Schwarzkopf: Commander in chief of the Allied forces in the Gulf War.

Scott Report: Parliamentary investigation by Sir Richard Scott into the selling of weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war by UK companies. Found apparent government permission, in violation of the UK arms embargo.

SCR 660 (2 August 1990): The Security Council resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding its immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

SCR 661 (6 August 1990): The resolution imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq.

SCR 678 (29 November 1990): The resolution authorising the use of "all necessary means" to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Military action to restore Kuwait's sovereignty would have been legal without SCR 678 as

self-defence is permitted under international law but SCR 678 was perceived to add legitimacy to military action.

SCR 686 (2 March 1991): The resolution passed immediately after the Gulf War; it sets out the terms for a cease-fire.

SCR 687 (3 April 1991): A long resolution that began the cease-fire, established UNSCOM, extended sanctions and, in paragraphs 21 and 22, provided ambiguous conditions for lifting or easing them.

SCR 688 (5 April 1991): A resolution condemning "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population" in the post-war civil war and demanding "that Iraq ... immediately end this repression".

SCR 986 (14 April 1995): See Oil-for-Food Programme.

SCR 1284 (17 December 1999): Another long resolution replacing UNSCOM with UNMOVIC (see below), demanding Iraqi co-operation on prisoners of war, altering the Oil-for-Food programme, and discussing the possible suspension of sanctions, again in ambiguous terms. France, Russia and China abstained from voting on it in the Security Council and Iraq has rejected it.

Second Humanitarian Panel Report: See Amorim Panels.

Security Council (UNSC): The United Nations with primary responsibility under the UN Charter for maintaining "international peace and security". It is composed of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, often called the P5) and ten non-permanent members, each of which serves a two year term.

Security Council Resolution (SCR): A statement of resolve by the UN Security Council. Motions require a majority of votes to pass but fail if any of the permanent 5 members vote against it. SCRs are not binding on the Security Council: it may alter its previous decisions by passage of subsequent resolutions.

Shatt al-Arab: Waterway between Iraq and Iran into the Persian Gulf.

Shi'a Islam: A denomination of Islam, with adherents believing that the legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad are to be traced through the line of descent from his cousin and son-in-law ʻAli. Shi'ism is internally divided: main Shiʻa denominations in the Middle East are the Twelvers, the Ismaʻilis, the Zaydis and the ʻAlawites. Shiʻa Muslims form between 60% and 65% of the Muslim community of Iraq.

Sunni Islam: A denomination of Islam which has the most adherents world-wide (around 72% of all Muslims). It recognises the successors to the prophet Muhammad without insisting that these had to be his descendants. It is divided into several schools including the Shafii, the Maliki and the Hanafi. It is the religion of many of the Arab countries, the Ba'th party and the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq.

Super-gun Affair: The "super-gun" was a massive smooth bore weapon capable of throwing ballistic shells over great distances which Iraq planned to build (ostensibly for aiming at Iran) in the 1980s. Iraq lacked the specialist metal-working skills needed to manufacture the weapon, so contracts for its manufacture were let throughout Europe. British Customs became suspicious of the pieces produced in Britain and eventually uncovered the whole affair in 1989-90, thus blocking the project's completion, much to Iraqi anger. Dr Bull, the designer of the weapon, was killed in Belgium by suspected Mossad assassins.

Sykes-Picot Agreement: An unofficial understanding reached in May 1916 between representatives of the French and British governments on how to divide up the Eastern sector of the Ottoman Empire after its occupation. It was substantiated in the San Remo conference and Mandate system which followed the end of the First World War. Although initially secret, the details came into the hands of the Russian revolutionaries in November 1917, and were published widely in the Arab world.

Takrit: A small town in Iraq, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein.

Tigris: One of Iraq's two principle rivers. See Euphrates.

Trigger mechanism: Specialist expression to refer to the steps that the government of Iraq must take for economic sanctions to be lifted.

Umma: A classical term for the community of Muslim believers bound together by religion. In modern Arabic, the term is also used to denote the nation.

UN Boundary Commission: Body established by SCR 687 to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border

UN Convention on Rights of the Child: Treaty on the Child Rights opened for signature in November 1989, and ratified by every state in the world except the United States and Somalia. It is the most widely ratified treaty in history

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): The UN's principal organ for international development.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): UN body responsible for refugees.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): UN body with principal responsibility for child welfare.

UNICEF Child and Maternal Mortality Study: First independent assessment of child and maternal mortality undertaken in Iraq since 1991. UNICEF reported in August 1999 that the mortality rate of children under-five had more than doubled in South/Central Iraq but had decreased slightly in Iraqi Kurdistan since sanctions imposition. As a result, UNICEF estimated that 500,000 more children under five died in Iraq than would have had Iraq's mortal rate continued to decline as it had in the 1980s.

Unipolar world: Expression used to describe the post-Cold War world which is dominated by a single super-power.

United Nation Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC): The new weapons inspection agency created by SCR 1284 to replace UNSCOM.

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM): The unit created by SCR 687 to oversee United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq. Their stormy relationship with Iraq ended on 16 December 1998 when their Executive Chairman, Richard Butler, withdrew them from Iraq, the day before the US and the UK began bombing. It is generally accepted that Butler was taking orders from Washington rather than from the Security Council, his official boss. The Iraqi government did not allow their return. Revelations that UNSCOM was used by various countries to spy on Iraq left it completely discredited.

Max Van Der Stoel: the United Nations Human Rights Rapporteur for Iraq from 1991 to November 1999, when he resigned. Following his initial critical report on the practices of the government of Iraq he has been denied access to Iraq. He has continued to issue reports strongly critical of the Iraqi government's human rights record, largely on the basis of reports from members of Iraqi opposition groups.

Voices in the Wilderness (UK) (VitW): Prominent UK anti-sanctions group breaking sanctions by taking medicine and food supplies into Iraq

without a license while announcing their intentions to the British Government. They do this to draw attention to the effects of sanctions.

Hans Von Sponeck: The second UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Iraq who resigned in March 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): See Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons.

West Bank: The Eastern territories of historical Palestine that were occupied in 1948 and annexed in 1950 by Transjordan to become the West Bank of the new Kingdom of Jordan. This area was occupied by Israel in 1967, and is now partly under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

World Food Programme (WFP): United Nations agency responsible for food issues.

Zionism: Political movement dating from the late 19th Century, especially under the leadership of Theodor Herzl and the World Zionist Movement. Its predominant aims have been to create and sustain a Jewish State, and from the early 20th Century, its efforts have concentrated on the historical territory of Palestine.

1991 Uprising: The uprising against the administration of Saddam Hussein which engulfed the country and nearly toppled the government after the Gulf War in 1991. Notoriously, Allied inaction allowed the government of Iraq to brutally suppress it.

661 Committee: See Sanctions Committee.